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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HUMAN CAPITAL
By
SAMUEL ASARE
MAY, 2021
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three essays. The overarching objectives are to provide causal evidence of the effects of health insurance program from Ghana, charter
school in the United States (U.S.), and economic conditions in the U.S. on healthcare
utilization, health behaviors and human capital development.
Chapter 1 uses the Demographic and Health Survey to study the healthcare utilization effects of Ghana’s 2004 adoption of a national health insurance scheme (NHIS),
covering over 95% of medical expenditures. First, we find that self-reported participation in the NHIS increases twelve-month healthcare visits by 32 percentage points using
the timing of the rollouts across districts as an instrument. We also show that the positive effect is larger for less-educated, poor, and rural women. Second, we find that the
NHIS increases deliveries in health facilities and prenatal care visits by 6 and 7 percentage points, respectively, using a difference-in-differences strategy and women from
rural Nigeria as the control group. Together, these findings are consistent with evidence
from similar programs in developed countries despite numerous implementation challenges and relatively low take-up of the NHIS.
In Chapter 2, we examine the impacts of exposure to charter schools on students’
long-term outcomes using the restricted, geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of

Youth data and school information from the National Center for Education Statistics.
We use an instrumental variable method by constructing charter school exposure in the
county of birth as an instrument for actual exposure in the county of residence. Our results suggest strong evidence of charter schools increasing four-year college completion
and reducing adverse health behaviors. We also show evidence of heterogeneity. While
college graduations are more pronounced among females and minorities, the reduction
in binge drinking and cigarette smoking is higher among minorities and high-educated
individuals. Overall, our results demonstrate that charter schools improve students’
long-term outcomes.
Finally, Chapter 3 uses individual-level data from the 1987–2019 Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System and state-level employment data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics to estimate the effects of macroeconomic conditions on cigarette smoking. We
find that a one-point increase in the employment rate raises the current cigarette smoking rate by 0.4%. We also show heterogeneity among males, Blacks and low-educated
individuals having larger impacts but no differential effects by age. A dynamic treatment effect analysis demonstrates that the procyclical relationship is declining and unstable over time, with a sharp temporal decrease during the Great Recession period
and a weak countercyclical effect in 2019. Overall, the results suggest that future adverse macroeconomic shocks will increase cigarette smoking, contrary to studies that
demonstrate healthy living in bad economic times.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is in three parts intended to understand how health system interventions, education policies, and the changing macroeconomic conditions affect medical care use, education as a component of human capital, and health behaviors. Policymakers worldwide make policy interventions to influence people’s choices to improve
their welfare. Understanding how the relevant populations respond or are affected by
such policies requires rigorous empirical analyses to show their effects convincingly due
to data limitations and several methodological challenges. This dissertation evaluates
a government-subsidized health insurance scheme from a developing country on healthcare use. The program was intended to correct market failures in the healthcare delivery system. We also estimate the impacts of charter school laws on students’ long-term
education and health behaviors. The state-level policy intervention makes approved K12 schools operate independently without interference from local and state education
boards. Besides these policy interventions, this dissertation also explores how individuals’ health behaviors change dues to the changing macroeconomic conditions.
The first essay (i.e., Chapter 1) estimates the causal effect of Ghana’s National
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), covering over 95% of medical costs,1 on healthcare
utilization among women of childbearing ages 15–49. Ghana implemented the NHIS
nationwide with a district-level staggered rollout from 2004–2007. Estimating the causal
effects of the NHIS on health outcomes is interesting for the following reasons. First,
the purpose of the NHIS was to increase access to healthcare by removing the “cash
and carry” system to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of reducing child mor1 See

more from http://www.nhis.gov.gh/benefits.aspx.

1

tality and improving maternal health. Under the “cash and carry” system,2 individuals
needed to pay for their healthcare utilization’s full user-cost. Second, the government
sold the insurance below its actuarially fair prices, subsidizing it for participants and
making it free for several vulnerable groups, including pregnant women and children,
through a 2.5% NHIS tax on goods and services, funding about 70% of the program’s
costs. Therefore, it is interesting to examine how people respond to health insurance in
developing countries. Third, implementation issues in the NHIS create methodological challenges in teasing out its causal effects on different outcomes. Characterized
by national coverage, universal eligibility, voluntary participation, and sharp rollouts
across districts, the design of the NHIS creates endogeneity issues. Another identification challenge is that a pre-post comparison using non-experimental data is ineffectual
in isolating its causal effect from the general time trend due to the universal eligibility and national rollout. Finally, although there is a vast body of literature on similar
programs from developed countries, only a few studies have attempted to estimate the
causal impact of Ghana’s NHIS on healthcare utilization. Studying health insurance
programs from developing countries is interesting because they can be different from
those in developed countries due to several factors, including political environments,
institutions, beliefs, and culture, affecting take-up decisions and healthcare utilization
behavior. This chapter of the dissertation fills the gap in the literature by focusing on
the NHIS from Ghana.
We present evidence on the causal impact of the NHIS on a variety of outcomes
using the Standard Demographic and Health Survey and quasi-experimental methods
that overcome prior methodological challenges. Our outcomes are twelve-month health2 See

more from http://www.nhis.gov.gh/nhisreview.aspx.
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care use, prenatal care visits, and births in health facilities in this chapter. We leverage the district-level staggered rollout of the NHIS coverage as an exogenous source of
variation to address the potential endogeneity in the NHIS take-up decisions. For the
twelve-month care-seeking outcome observed only in the survey years, we employ an
instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy. We use the years of eligibility as an instrument for actual insurance participation. Using rural Nigeria as one control group,
we use a difference-in-differences estimation framework for the births in health facilities
and prenatal visits that are available retrospectively in all years. Our findings are that
the NHIS increases twelve months healthcare utilization, institutional births, and prenatal care visits among women of childbearing ages by about 32, 6, and 7 percentage
points, respectively. They correspond to about 66%, 18%, and 19% increase at their
baseline means, respectively. We also demonstrate that the NHIS has heterogeneous
impacts in favor of poor, low-educated, and rural women.
In Chapter 2, we study the long-term effects of charter school exposure on education and health outcomes in the United States. Excessive alcohol consumption and
cigarette smoking are two health behaviors we consider. Two decades after the inception of charter schools in the U.S., we know little about their long-term impacts. Additionally, few studies have examined charter school exposure effects on students’ educational outcomes using nationwide data. We use the National Center for Education
Statistics and the restricted, geocoded data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLYS) to fill this gap. Because the NLSY data did not have charter school information before 2003 but has state and county of births and residence as geographic
identifiers, we link the school- and individual-level information at the county level. By
exploiting variation in birth cohort, county of birth, and county of residence, we con3

struct and use charter school exposure in the county of birth as an instrument for actual exposure in the county of residence. This enables us to address endogeneity bias
since students could be making location choices based on charter school opening and
attenuation bias since people do not live in their county of birth perpetually. We find
strong evidence of charter school exposure increasing four-year college completion. Our
results are more pronounced when we restrict our sample to include only those who already graduated from high school. We also find that charter school exposure reduces
excessive alcohol consumption (binge drinking) and cigarette smoking. Finally, we find
evidence of heterogeneity in the charter schools’ impacts. While four-year college graduations are larger among females and minorities (i.e., Black and Hispanics), the reduction in binge drinking and cigarette smoking is higher among minorities and higheducated individuals. Our findings from this chapter demonstrate that charter school
policies have long-term impacts on students’ outcomes.
Chapter 3 estimates the impact of economic conditions on cigarette smoking.
Although some previous literature reports substantial procyclical effects, suggesting
lifestyles get healthier during bad economic times (Ruhm, 2000, 2005; Xu, 2013), updated results with long-run data, including the Great Recession period, are sparse. Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from 1987–2017 and employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we leverage variation in overtime
state-level employment rates to estimate its effects on cigarette smoking. Though we
find that similar estimates shown in Ruhm (2005), we also show that the impacts are
widely driven by the older cohorts in our data and demonstrate evidence of attenuation bias toward countercyclical effects in the recent data. We present evidence of an
imprecise zero estimate in 2019, just before the famous coronavirus pandemic, despite
4

the large sample of individuals used in our estimations. We also show that the procyclical relationship between smoking and economic conditions declined drastically during
the Great Recession period. Therefore, we expect a countercyclical relationship during
the coronavirus pandemic season, suggesting that cigarette smoking will increase as the
economy deteriorates. Finally, we find evidence of differential effects by race, gender,
and education.
The rest of this dissertation is organized to provide detailed information on the
backgrounds of policies, existing studies, conceptual frameworks, empirical strategies,
data, results, and conclusions of each chapter.
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Chapter 1
Health Insurance Provision and Women’s Healthcare
Utilization: Evidence from the National Health Insurance
Scheme in Ghana

1.1

Introduction
Low healthcare utilization is an issue in developing countries. It likely leads to

high maternal and infant mortality. Several countries implemented health insurance
programs between 2001 and 2015, under the guidance and support of organizations
such as the United Nations, United States Agency for International Development, and
the World Health Organization. One such country was Ghana, which suffered from
market failures under the traditional “cash-and-carry” system.1 The government of
Ghana, in late 2003, passed into law a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and
started district-level rollouts in early 2004.2 Before the NHIS, there were growing concerns regarding healthcare access because of the high incidence of home deliveries, low
prenatal and postnatal care visits, self-medication, and the substitution of formal healthcare utilization for visits to traditional doctors and pastors as cheaper alternatives.
This study estimates the causal effect of the NHIS on healthcare utilization among
women of childbearing ages (15 − 49). We limit our outcomes to any healthcare visits in
the last twelve months, any births in health facilities (or institutional births), and any
prenatal care visits in the first four months of pregnancy. Studying the impact of the
1 Under the “cash-and-carry” system, consumers pay the full user cost of healthcare utilization. We discuss more of
this system in Section 1.3.
2 Districts, which are the third administrative division of Ghana, made rollout decisions during the rollout period.
Therefore, even though the first district implemented the NHIS in March 2004, some district delayed rollout until April
2007.
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NHIS on women’s utilization behavior is essential because it provides evidence on the
extent to which the NHIS could help Ghana achieve the MDG goals of reducing child
mortality (Cesur et al., 2017; Currie and Gruber, 1996) and improving maternal health.

Figure 1.1. Trend of NHIS Coverage Rate in Ghana, 2010 − 2014
Source: Nsiah-Boateng and Aikins (2018)

Another important reason for studying the causal impact of the NHIS on healthcare utilization is that instituting health insurance in a developing country is challenging and sometimes unsuccessful irrespective of the program’s level of generosity. Grossman’s demand for health model suggests that as the price of health investment input
falls, their demands rise, increasing health investments (Grossman, 1972). It indicates
that government provision of cheap health insurance to places with limited health inputs and high healthcare costs reduces medical care’s expected costs. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect a massive take-up of health insurance as a form of investment.
7

However, this has not always been the case in many developing countries. Sometimes
insurance programs don’t get implemented in African countries, and if they are, they
are mostly not administered in a way that makes them work.3 In the case of Ghana,
even though the government sells the NHIS below the actuarially fair price, we observe low insurance coverage rates, as demonstrated in Figure 1.1. In this paper, we
document the reasons for the low take-up of the NHIS and show how the NHIS induces
healthcare utilization among women of childbearing ages in the presence of the numerous implementation challenges.4
The study uses instrumental variable (IV) and difference-in-differences (DID)
methodologies. For the IV strategy, we use the timing of the rollouts across districts
in Ghana to construct an instrument for NHIS participation to address the endogeneity concerns. Because districts independently made the participation decisions, there is
variation in the timing of implementation (i.e., district-level staggered rollouts).5 Using
the instrument, we jointly model the decision to enroll in the NHIS and the outcome
of any twelve-month healthcare visits. For the DID research design, we use rural Nigeria as a control group and the variation in the district-staggered rollouts to estimate
the causal effect of the NHIS on institutional births and prenatal care visits. For most
children in our sample, we do not have information on their mothers’ insurance participation in utero and at birth. Since the individuals from rural Nigeria were less likely
to be affected by a similar health insurance program, we use them to complement the
Ghanaian children to allow us to use the DID strategy.
3 For

example, Nigeria introduced the NHIS in 1999 but was unsuccessful (Monye, 2006).

4 The

NHIS faces several challenges, which affect the participation rate. We discuss in Section 1.3 that factors that
lead to low enrollment rates include household credit constraints, availability of informal healthcare and social networks,
scarce supply-side factors, and cultural practices.
5 We provide a detailed discussion of the NHIS and the rollout processes in Section 1.3 and demonstrate that the
rollout of the NHIS across districts and over time are exogenous to the districts’ pre-treatment outcomes and characteristics in Section 1.6.
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We use the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), available in several developing countries, as an individual-level data source. We pool the 2003, 2008, and 2014 survey waves for Ghana and 2003, 2008, and 2013 survey waves for Nigeria. Our samples
consist of women of ages 15−49 and under five-year-old children born from 1999−2013,
covering several periods of economic cycles, including the Great Recession. We also utilize administrative information on the dates of certificates of commencement of the
NHIS in each district. We link the district-level information on policy dates to the
individual-level data sets to define the instrument as years of exposure to the NHIS
in their residential district at the survey interview date. Our final samples range from
15, 000 − 47, 000, depending on the outcome.
Our results are as follows. From our IV model, we find that the NHIS increases
women’s probability of utilizing healthcare within twelve months by approximately 32
percentage points. Relative to a baseline mean of 47.7%, the estimate corresponds to
66% increase. Using the IV strategy, we also demonstrate that the NHIS has heterogeneous impacts on women with different demographic characteristics and locations. We
find that the NHIS has differential effects in favor of poor women, rural women, and
women with lower educational attainments.
The second set of results, which come from the DID models, suggests that the
NHIS increases institutional births and prenatal care visits by about 5.7 and 6.6 percentage points, corresponding to 18.8% and 18.2% increase relative to the baseline
means of 30.6% and 36.4%, respectively. We also provide event study analysis to show
how the timing of the rollouts of the NHIS across districts leads to differential effects
over time. We find that the NHIS has statistically significant impacts after three years
of national coverage. Even though all areas in our sample implemented the NHIS be9

fore April 2007, we still do not find consistent increases in healthcare utilization until
2010. Thus, unlike similar programs from advanced countries that experience early impacts on healthcare utilization, our results are consistent with those from developing
countries with little to no effect on healthcare utilization in their early stages.6
Our final set of results shows the impact of the free maternal care policy on institutional births and prenatal care visits. We find that the law increases deliveries in
health facilities and prenatal care visits by approximately 26%. But we argue that the
intent-to-treat effect could be larger if all the eligible women obtained NHIS coverage.
Although our DID strategy assumes that all the qualified women received treatment,
less than one-half of those who were pregnant at the interview date reported having
NHIS coverage post the free maternal care policy.
This study makes four contributions to the literature. Since its inception, many
studies have analyzed the impacts of the NHIS on different outcomes.7 Some of these
studies failed to address potential endogeneity concerns in the NHIS. Consequently,
they do not make any causal interpretations of their findings. Similar to other health
insurance programs elsewhere with endogeneity issues (Einav et al., 2013; Simon, 2005;
Sapelli and Vial, 2003), Yilma et al. (2012) document evidence of moral hazards in the
NHIS. Other studies that examined the causal effect of the NHIS have either methodological challenges, data limitations with external validity concerns, or focused on different populations of interest (e.g., under five-year-old children).
As our first contribution, we address critical methodological issues regarding the
6 For example, in the US, the Oregon health insurance experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2012) and the Affordable care
Act (Courtemanche et al., 2017) affected healthcare utilization in their early stages. In developing countries [for example, the case of the Chinese cooperative medical scheme (Wagstaff and Yu, 2007)], universal healthcare coverage had
little impact on the use of services in their initial implementation stages. But the NHIS in Taiwan is an exceptional program. Studies show that the take-up was high. It also affected healthcare utilization a few years after its implementation
(Chen et al., 2007).
7 Examples of these studies include Dzakpasu et al. (2012); Ansah et al. (2009); Brugiavini and Pace (2016);
Abrokwah et al. (2019); Mensah et al. (2010); Abrokwah et al. (2014); Powell-Jackson et al. (2014); Bonfrer et al. (2016);
Agbanyo (2020).
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endogeneity of health insurance choice and the design of the NHIS to interpret our estimates causally. By design, the NHIS participation is endogenous. Because of universal eligibility and voluntary participation, individuals with poor health expected to be
sicker are more likely to enroll in the NHIS. Such people are more likely to self-select
to obtain coverage and utilize healthcare excessively. Besides, behavioral responses in
the form of ex-ante and ex-post moral hazards can be additional issues in the NHIS.
In the absence of cost-sharing measures and cap on healthcare utilization after gaining
coverage, participants of the NHIS can engage in risky behaviors, underinvest in other
health inputs, or use healthcare excessively. Another issue from the design of the NHIS
is that since everyone is eligible and rollouts across districts were sharp, it renders any
pre-post comparison using non-experimental data ineffectual in isolating the causal effect of the NHIS from the general time trend.8 Without accounting for these concerns,
we cannot interpret our results causally. Our empirical strategies and data allow us to
address the endogeneity concerns and disentangle the causal effect of the NHIS from
time trends.
Second, we contribute by studying how people respond to health insurance policies in developing countries. Contrary to the vast body of literature on public health
insurance programs in developed countries, we do not have enough evidence from different programs from developing countries to make conclusions about the impacts of
health insurance on utilization (Abrokwah et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2007). In underdeveloped nations, several factors, including lack of health facilities, political and institutional settings, and culture, can influence people to make sub-optimal choices. This
study provides evidence from Ghana’s adoption of the NHIS, which faces most of these
8 Several surveys in Ghana occurred either before or after the rollout period. The implication is that all the people
had no coverage in the pre-NHIS period, and every individual in Ghana was eligible in the post-NHIS period. Therefore,
there is no variation in the treatment of the NHIS across districts over time in these surveys.
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challenges.9 Additionally, our results from the NHIS in Ghana can be useful to policymakers from other developing countries without health insurance programs and those
with but are unsuccessful. Since many African countries have no health insurance programs, the NHIS in Ghana can guide them.10 Our causal estimates from the NHIS in
Ghana can help policymakers in these countries to make informed decisions, minimizing
uncertainties, if they decide to implement a similar healthcare policy.
Another important aspect of the study is that we provide the most credible causal
estimates on the NHIS by overcoming possible misreporting in self-reported insurance
participation.11 In the absence of administrative data, studies rely on self-reported
NHIS participation information in surveys subject to possible misreporting. Because
the literature has demonstrated that the bias in a misreported-binary program participation variable is nontrivial (Wossen et al., 2019; Nguimkeu et al., 2019; Battistin
and Sianesi, 2011), we take measures to overcome it. For the instrument used in the IV
model, our data sets allow us to define NHIS participation to include only the women
with verified valid NHIS cards. We argue in Section 1.6 that, unlike similar studies
on the NHIS with misreporting concerns (Mensah et al., 2010; Bonfrer et al., 2016;
Abrokwah et al., 2014, 2019), our definition of NHIS participation enables us to replicate the trends in national enrollment rates shown in Figure 1.1. It suggests that our
estimates would be biased if we included women without verified NHIS cards.
Finally, we focus on the healthcare utilization outcomes of women and children
9 Although there are many studies on social health insurance programs from developed countries, Ghana cannot
adapt their estimates due to the differences in the levels of need and other factors. Moreover, this study is also relevant
in developed countries due to disparities in geographic characteristics, demography, and economic conditions. In developed countries, programs like the NHIS could have differential treatments across different demographic groups. If the
targeted population is similar to the Ghanaian people, then the causal estimates from the NHIS can be reasonably inferred. Therefore, policymakers in developed countries can also learn from programs in underdeveloped nations if they
have a similar targeted population.
10 For example, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, and Zambia do not have any health insurance programs.
11 A misclassification of NHIS participation occurs when some individuals report treatment status, that is, report
being covered by the NHIS when they are not (“false positives”) or report as uninsured when they have NHIS coverage
(“false negatives”).
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since insurance is particularly for these groups for the following reasons. One reason
is that they were the sub-groups of the population in Ghana who were most vulnerable before implementing the NHIS. Hence, we expect that the highest impacts of the
NHIS would be among such sub-population. Because infant and maternal mortality
were high and maternal healthcare utilization was extremely low, we focus on these
groups to understand how insurance changed their utilization behavior. Consequently,
the NHIS was designed with different generosity levels, which favored most women and
children as described in detail in Section 1.3. Another reason why focusing on child and
maternal healthcare use is important is that because they have long-run consequences
on health, as demonstrated in the case of other health insurance programs such as the
Medicaid in the US (Miller and Wherry, 2019; Boudreaux et al., 2016). We also argue that because household assets and decision-making power are controlled mostly by
men, putting women and children at a disadvantage, the NHIS is expected to improve
their health outcomes significantly. Even with some women’s healthcare utilization decisions, some households still have men making choices. On the economic side, the unemployment rate among women is high compared to men in Ghana, putting them at
a disadvantage to afford the NHIS. For example, in 2014, the DHS survey estimated
that past twelve months unemployment rate among women was about 23%, while that
of men was approximately 14%. Lastly, the data used in this study does not provide
healthcare utilization information for men, limiting us to focus on only women and children.
We structure the article as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief literature review
on the effects of the NHIS on healthcare utilization. We provide background information of the NHIS and discuss the conceptual framework for understanding its impact as
13

well as possible factors that hinder take-up in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, we describe
the data for the study, followed by a full description of the empirical strategies used to
identify the causal impact of the NHIS on the outcomes in Section 1.5. We present our
results in Section 1.6 and conclude in Section 1.7.

1.2

Literature Review
Some studies show correlations between the NHIS and healthcare utilization (Chankova

et al., 2009; Dzakpasu et al., 2012; Brugiavini and Pace, 2016; Blanchet et al., 2012;
Agbanyo, 2020). Since these studies do not make any causal claims due to the endogeneity concerns in the NHIS that they fail to address, we do not discuss them in detail. As evidence of endogeneity in the NHIS, Yilma et al. (2012) find that households
with NHIS are less likely to invest in malaria preventative inputs. By obtaining full
NHIS coverage that makes malaria treatment free, they are less likely to own mosquito
bed nets and, even more so, are less likely to sleep under the nets. Also, the fact that
individuals voluntarily select into the NHIS, unobserved heterogeneity, including health
status, preferences, and risk behaviors, affect the decision to enroll in the NHIS and
health-seeking behaviors (Abrokwah et al., 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, we find only two articles on NHIS that relate to our
study in part. Both studies use district-level variation in the timing of NHIS rollout to
tackle endogeneity in NHIS participation.12 Abrokwah et al. (2014) estimate the effects
of the NHIS on prenatal care visits using two-parts models and finds that the NHIS
increases prenatal care visits. A limitation of their study is that they use data from
12 We also use a similar identification strategy. However, while these studies use a 0/1 IV for NHIS participation,
we improve by using the number of years of exposure to the NHIS before the interview dates. Several studies have used
staggered rollouts of programs as exogenous sources of variation to evaluate the program’s impact on outcomes of interest (Gruber and Hanratty, 1995; Ater et al., 2017).
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only the 2005/6 wave of the Ghana Living Standard Survey and restrict their sample
to a few women who were pregnant within one year before the survey interview date.
We overcome the external validity concerns of their study by using a large sample of
children from several districts in Ghana, born from 1999 − 2013. The second study,
Abrokwah et al. (2019), finds strong evidence that participation in the NHIS increases
formal and informal care use. Our study differs from Abrokwah et al. (2019) since we
estimate the impact of the NHIS on different and specific utilization outcomes.
Two studies use propensity score matching methodology but fail to convincingly
estimate the causal impact of the NHIS on healthcare utilization. Bonfrer et al. (2016)
study maternal healthcare utilization using the 2008 wave of the DHS survey data and
find that NHIS participation increases prenatal and postnatal care visits, but decreases
the number of unwanted pregnancies, and has no effect on child vaccination. A drawback in their study is the assumption that the mother’s enrollment status at the interview date is representative of their enrollment status during pregnancy among under
two-year-old children. They possibly misclassified NHIS participation and reported that
39.8% of the women in their sample had NHIS coverage. However, we use the same
data source to demonstrate that only 25% of the women had NHIS coverage in 2008.
The severity of their assumption is that standard errors-in-variable methods do not easily overcome non-classical measurement error that their misclassified binary endogenous
NHIS variable introduces into the models. We define insurance participation to include
only the women with verified valid NHIS cards to avoid measurement error concerns.13
One other study, Mensah et al. (2010), administered a survey to recruit 2, 000
women from two administrative regions of Ghana, but could only match a sample of
13 We

describe the data in detail in Section 1.4.
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625 of them to evaluate the impact of gaining health insurance on healthcare utilization. They find that the women who enroll in the NHIS are more likely to utilize prenatal care services and deliver in health facilities. Because the women recruited in the
survey come from only two of the ten administrative regions of Ghana, their sample
may not represent the Ghanaian population. Therefore, the external validity of their
estimates is a concern.
Using randomized control trials (RCTs), Ansah et al. (2009) and Powell-Jackson
et al. (2014) study the effects of free NHIS enrollment on healthcare utilization among
under five-year-old children.14 Powell-Jackson et al. (2014) find that the provision of
free NHIS increases the number of annual visits to clinics but reduces informal care
use and financial stress, including out-of-pocket spending and borrowing, but do not
affect the number of annual hospital visits and health outcomes of children. Ansah
et al. (2009) find similar results that providing children with free access to healthcare
through the NHIS increases formal healthcare utilization and decreases informal healthcare use. Our study differs from these studies in two ways. First, although both articles
use experimental data that may be preferred to survey data, the individuals from the
few poor rural districts are not representative of the Ghanaian population. Therefore,
external validity is a concern in their study. We use data from several districts, which
overcome the external validity concern. Second, these studies focus on the outcomes
of under five-year-old children. But we consider the utilization behavior of women age
15−49, which we expect the NHIS to affect differently compared to the under five-yearold children.
14 In an experiment, Powell-Jackson et al. (2014) provided randomly assigned treated households in one poor rural
district in Southern Ghana, with free healthcare by paying their enrollment fees for the NHIS. They then study the
children’s outcomes, including the use of healthcare, health status, and financial strain. Similarly, Ansah et al. (2009)
provided free health insurance to some children in two districts to compare their outcomes to those of the control group.
They then study the effects of free health insurance on anemia, healthcare utilization, and mortality.
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1.3

Program Overview and Conceptual Framework

1.3.1

The Political Economy of Ghana and the NHIS

Ghana is a West African country that shares a border with Burkina Faso to the
North, the Gulf of Guinea to the South, Togo to the East, and Cote d’Ivoire to the
West. It gained independence from the British in 1957 and faced a lot of political unrest until 1992. Since then, it has consistently and democratically voted every four
years and changed the ruling government every eight years.15 The estimated population of Ghana in 2018 was approximately 29.8 million, with an annual growth rate of
2.2%. Timber, gold, diamond, bauxite, oil, etc., are some of the natural resources endowed in Ghana, but more than 70% of its economically active population engages in
agriculture, forestry, and fishing (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). A significant part
of Ghana’s export commodities comes from cash crops, including cocoa, oil palm, and
cashew. Post-independence until the late 1980s, agricultural raw materials accounted
for more than 50% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP),16 but the service and industry sectors have become popular recently (Aryeetey and Fosu, 2003).
Financed by tax, the Ghanaian government, as part of its 10-year development
plan after independence in 1957, included an expansion of existing public health facilities, reduction of healthcare user fees, and in most cases, completely free healthcare
(Arhinful, 2003). But the private healthcare centers charged unsubsidized user fees.
Because of a series of political unrest between 1965 and 198217 and worsening economic
15 Starting from 1992, only two political parties have governed the country. The National Democratic Congress ruled
the country from 1993 - 2000, and 2009 - 2016, while the New Patriotic Party (NPP) ruled from 2001 - 2008, and 2017 date.
16 We demonstrate later that during the post-independent period until 2005, Ghana did not experience any significant
growth in its GDP per capita.
17 During

this period, military men overthrew governments, and successive governments killed prominent people.
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conditions, subsidizing the healthcare industry was not a sustainable policy option for
the government (Yevutsey and Aikins, 2010; Fusheini et al., 2012). After the period
of political instability, prolonged drought, widespread bush fires, declining agriculture,
and famine further worsened economic conditions. It forced Ghana to adopt the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment program
in 1983. The government of Ghana then cut down fiscal expenditure and abolished all
healthcare subsidies through the adjustment program (Ankomah, 2004; Fusheini et al.,
2012). The Ghanaian government instituted user fees of healthcare utilization to generate revenue to finance the industry. The charging of user fees continued through 1992
when another restructuring of the healthcare industry occurred to impose the full costs
of using public health services on consumers, a system popularly known as the “cash
and carry.” The cost of medical care upsurged and resulted in low participation in formal healthcare utilization. The majority of the Ghanaian residents substituted health
facility visits for alternatives, including self-medication, traditional medicine, and spiritual healing (Fusheini et al., 2012).18
With support from the United States Agency for International Development, the
Government of Ghana enacted and implemented the NHIS in early 2004 to address the
several issues that the “cash and carry” system created. Before instituting the NHIS,
private, employer-based, and community-based health insurance schemes existed but
were limited to a few areas.19 Approximately 3% of the Ghanaian population participated in all insurance programs, according to the DHS 2003 survey report. Over time,
enrollment in the NHIS has been increasing. Figure 1.1, which plots the trend of NHIS
18 Because of these issues, maternal and infant healthcare utilization services were low and maternal, and infant mortality was high. For example, only 25% of pregnant women had at least one antenatal care visit in 1998, and under
five-year-old mortality in Ghana is 108 deaths per 1, 000 live births (Ghana Statistical Service, 1999).
19 Atim et al. (2001) provide a list of all the communities with healthcare financing schemes before the implementation of the NHIS.
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coverage from 2010 − 2014, shows an increasing NHIS coverage over time.20 Part of the
reason is that the NHIS covers about 95% of all health issues and drugs in Ghana.21
The rollout of the NHIS occurred at the district level, which is the third administrative division of Ghana. Districts that wanted to participate in the NHIS needed at
least 2, 000 individuals to register initially, subject to review every six months. The
NHIS by design have two types of costs (i.e., renewable registration fee and annual
premium). All districts were initially required to charge premium based on the consumer’s “ability to pay” with the yearly registration fee and premium ranging from
₡7, 000 − ₡50, 000 [i.e., ¢77 − $5.52 in 2005 U.S. dollars]22 and ₡72, 000 − ₡480, 000
[i.e., $7.95 − $53.03 in 2005 U.S. dollars] (Abrokwah et al., 2019; Blanchet et al., 2012).
Because there were no formal ways of determining the income of participants, districts
decided to charge flat rates for both the premium and registration fees.23 Because districts made the participation decisions, rollouts were staggered from 2004 − 2007. While
some areas began to roll out the NHIS in 2004, others delayed until 2007.
Through the NHIS, the government of Ghana also tries to extend healthcare access to impoverished individuals. The policymakers use a non-linear subsidy structure
to divide the Ghanaian population into three groups. Individuals with mental disorders, indigents, and those on government cash transfer programs form one group and
are eligible for free NHIS coverage. As a complementary policy to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, the government of Ghana enacted a free maternal health
20 We

computed the annual coverage rate as the fraction of the population who were active participants.

21 Among

the items covered by the NHIS are malaria, asthma, diabetes, hypertension, free maternal care for pregnant
women, out-patient, in-patient services, oral health, eye care, healthy delivery, and complicated delivery. See more from
http://www.nhis.gov.gh/benefits.aspx
22 We used the 2005 average cedi (i.e., the old Ghanaian currency) to the U.S. dollar exchange rate of ₡9,051.95 =
$1. Ghana redenominated its cedi currency in July 2007 at a rate of ₡10,000=GH₡1.
23 Because many people in Ghana work in the informal sector and do not file taxes annually, it is almost impossible
to verify their self-reported income. Most districts charged a fixed premium of ₡72, 000 despite the income disparities
among participants (Abrokwah et al., 2014).
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policy in July 2008, which provides pregnant women free NHIS coverage to cover their
pregnancies, childbirths, and three months postpartum (Dalinjong et al., 2018). Second, the formal sector employees, Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) pensioners, adults over 70 years, and children under 18 years whose parents have
NHIS coverage form another group and receive a partial subsidy. They pay only the
registration fee and no premium for the NHIS. The rest of the population (i.e., informal
sector employees) form the last group and face the full price of the NHIS with no subsidy. Without any restrictions, all Ghanaian citizens are eligible for the NHIS so far as
it is available in their residential districts, and enrollment occurs throughout the year
with a waiting period of three months. Unlike the Affordable Care Act in the U.S., the
mandate arm of the NHIS requiring every Ghanaian resident to enroll in insurance is
ineffective since there is no penalty for those without coverage.
The formal sector employees pay only registration fees because the government of
Ghana deducts 2.5 percentage points of their SSNIT monthly contribution to fund the
NHIS. Aside from these sources of funds, the primary source of revenues for the NHIS
is taxation of goods and services. A national health insurance levy (NHIL) of 2.5% on
all goods and services under the Value Added Tax (VAT) funds the NHIS. Relative to
the total costs of implementing the NHIS, premium collection constitutes a small fraction of revenue. A large proportion of the NHIS revenue comes from the NHIL levy and
SSNIT contributions. For example, the total premium accounted for only 3.4%, while
the SSNIT contributions and NHIL levy generated 20.4% and 73.8%, respectively, of
the total revenue in 2014.24
24 The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) is responsible for managing all the funds of the insurance program. The NHIA compiles registration lists from districts, receives funds for the NHIS, and disburses
funds to health care providers. Also, the NHIA deposits all the funds into a central National Health Insurance
Fund (NHIF) and disburses proportional to each district’s contribution (Alhassan et al., 2016). See more from
http://www.nhis.gov.gh/nhisreview.aspx and http://www.nhis.gov.gh/about.aspx
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1.3.2

Conceptual Framework

Grossman (1972) provides a basic framework for understanding the demand for
health. In his model, people demand “good health” for two reasons. First, in the form
of sick-free days, they seek “good health” as a consumption commodity since they become happy when healthy. To produce the “good health,” they inherit initial stock of
health capital (i.e., their human capital that depreciate with age and increase through
investments) and die when their stocks of health fall below certain levels. Second, they
demand “good health” as an investment commodity that determines the time available
for market and non-market activities. They can work for wages or engage in home productions during sick-free days. One conclusion from the model is that a ceteris paribus
reduction in the price of a health input reduces the “shadow price” of health, and the
amount of health demanded increases. The “shadow price” of health depends on the
cost of medical care and other factors; a shift in any of these factors changes the amount
of health demanded and the derived demand for health investment.
The provision of the NHIS in Ghana is similar to reducing the price of health inputs in Grossman’s model except for those in perfect health who would spend nothing
even without the insurance program. Before the NHIS, the Ghanaian health industry
had a limited number of health inputs and high medical costs. There was almost no
health insurance in many areas before the NHIS became available. The implementation
of the NHIS reduced the expected cost of medical care.25 Therefore, we expect the majority of Ghanaian residents to enroll in the NHIS. Surprisingly, the annual NHIS participation rate has always been lower than one-half of the Ghanaian population, even
25 The cost per bed day and outpatient visit in a hospital were about ₡60, 000 and ₡18, 000, respectively, in 2005.
For more information, see from https://www.who.int/choice/country/gha/cost/en/.
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after a decade of national coverage (see Figure 1.1). In part, a theoretical argument for
the low take-up is that healthcare utilization may be exhibiting diminishing marginal
returns (Folland et al., 2016). However, since healthcare utilization was low before providing the NHIS, we rule out this explanation. We devote the rest of the section to discuss the potential reasons for the low NHIS participation rate.
The household’s budget constraint is one reason why some individuals cannot
enroll in the NHIS. Although the expected cost of obtaining coverage in the NHIS is
lower than the expected expenditure on healthcare utilization, some individuals are
unable to enroll due to credit constraints. Given that the majority of the Ghanaian
population lives under $1 every day, the cost of obtaining the NHIS represents a significant expenditure on the budgets of households with low socioeconomic status and
large family sizes (Kusi et al., 2015). A survey of households by Kusi et al. (2015) show
that about 29% of individuals without NHIS coverage face credit constraints. In our
data, about 25% of the women without NHIS coverage in 2014 believes that the NHIS
is expensive.
Another reason is that most Ghanaian people patronize the informal healthcare
industry, which serves as substitutes or complements to the formal healthcare sector.
The government permits the use of traditional, complementary, and alternative medicines
as forms of informal healthcare.26 Evidence shows that about 70% of the Ghanaian
population depends exclusively on traditional medicine for their healthcare (WHO,
2001). A recent survey by Gyasi (2015) shows that approximately 87% of their sample
uses traditional and alternative medicines.
We also argue that risk-sharing opportunities and social networks serve as al26 Complimentary or alternative medicine refers to other traditional medicines imported from other countries, but
not part of Ghana’s traditions. In Ghana, complementary or alternative medicines are highly patronized and usually
advertised on the media.

22

ternative insurance for some people in Ghana. Because well-designed insurance programs were initially not available in Ghana, some extended-families, communities, or
villages often provided mutual insurance to mitigate impacts of shocks. There is evidence on the existence of risk-sharing behaviors of group members of organizations and
the availability of financial assistance in the event of shock (Goldstein et al., 2002; Fenenga et al., 2015). We suspect that sometimes, joining informal organizations crowd
out NHIS coverage due to budget constraints.27
Supply-side factors, including access to health facilities and trust in healthcare
and NHIS employees, potentially affect participation in the NHIS. Individuals who
trust workers in the healthcare industry are more likely to obtain coverage (Fenenga
et al., 2015). Kusi et al. (2015) find that most of the individuals in their sample who
complained about the poor services from the formal healthcare industry were less likely
to participate in the NHIS.28
Finally, we argue that religion and culture can affect people’s participation in the
NHIS. Religious and cultural norms play essential roles in Ghana’s healthcare industry.
Prayer for healing is a common practice in Ghana, where people seek divine healing
from pastors and spiritual superiors. Some people also practice self-medication using
their experiences and knowledge in drugs and herbal medicines.29 A qualitative evidence on the negative relationship between religious and cultural norms and participation in the NHIS exists (Fenny et al., 2016).
27 Usually, the expected benefits of becoming a group member of an organization expand beyond just mitigating
health shocks even though the evidence is weak in the literature (Fenenga et al., 2015).
28 Examples of the claims are perceived poor quality of health services, lacked trust in scheme officials, lacked health
facilities in their area, experienced negative attitudes from providers, etc.
29 People visit chemical or drug stores to purchase medications without doctor’s prescriptions, except a few, in
Ghana.
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1.4

Data
We use the restricted geocoded Standard Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)

for Ghana and Nigeria as our primary data source. Supported by the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the DHS program has assisted over 400 surveys in about
90 developing countries to conduct irregular, but high-frequently in-depth householdlevel surveys of health since the late 1970s (Young, 2013).30 Ghana and Nigeria have
benefited from the DHS program since 1988 and 1990, respectively. The surveys collect, analyze, and distribute accurately, a wide range of standard information across
countries.31 At the country-level, they provide nationally representative data on fertility, family planning, maternal healthcare utilization, gender, HIV/AIDS, malaria,
and nutrition. All data sets from the DHS surveys are publicly available except for information on HIV and residential location. Countries restrict these sensitive data for
confidentiality. We pool the 2003, 2008, and 2014 survey waves from Ghana as well
as 2003, 2008, and 2013 survey waves from Nigeria.32 DHS surveys cover many families and have high response rates, as the Ghanaian waves include 6, 200, 12, 000, and
11, 800 households interviewed in 2003, 2008, and 2014, respectively. Their response
rates are at least 95.7%. Similarly, the DHS survey in Nigeria recruited 7, 225, 34, 070,
and 38, 522 households in 2003, 2008, and 2013, respectively, with a minimum response
rate of 98.3%.
They administer three main questionnaires (i.e., household, women, and the men
30 For

detailed information, see https://dhsprogram.com/Who-We-Are/About-Us.cfm

31 Although they also collect country-specific information, most of the questions and their unit of measurement are
standard across countries.
32 Although there are three other earlier survey waves available for both countries, they do not have all the information needed for this study, including twelve-month healthcare visits. Also, the 1999 survey wave for Nigeria is not
publicly available.
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questionnaires) with different eligibility criteria. Eligibility for the men’s sample is ages
15–59, while that of the women is ages 15–49. In the women questionnaire, the survey collects a broad set of questions on health insurance and healthcare utilization. We
construct a binary indicator variable for past twelve-month healthcare visits as one outcome.33 For under five-year-old children, detailed information on their places delivered
is available. The surveys also provide a history of the mother’s last birth prenatal care
visits for under five-year-old children.34 We link the women and child’s samples to create an indicator variable for antenatal care visits and births in health facilities as two
other outcomes.
Our variable of interest in this study is the woman’s insurance participation status when utilizing healthcare. In the DHS survey, the women provide information on
their health insurance coverage at the interview date. The surveys also ask additional
questions to identify the type of health insurance plan that respondents patronize. Insurance plans available in the DHS surveys from Ghana are the NHIS, employer-based
health insurance, mutual health organization (or community-based insurance), private
health insurance, and commercial health insurance. However, over 98% of insurance
participants obtain NHIS coverage. Consequently, we drop the women in the 2008 and
2014 surveys with insurance coverage from other types to focus on just the NHIS.35
One advantage of the DHS survey is that it verifies the validity of the responses to the
NHIS participation questions. They ask the women to provide their valid NHIS cards if
they claim to have coverage.36 We construct the NHIS participation variable to include
33 We are unable to use the men’s sample in this study because there is no information on their healthcare utilization.
Additionally, information on postnatal care visits is available for only under-two-year old children.
34 We use the date of birth to create outcomes from 1999 - 2013. However, we do not have enough samples in 2004
and 2019 for individuals from Ghana. Since rollouts of the NHIS began in 2004 and a few districts enrolled, we add the
few individuals from 2004 to the 2003 samples, and 2009 to 2008 for the prenatal care visits outcome.
35 However,
36 In

we use private health insurance enrollment before the NHIS for identification purposes.

the questionnaires, respondents answer questions on health insurance participation status. The follow-up ques-
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only the women whose NHIS cards are verified.
Our second source of data comes from the National Health Insurance Authority
(NHIA), who provided information on the dates of commencement of NHIS in districts.
We do not have full details on the rollout dates for all areas in Ghana. However, we
have information for 111 of the 130 districts in Ghana. From the NHIA data, we construct our instrument, the years of exposure to the NHIS in the district of residence at
the interview date and link it to the individual data sets from the DHS at the district
level. Therefore, districts are the level of treatment in all our analyses.
A limitation of the DHS data is that information on women’s insurance participation outcomes is known only in the survey year. For under five-year-old children whose
data are available in off-survey years, we do not have information on the mother’s insurance participation status at the time of conception or childbirth. Unfortunately, we
lose most of the children if we use only the under one-year-old children whose mother’s
NHIS participation outcomes are available. Another challenge from restricting the data
is that we would not have enough observations for estimation. The consequence of using a small sample is that we would lose statistical power and would be unable to detect statistically significant effects of the NHIS on the outcomes. Consequently, we are
unable to use the DHS data from Ghana to estimate the impacts of the NHIS on prenatal care visits and institutional births unless we assume that the mother’s enrollment
status at the time of the interview is a representative for the enrollment status during pregnancy or delivery. We avoid such an assumption because it can lead to nontion is to identify the type of insurance that they purchase if the answer to the previous questions is “Yes.” The next
question probes to verify from those who claim to be NHIS participants if they have valid NHIS cards. Because the interviewers want to confirm the validity of their responses, they check the NHIS cards and categorize them as follows:
“Yes, card seen,” “Yes, card not seen,” and ”No.” The last question that validates these answers is to determine why
some of the NHIS participants did not hold valid NHIS cards. In our sample, most respondents either do not renew their
insurance status on time or are new participants and in the three-month waiting period.
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classical measurement errors in our variable of interest.37 Therefore, we use children
from Nigeria as one comparable group and define our treatment group as all children
from Ghana in the samples.

1.5

Empirical Strategies
Consider the structural equation for binary choice healthcare utilization:

Yidt = 1(β0 + β1 Iidt + ΛXidt + γd + τt + idt > 0),

(1.1)

where 1(•) is the indicator function taking the value one if its argument is true and
zero otherwise, Yidt represents the outcomes, any healthcare visits in the past twelve
months, births in health facilities, and any prenatal care visits, for individual i in district d at time t. The variables, Iidt and idt , represent NHIS participation outcome and
the error term, respectively, for individual i in district d at time t. Notice that the observed insurance participation, Iidt , takes the value one if the individual purchases the
NHIS and zero otherwise. The vector Xidt represents the set of individual and household characteristics such as age, gender, occupation, education, wealth index, a dummy
for residential locations (rural or urban), etc. We include a vector of district and year
fixed effects (i.e., γd and τt , respectively) to account for district-level and time-invariant
characteristics that contribute to changes in Yidt other than the NHIS.
For each outcome, our econometric objective is to estimate causally the value of
β1 , which represents the impact of the NHIS. However, an identification challenge is the
issue of endogeneity in the NHIS participation outcome. As discussed earlier, Iidt has
at least two significant sources of endogeneity. Adverse selection stems from the fact
37 We

discuss the consequences of the misclassification of the NHIS participation variable later.
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that some individuals make participation decisions based on their type (i.e., healthy
or unhealthy). Because everyone in Ghana is eligible for the NHIS, sicker individuals
are more likely to participate. Also, given that there is open enrollment throughout the
year with only a three-month waiting period, individuals can strategically make participation decisions. The issue of “ex-ante moral hazard,” which means lower investments
in health and behavioral changes in anticipation of using health insurance to access
healthcare, is documented in the literature as another issue in the NHIS (Yilma et al.,
2012). Therefore, for a causal interpretation of β̂1 , we address these problems. We use
different empirical strategies to address the endogeneity, depending on data availability.

1.5.1

Instrumental Variable Strategy

For the twelve-month healthcare visits outcome, which we observe only in the
year of the survey, we use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to address the endogeneity issues in NHIS participation. We specify the insurance participation equation
as follows.

Iidt = 1(α0 + α1 Zdt + θXidt + ηidt > 0),

(1.2)

where the variable ηidt represents an independently and identically distributed error
term for individual i in district d at time t. The rest of the variables and indicator
function, 1(•), have their usual interpretations.
In equation (2), the variable Zdt denotes our instrument, varying across districts
and over time. We use the timing of the rollout of the NHIS across districts and the
survey interview dates to construct the IV. Specifically, we define the IV as the number
of years that the individuals become exposed to the NHIS in their residential districts.
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The IV has no variation within districts surveyed in the same year because they survey individuals in the same area in the same month. Although Abrokwah et al. (2019)
define their IV as a binary indicator of the presence of the NHIS in the district of residence, we improve it by allowing for variations in the years of exposure. Our intuition
for using the years of NHIS exposure as an IV is that the women at the margin of signing up in the NHIS are more likely to obtain coverage as they get more years of exposure. We argue that some individuals require more time to understand the NHIS, trust
it, or save money to purchase coverage. Others may need advertisements, testimonies,
or an awareness of its importance in enrolling in the NHIS.
Angrist and Pischke (2008) review the assumptions needed to interpret our estimates causally. The first identifying assumption for a valid instrument is exclusion
restriction requiring Zdt to be uncorrelated with idt [i.e., Cov(Zdt , idt ) = 0], enabling
us to interpret the IV estimates as local average treatment effects (LATE). It imposes
a restriction that NHIS participation is the only channel through which years of insurance eligibility affect the healthcare utilization outcomes, ignoring all other potential
channels. We argue that this assumption is likely satisfied based on our knowledge of
the institutional details. Since the NHIS rollout decision and premium choices were
made by district executives, presided over by the chief executive officer appointed by
the president of Ghana, they were influenced politically rather than need. We demonstrate that the years of eligibility are uncorrelated with the outcomes and pre-treatment
characteristics of the districts in Section 1.6. Stating the exclusion restriction assumption differently, it says that the only channel through which Yidt and Zdt are related is
through Iidt . This assumption is likely to be satisfied because districts don’t have control over resource allocations, including the construction of healthcare centers and the
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posting of health workers. The government of Ghana determines how and where to allocate resources, likely uncorrelated with years of NHIS eligibility. In Section 1.6, we
demonstrate that including supply factors in the models does not affect our estimates.
In the case of heterogeneous treatment effects, likely the case of the NHIS based
on institutional details and results presented in Section 1.6, a second part of the identifying assumption required is independence, the NHIS rollout as good as random (or independent of potential outcomes, conditional on the observable characteristics). Satisfying the independence assumption would not require the exclusion restriction for identifying the reduced form estimates. In other words, the reduced form estimates would
capture all the possible channels through which the NHIS affects the utilization outcomes.
Another identifying assumption that we discuss is the monotonicity of the instrument. Although years of NHIS eligibility may not affect some people, the impact must
be in the same way (direction) among those affected. In other words, eligibility should
not increase the NHIS take-up among a group of people, decreasing the NHIS participation among another sub-population. The final identifying assumption is the relevance
of the instrument or first stage. The estimate of α1 should be different from zero with a
high F-statistic not less than 10 in practice. In Section 1.6, we show that the F-statistic
is approximately 30, suggesting a strong first stage.
To understand the IV better to interpret the first stage appropriately, we briefly
discuss it as follows. First, we show that the rollout of the NHIS across districts and
over time is staggered. Figure 1.2 shows a plot of the count of districts that adopted
the NHIS over time. We observe that there is a significant variation in the dates of
NHIS adoption. Second, we show the distribution of the IV in our data in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.2. Timing of Rollout of NHIS, 2004 − 2007

Among the women exposed to the NHIS, the IV values range from approximately one
year and five months to nine years and six months.
Because the outcome, Yidt , and the endogenous regressor, Iidt , are binaries, we do
not interpret our main results from the linear IV estimator. With a binary outcome
and a binary treatment variable, the econometrics literature has documented important problems using a linear IV estimator (or linear probability models). At best, the
linear IV estimator may only approximate the average marginal effects, which sometimes turns out to be poor in practice (Wooldridge, 2010). The reason is that the conditional mean functions in equations (1) and (2) can be highly nonlinear such that their
“derivatives can be quite far from the derivatives of their linear approximations” (Lewbel et al., 2012).38 The poor approximations of the nonlinear models from the linear
38 We can think of approximating an S-shaped cumulative distributive function with a straight line. Higher nonlinear
functions are poorly approximated with linear curves.
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Figure 1.3. Histogram of Years of NHIS Exposure among Women in the TwelveMonths Healthcare Visits Sample

models can lead to marginal effects that are inconsistent and inefficient estimates of the
treatment effects (see Appendix A for a comprehensive discussion of this issue). We use
a bivariate probit model that is widely suggested in the literature. While it makes a
distributional assumption of joint normality of the error terms in equations (1) and (2),
allowing the identification of the parameters to come from the functional form restriction and the excluded instrument, it consistently estimates the average marginal effects.
Altonji et al. (2005a) propose this strategy in their catholic schooling study. Aside from
the benefit of getting consistent and efficient marginal effects, the bivariate model allows us to jointly model the effect of the exogenously staggered rollout of the NHIS on
insurance participation and the impact of NHIS on healthcare utilization. This joint es32

timation approach also allows us to avoid potential biases from any unobserved factors
common to the NHIS take-up and healthcare utilization decisions (Abrokwah et al.,
2019).

1.5.2

Difference-in-Differences Strategy

As indicated earlier, for outcomes that we observe in all years (i.e., 1999 − 2013),
we are unable to use the IV strategy. For the children born in the off-survey years, we
do not have their mothers’ insurance participation outcomes in utero or at birth. We
lose most of them if we drop those whose mothers’ NHIS participation outcomes are
not available. Since we do not want to assume that the enrollment status of insurance
in the survey year and the time of utilization are the same, we use similar individuals
from Nigeria as one control group. Combining the children born in Ghana and Nigeria
allows us to use difference-in-differences (DID) methodology to estimate the intent-totreat effect of the NHIS on births in health facilities and prenatal care visits. Consider
the baseline specification below:

Yidct = 1(δ0 +δ1 POSTdct +δ2 (TREATdc ×POSTdct )+ΩXidct +ζd +Ψt +ξidct > 0), (1.3)

where Yidct represents the outcome of individual i living in district d of country c at
year t and POSTdct is an indicator for whether district d of country c implemented the
NHIS at year t when the outcome was realized. The vector Xidct represents a set of
characteristics of individual i living in district d of country c at time t, while ξidct captures the corresponding unobserved components. The specification also includes a vector of year fixed effect, Ψt , and district fixed effect, ζd , to account for the impacts of
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time-invariant and district-level characteristics that can cause changes in the outcomes
rather than the NHIS. Since only the individuals from districts in Ghana are exposed
to the NHIS and no district from Nigeria implemented the NHIS during our study period, we exclude TREATdc from equation (3) to avoid perfect collinearity.39
In equation (3), the parameter of interest is δ2 . Its estimate, δ̂2 , has a causal interpretation of identifying the intent-to-treat effect of the NHIS on the outcomes if our
data satisfy two assumptions. First, we need to ensure that the individuals in our data
fulfill the assumption of perfect compliance. (All the individuals must have remained
in their assigned group throughout the study period.) If some individuals switched
groups, our estimate can be susceptible to non-compliance and be biased.40 An issue
equivalent to the switching of treatment assignment is when the control group receives
similar treatment from other programs. In this case, it would be challenging to isolate
that program’s impact from the causal effect of NHIS that we evaluate. One control
group that potentially satisfies this assumption is the under five-year-old children from
Nigeria. In our study period, Nigeria’s government did not implement any significant
health insurance program or policy that affected these children.41 Even though the federal government of Nigeria established a similar NHIS program in 1999 (Monye, 2006),
it was unsuccessful,42 and it relaunched a new health insurance program called “Formal
Sector Social Health Insurance Program (FSSHIP)” in 2005 (Onoka et al., 2014).43
39 TREAT

dc

is perfectly collinear with the district fixed effect.

40 If some of the individuals in the control group defected to the treatment group, we would overestimate the effect of
the NHIS. We would find an underestimated intent-to-treat effect if some individuals also switched from the treatment to
the control group.
41 Nevertheless, if there was any insurance program, we can construct a random sample such that the women in this
sub-sample would not be affected significantly.
42 Anarado (2001) discusses the various reason why the NHIS in Nigeria was unsuccessful. In summary, the author
claimed that the NHIS faced implementation issues such as changes in political regimes, poor designs, etc. For example,
the NHIS was designed to be compulsory for only a few of the population working in formal sector organizations with
ten or more employees and voluntarily for everyone else. Given that a majority of the labor force worked in the agriculture sector, which was predominantly subsistence, the design of the NHIS automatically led to low participation.
43 The FSSHIP covers only formal sector employees (public and organized private-sector firms employing ten or more
people), the informal sector (urban self-employed and rural community user-groups), and the vulnerable groups.
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Despite the implementation of NHIS and FSSHIP in Nigeria, most mothers of the
children in our sample have no insurance coverage. The DHS survey reports indicate
that about 98% of women had no health insurance coverage in 2008 and 2013. Also,
since most of the population employed in the formal sector live in urban areas (Ibiwoye
and Adeleke, 2008), we eliminate the women and their children living in urban areas to
use only those residing in rural areas as our control group. By removing the children
living in Nigeria’s urban areas, we minimize the possibility of including children whose
mothers had health insurance coverage in the control group. Using the 2008 and 2013
DHS survey reports, we realize that less than 1% of rural Nigeria women had health
insurance coverage. Additionally, our data shows that the mothers of only 0.58% of the
children in our sample have health insurance coverage.44
The second condition for identifying δ2 in equation (3) is that our data must satisfy the parallel trends assumption. In the absence of the NHIS, any changes in the
outcomes that would have occurred in the post-NHIS period would not vary differentially between the treatment and control groups. Figure 1.4 shows the parallel trends
of the mean outcomes in the pre- and post-NHIS periods. We show that the pre-trends
of the births in health facilities (in Panel A) and prenatal care visits (in Panel B) are
identical for the treatment and control groups. After the implementation of the NHIS
in 2004, the treatment and control groups’ trends for both outcomes diverged. By including district and birth year fixed effects, we hope to account for any unobserved heterogeneity affecting the outcomes of our treatment and control groups differently.
44 A significant issue that we cannot address with our data is the problem of endogenous migration. If some mothers
and their children migrated from urban areas to rural areas after childbirth, we do not observe this information. Additionally, we cannot address women’s endogenous migration from rural areas to urban areas but resettle in rural areas
after childbirth.
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Panel A: Births in Health Facilities (or Institutional Births)

Panel B: Prenatal Care Visits in the First Four Months of Pregnancy

Figure 1.4. Parallel Trends of the Outcomes (%) for Treatment and Control Groups
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1.5.3

Event Studies

While we cannot formally test the parallel trend assumption since we do not observe the counterfactual, we evaluate the chances of satisfying it through event study
models. The event study models allow us to interact with our treatment variable, the
full set of pre-NHIS year fixed effect. Similar to the approach in Pesko (2018) and Courtemanche et al. (2017), we estimate the parameters using data from the pre-NHIS period
and omit the last year as the baseline group. We specify the pre-NHIS period event
study model as below:

Yidct = λ0 + λk

2002
X

YEARk × TREATdc + ΩXidct + Πcd + Ψt + ξidct .

(1.4)

k=1999

In equation (4), we would be concerned if the estimated coefficients, λ̂k , for k = 1999 −
2002, are statistically significant and different from zero. However, imprecise estimates
or precise zero estimates suggest that there are no observed differences between the
treatment and control groups in the pre-NHIS period, conditional on the observable
characteristics.
We also take advantage of the event study model to test for differential effects
of the NHIS on the outcomes over time. To do this, we use the individuals in the preNHIS period (i.e., 1999 − 2003) as the reference group, and interact with our treatment variable, a full set of post-NHIS year fixed effect. We specify the post-NHIS period event study model as below:

Yidct = λ0 + λk

2013
X

YEARk × TREATdc + ΩXidct + Πcd + Ψt + ξidct .

(1.5)

k=2004

In equation (5), the parameters of interest are λk , for k = 2004 − 2013. We expect their
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magnitudes and precision to improve as k rises. Achieving such results will provide suggested evidence that the NHIS has differential effects over time.
We plot the estimates from the event study models in equations (4) and (5) in
Figure 1.5. We show their precision graphically by plotting their 95% confidence intervals. For both outcomes, our findings suggest that there are no economically and
statistically significant differences between the outcomes of the treatment and control
groups in the pre-NHIS period. All the estimates are statistically insignificant for both
outcomes. In the post-NHIS period, we find that the estimates remain statistically insignificant until 2011 for births in health facilities, but irregular for prenatal care visits.

1.6

Results

1.6.1

Descriptive Statistics

We first describe the differences between the characteristics of women who gain
NHIS coverage and those without any insurance in Ghana. Table 1.1 reports the means
and standard deviations of the variables we use in the IV methods. We employ approximately 15, 100 women aged 15 − 49 to study the causal effect of the NHIS on
twelve-month healthcare visits. In this sample, about 3, 700 (24.4%) have NHIS coverage, while the remaining 11, 400 (75.6%) women do not have health insurance coverage. About 11% of the women with NHIS coverage are pregnant compared to 8% of
the uninsured women who are also pregnant. Healthcare visits vary tremendously by
health insurance coverage. Our sample shows that the women who have NHIS coverage are 19 percentage points more likely to visit healthcare than those without health
insurance. The NHIS participants are slightly older and are more likely to be married
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Panel A: Births in Health Facilities (or Institutional Births)

Panel B: Prenatal Care Visits in the First Four Months of Pregnancy

Notes: In each figure, two separate linear regression models were used to calculate the estimates. The first regression used only data from the pre-NHIS period (1999 - 2003) to estimate the pre-NHIS coefficients (with 2003, before the NHIS, serving as the reference). The
second regression used all data from 1999 to 2013 to estimate the post-NHIS coefficients, using the entire pre-NHIS period (1999 - 2003) as the reference. Results are conditional on the
characteristics: sex of child, indicator for twins, birth order, place of resident (rural/urban),
household wealth index, mother’s age, marital status, education, occupation, literacy status,
ethnicity, and religion.

Figure 1.5. Event Study of the Effects of the NHIS on the Outcomes
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than non-participants of the NHIS. We find a somewhat small difference (2 percentage
points) between the fraction of the uninsured and the insured who live in rural areas,
suggesting an approximately equal distribution of NHIS coverage across locations. The
fraction of women who experience at least one birth in five years differs between the
NHIS participants and the women without any health insurance coverage. However, the
number of children born by women with and without NHIS coverage does not differ.

Table 1.1. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parenthesis) of Last Twelve Months
Healthcare Visits and Characteristics of Women (ages 15 − 49) with and without NHIS
Coverage in Ghana

Outcome and Instrument
Any 12-Month Healthcare Visits
Years of NHIS Exposure
Characteristics of Women
Currently Married
Currently Pregnant
Rural Residence
Age of Woman
15 − 26
27 − 34
35 − 40
41 − 49
Number of Children Born
No Child
One Child
Two Children
≥ Three Children
Births in the Past 5 Years
No Birth
One Birth
≥ Two Births
Wealth Index
1st Quartile (poorest)
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
5th Quartile (richest)

Insured

Uninsured

All Women

0.62 (0.49)
7.10 (2.28)

0.43 (0.50)
4.47 (3.74)

0.48 (0.50)
5.11 (3.62)

0.52 (0.50)
0.11 (0.31)
0.50 (0.50)

0.45 (0.50)
0.08 (0.28)
0.52 (0.50)

0.47 (0.50)
0.09 (0.28)
0.51 (0.50)

0.40
0.29
0.18
0.17

(0.49)
(0.45)
(0.38)
(0.37)

0.46
0.25
0.15
0.17

(0.50)
(0.43)
(0.36)
(0.38)

0.45
0.26
0.16
0.17

(0.50)
(0.44)
(0.37)
(0.38)

0.40
0.36
0.19
0.05

(0.49)
(0.48)
(0.39)
(0.22)

0.43
0.34
0.17
0.06

(0.50)
(0.47)
(0.38)
(0.24)

0.42
0.34
0.18
0.06

(0.49)
(0.47)
(0.38)
(0.23)

0.53 (0.50)
0.31 (0.47)
0.16 (0.37)
0.21
0.18
0.20
0.20
0.20
40

(0.41)
(0.39)
(0.40)
(0.40)
(0.40)

0.61 (0.49)
0.27 (0.44)
0.13 (0.33)

0.59 (0.49)
0.28 (0.45)
0.13 (0.34)

0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42)
0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38)
0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39)
0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41)
Continued on the next page
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Insured
Education
No Education
1−9
10 − 12
≥ 13
Literate
Occupation
Not Working
Professionals, Tech., Mgt., Clerks
Sales & Services
Agric. Sector & Self-employed
Manual Work
Ethnicity
Akan
Ga-Dangme, Ewe & Guan
Mole-Dagbani
Hausa
Others
Religion
Catholic
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
No Religion
Year of Survey
2003
2008
2014

Uninsured

All Women

0.23
0.50
0.19
0.08
0.53

(0.42)
(0.50)
(0.39)
(0.27)
(0.50)

0.27
0.50
0.18
0.06
0.48

(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.38)
(0.23)
(0.50)

0.26
0.50
0.18
0.06
0.49

(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.38)
(0.24)
(0.50)

0.25
0.08
0.35
0.21
0.12

(0.43)
(0.26)
(0.48)
(0.40)
(0.32)

0.25
0.04
0.33
0.25
0.12

(0.43)
(0.21)
(0.47)
(0.43)
(0.33)

0.25
0.05
0.34
0.24
0.12

(0.43)
(0.22)
(0.47)
(0.43)
(0.32)

0.41
0.21
0.26
0.10
0.02

(0.49)
(0.41)
(0.44)
(0.30)
(0.15)

0.43
0.20
0.23
0.10
0.04

(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.42)
(0.30)
(0.20)

0.43
0.21
0.23
0.10
0.04

(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.42)
(0.30)
(0.19)

0.19
0.58
0.19
0.02
0.03

(0.39)
(0.49)
(0.39)
(0.13)
(0.16)

0.16
0.60
0.17
0.04
0.04

(0.37)
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.19)
(0.18)

0.17
0.59
0.18
0.03
0.03

(0.37)
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.17)
(0.18)

0.01 (0.11)
0.22 (0.41)
0.77 (0.42)

0.34 (0.47)
0.21 (0.41)
0.46 (0.50)

0.26 (0.44)
0.21 (0.41)
0.53 (0.50)

3,683

11,429

15,112

Observations

The DHS data includes a computed wealth index using household assets. Since
there is no measure of income in our data, we substitute it with the wealth index categorized into quartiles. The distribution of wealth index between the NHIS participants and non-participants are generally not different. The variable completed years
of schooling, categorized into four groups (i.e., 0, 1 − 9, 10 − 12, and ≥ 13), shows
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that approximately 27% of the women who do not have NHIS coverage have zero years
of education. On the other hand, about 23% of women with health insurance have no
formal education. A slightly higher fraction of the women with NHIS coverage is more
likely to attend senior high school or college than those without coverage. The literacy
rate (ability to write and read English) differ by NHIS participation status, as about
53% of women with and 48% of those without health insurance are literates.
The distribution of occupation between the women with and those without NHIS
coverage differ. The fractions of women who work in the professional environment or
sales and service are higher among the NHIS participants than the non-participants.
While 25% of the women with NHIS coverage work in the agricultural industry or are
self-employed, 21% of the women with insurance coverage work in these areas. We also
find a pattern in the distribution of ethnicity and religious affiliations. We observe that
more significant fractions of women in some ethnic groups are more likely to participate in the NHIS than women from other tribes in Ghana. Likewise, some religious segments show a strong preference for the NHIS than others. In summary, Table 1.1 shows
that age, years of schooling, marital and pregnancy status, past five-year birth history,
wealth index, occupation, ethnicity, and religious affiliation differ between the women
with and those without NHIS coverage.
In Table 1.2, we also summarize the characteristics of the women stratified by
those who do not attend health facilities (in Column 1) and the women who seek healthcare (in Column 2). Our sample shows that about 7, 200 (47.7%) of the women visit
healthcare, while the remaining 7, 900 (52.3%) do not seek healthcare in twelve months.
Similar to the distributions of characteristics described in Table 1.1, in Table 1.2, we
show that they differ between the women who visit and those who do not attend health42

care in twelve months. Therefore, we include all of them in our regressions to account
for the observed differences.

Table 1.2. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parenthesis) of the Characteristics of
Women (ages 15 − 49) With and Without Healthcare Visits in the Last Twelve Months
in Ghana

Insurance and Instrument
NHIS Coverage
Years of NHIS Exposure
Characteristics of Women
Currently Married
Currently Pregnant
Rural Residence
Age of Woman
15 − 26
27 − 34
35 − 40
41 − 49
Number of Children Born
No Child
One Child
Two Children
≥ Three Children
Births in the Past 5 Years
No Birth
One Birth
≥ Two Births
Wealth Index
1st Quartile (poorest)
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
5th Quartile (richest)
Years of Education of Woman
No Education
1−9
10 − 12
≥ 13+
Literate
Occupation of Woman
Not Working
Professionals, Tech., Mgt., Clerks

With Visits

Without Visits

All Women

0.32 (0.47)
5.41 (3.53)

0.18 (0.38)
4.84 (3.68)

0.24 (0.43)
5.11 (3.62)

0.57 (0.49)
0.13 (0.34)
0.48 (0.50)

0.37 (0.48)
0.05 (0.22)
0.54 (0.50)

0.47 (0.50)
0.09 (0.28)
0.51 (0.50)

0.37
0.32
0.19
0.16

(0.48)
(0.47)
(0.39)
(0.37)

0.52
0.20
0.14
0.18

(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.34)
(0.38)

0.45
0.26
0.16
0.17

(0.50)
(0.44)
(0.37)
(0.38)

0.35
0.37
0.21
0.06

(0.48)
(0.48)
(0.41)
(0.25)

0.49
0.31
0.14
0.05

(0.50)
(0.46)
(0.35)
(0.21)

0.42
0.34
0.18
0.06

(0.49)
(0.47)
(0.38)
(0.23)

0.44 (0.50)
0.36 (0.48)
0.19 (0.40)

0.72 (0.45)
0.20 (0.40)
0.08 (0.27)

0.59 (0.49)
0.28 (0.50)
0.13 (0.34)

0.22
0.17
0.18
0.20
0.23

(0.41)
(0.37)
(0.39)
(0.40)
(0.42)

0.24
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19

(0.43)
(0.39)
(0.40)
(0.39)
(0.39)

0.23
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.21

(0.42)
(0.38)
(0.39)
(0.40)
(0.41)

0.26
0.47
0.19
0.08
0.48

(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.39)
(0.27)
(0.50)

0.25
0.53
0.17
0.05
0.50

(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.38)
(0.21)
(0.50)

0.26
0.50
0.18
0.06
0.49

(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.38)
(0.24)
(0.50)

0.19 (0.39)
0.07 (0.25)
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0.30 (0.46)
0.25 (0.43)
0.04 (0.19)
0.05 (0.22)
Continued on next page
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Sales & Services
Agric. Sector & Self-employed
Manual Work
Ethnicity
Akan
Ga-Dangme, Ewe & Guan
Mole-Dagbani
Hausa
Others
Religion
Catholic
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
No Religion
Survey Year
2003
2008
2014
Observations

With Visits

Without Visits

All Women

0.37 (0.48)
0.24 (0.42)
0.13 (0.34)

0.31 (0.46)
0.25 (0.43)
0.11 (0.31)

0.34 (0.47)
0.24 (0.43)
0.12 (0.32)

0.41
0.21
0.25
0.10
0.04

(0.49)
(0.41)
(0.43)
(0.30)
(0.18)

0.44
0.20
0.22
0.09
0.04

(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.41)
(0.29)
(0.20)

0.43
0.21
0.23
0.10
0.04

(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.42)
(0.30)
(0.19)

0.17
0.59
0.19
0.03
0.03

(0.38)
(0.49)
(0.39)
(0.17)
(0.17)

0.17
0.60
0.16
0.03
0.04

(0.37)
(0.49)
(0.37)
(0.18)
(0.19)

0.17
0.59
0.18
0.03
0.03

(0.37)
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.17)
(0.18)

0.23 (0.42)
0.20 (0.40)
0.57 (0.50)

0.29 (0.45)
0.22 (0.41)
0.50 (0.50)

0.26 (0.44)
0.21 (0.41)
0.53 (0.50)

7,213

7,899

15,112

From Table 1.1 and 1.2, we are yet to describe two variables of interest in detail:
the NHIS participation and years of NHIS exposure variables. At the time of the interview, about 24.4% of the women in the sample had verified valid NHIS cards.45 We observe differences in NHIS coverage between the women who visit healthcare and those
who do not. The women who attend health facilities for care are 14% more likely to
be NHIS participants than those who do not visit any healthcare in twelve months.
The years of NHIS exposure also differ by both NHIS coverage status and healthcare
45 By defining the NHIS participants to include only women with valid NHIS cards, we replicate the statistics in
Figure 1.1, constructed from the National Health Insurance Authority’s administrative data. For example, Figure 1.1
shows that about 39% of the Ghanaian population participated in the NHIS in 2014. We take several steps to verify the
validity of the statistics presented in Figure 1.1. For example, the NHIA reported that only 10.5 million of the Ghanaian
population were active subscribers of the NHIS in 2014, and 69% were from the premium exempt category. Since the
number of people in Ghana was 27.22 million in 2014, it suggests that 38.6% of the Ghanaian population had NHIS
coverage. We find from our data that about 35.2% of the women had NHIS coverage in 2014. It suggests that our data
is representative of the Ghanaian population. Other studies of the NHIS, including Abrokwah et al. (2019), report that
more than 60% of women in Ghana had NHIS coverage in 2014.
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utilization behavior. The average span of NHIS exposure in the full sample is approximately five years and one month. However, the women who enroll in the NHIS have
about seven years and one month of NHIS exposure, compared to four years and six
months among the women who do not have health insurance coverage (see Table 1.1).
Similarly, the women who visit health facilities for care have five years and five months
of NHIS exposure, compared to those who do not attend any health facilities for care
with four years and ten months (see Table 1.2).
For the samples used in the DID framework, Table 1.3 reports the pre- and postNHIS treatment means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of institutional births
and prenatal care visits outcomes stratified by the treatment and control groups. Because the surveys gather information on the places of births of all under five-year-old
eligible children but ask questions on a history of mother’s prenatal care visits for the
last child, the sample sizes differ by outcomes. For the institutional birth outcome, we
obtain information on about 9, 000 and 37, 900 under five-year-old children from Ghana
and rural Nigeria (see Panel A of Table 1.3). Similarly, we have details on 6, 200 and
27, 200 under five-year-old children from Ghana and rural Nigeria for the outcome of
prenatal care visits (see Panel B of Table 1.3).
The first panel of Table 1.3 shows that, on average, approximately 48% and 25%
of under five-year-old children in Ghana and rural Nigeria were born in health facilities
in the pre-NHIS period. The statistic in Ghana increased to 66% but decreased in rural Nigeria to 24% in the post-NHIS period. In the full sample, about 33% and 30% of
children were born in health facilities in the pre- and post-NHIS periods, respectively.
We observe that the fraction of institutional births in the pre-NHIS period is more significant than that of the post-NHIS period in the full sample. The reason is that the
45

Table 1.3. Means and Standard Deviations (in parenthesis) of Births in Health Facilities and Prenatal Care Visits by Pre– & Post–Period for the Treatment, Control
& the Full-Sample
Panel A: Births in Health Facilities
Treatment Group
Pre-NHIS

Post-NHIS

Total

Ghana

0.48
(0.50)

0.66
(0.48)

0.58
(0.49)

Observations

3,852

5,104

8,956

Control Group
Pre-NHIS

Post-NHIS

Total

Rural Nigeria

0.25
(0.43)

0.24
(0.43)

0.24
(0.43)

Observations

7,179

30,722

37,901

Full Sample
Pre-NHIS

Post-NHIS

Total

All Children

0.33
(0.47)

0.30
(0.46)

0.31
(0.46)

Observations

11,031

35,826

46,857

Panel B: Any Prenatal Care Visits (Pregnancy ≤ 4 Months)
Treatment Group
Pre-NHIS

Post-NHIS

Total

Ghana

0.70
(0.46)

0.81
(0.39)

0.76
(0.43)

Observations

2,601

3,590

6,191

Control Group
Pre-NHIS

Post-NHIS

Total

Rural Nigeria

0.28
(0.45)

0.27
(0.45)

0.27
(0.45)

Observations

3,286

23,924

27,210

Full Sample
Pre-NHIS

Post-NHIS

Total

All Children

0.46
(0.50)

0.34
(0.48)

0.36
(0.48)

Observations

5,887

27,514

33,401
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relative share of the control group increased in the post-NHIS period drastically. In the
pre-NHIS period, individuals from rural Nigeria account for approximately 65% of the
sample, while in the post-NHIS period, they constitute 86%. Because the outcome improved only in the treatment group and worsened in the control group, we expect the
control group’s impact to drive the average outcome in the post-NHIS period. Overall,
about 31% of the children in the full sample were born in health facilities.
Likewise, Panel B of Table 1.3 reports that, on average, the mothers of 70% and
28% of the children in Ghana and rural Nigeria received prenatal care services within
the first four months of pregnancies in the pre-NHIS period. In the post-NHIS period,
these statistics increased to 81% for the treatment group and decreased to 27% for the
control group. In the full sample, mothers of 36% of under five-year-old children had
prenatal checkups in the pre-NHIS period. But in the post-NHIS period, the statistic
reduced to 34% due to the control group’s dominance. On average, prenatal care checkups did not change in rural Nigeria. Approximately the mothers of 36% of the children
in the full sample attended prenatal care checkups in the first four months in utero.

Table 1.4. Means and Standard Deviations (in parenthesis) of Household and Parents’
Characteristics by Treatment Group, Control Group & the Full-Sample − Births in
Health Facilities
Treatment Group Control Group All Children
Post-NHIS Period
Treatment (Ghana)
Treatment × Post
Child’s Characteristics
Male
Twin
Birth Order
First
Second

0.57 (0.50)

0.81 (0.39)

0.77 (0.42)
0.19 (0.39)
0.11 (0.31)

0.51 (0.50)
0.02 (0.13)

0.51 (0.50)
0.02 (0.13)

0.51 (0.50)
0.02 (0.13)

0.23 (0.42)
0.20 (0.40)

0.18 (0.38)
0.19 (0.39)
0.16 (0.37)
0.17 (0.37)
Continued on next page

0.57 (0.50)
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Treatment Group Control Group All Children
Third
Fourth
≥ Fifth
Household Characteristics
Rural Residence
Wealth Index
1st Quartile (poorest)
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
5th Quartile (richest)
Mother Currently Married
Mother’s Age
15 − 26
27 − 34
35 − 40
41 − 49
Mother’s Education
No Education
1−9
10 − 12
≥ 13
Literate
Mother’s Occupation
Not Working
Manual Work
Professionals, Tech., Mgt., Clerks
Sales & Services
Agric. Sector & Self-employed
Ethnicity
Hausa
Ghana: Akan
Ghana: Ga-Dangme, Ewe & Guan
Ghana: Mole-Dagbani
Ghana: Others
Nigeria: Fulani
Nigeria: Igbo
Nigeria: Yoruba
Nigeria: Others 1
Nigeria: Others 2
Religion
No Religion
Catholic

0.16 (0.37)
0.14 (0.34)
0.28 (0.45)

0.15 (0.35)
0.13 (0.33)
0.39 (0.49)

0.65 (0.48)

0.15 (0.36)
0.13 (0.33)
0.37 (0.48)
0.93 (0.25)

0.33
0.22
0.17
0.15
0.13
0.74

(0.47)
(0.42)
(0.38)
(0.36)
(0.33)
(0.44)

0.32
0.30
0.21
0.12
0.04
0.93

(0.47)
(0.46)
(0.41)
(0.32)
(0.20)
(0.25)

0.32 (0.47)
0.29 (0.45)
0.20 (0.40)
0.13 (0.33)
0.06 (0.235)
0.90 (0.31)

0.32
0.42
0.21
0.09

(0.47)
(0.49)
(0.41)
(0.29)

0.43
0.37
0.19
0.06

(0.49)
(0.48)
(0.39)
(0.24)

0.41
0.38
0.19
0.07

(0.49)
(0.49)
(0.39)
(0.25)

0.41
0.47
0.10
0.03
0.28

(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.30)
(0.17)
(0.45)

0.57
0.29
0.11
0.02
0.29

(0.50)
(0.46)
(0.32)
(0.14)
(0.45)

0.54
0.33
0.11
0.02
0.29

(0.50)
(0.47)
(0.31)
(0.15)
(0.45)

0.13
0.12
0.03
0.32
0.40

(0.34)
(0.33)
(0.17)
(0.47)
(0.49)

0.32
0.10
0.02
0.35
0.21

(0.47)
(0.30)
(0.12)
(0.48)
(0.40)

0.29
0.11
0.02
0.35
0.24

(0.45)
(0.31)
(0.14)
(0.48)
(0.43)

0.13
0.38
0.18
0.26
0.05

(0.34)
(0.49)
(0.39)
(0.44)
(0.21)

0.32 (0.47)

0.28
0.07
0.04
0.05
0.01
0.09
0.05
0.05
0.11
0.27

(0.45)
(0.26)
(0.18)
(0.22)
(0.09)
(0.28)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.32)
(0.44)

0.11
0.07
0.06
0.14
0.33
0.06 (0.24)
0.15 (0.35)
48

(0.31)
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.35)
(0.47)

0.01 (0.11)
0.08 (0.26)
0.09 (0.29)
Continued on next page
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Treatment Group Control Group All Children
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
Survey Year
2003
2008
2013
2014
Observations

0.53 (0.50)
0.20 (0.40)
0.06 (0.24)

0.28 (0.45)
0.61 (0.49)
0.02 (0.13)

0.33 (0.47)
0.53 (0.50)
0.03 (0.16)

0.35 (0.48)
0.26 (0.44)

0.09 (0.29)
0.48 (0.50)
0.43 (0.50)

0.14
0.44
0.35
0.08

0.39 (0.49)
8,956

37,901

(0.35)
(0.50)
(0.48)
(0.26)

46,857

The statistics in Table 1.3 suggest that the simple DID estimates without independent variables are 0.17 and 0.12 for births in health facilities and prenatal care visits, respectively. However, other factors could affect the outcomes, which the simple
DID estimates would not capture. We summarize some of these characteristics in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. In general, the distribution of the observable characteristics of under five-year-old children in the control and treatment groups differ significantly for
both outcomes. For example, the mothers of about 32% of the children in the control
group have no occupation when we consider births in health facilities outcome (see
Table 1.4). In the treatment group, the mothers of only 13% of the children are unemployed. Also, mothers of 57% of children in the control group have no formal education. On the other hand, the mothers of about 41% of the children from Ghana reported having no years of schooling. Our DID estimates will account for these differences by including the observable characteristics in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. However, after
controlling these differences, other unobserved characteristics could have caused the differences in the treatment and control groups’ utilization outcomes. By including the
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year of birth and district fixed effects in the models, we hope to account for the unobserved heterogeneity to obtain unbiased and precise estimates.

Table 1.5. Means and Standard Deviations (in parenthesis) of Household and Parents’ Characteristics by Treatment Group, Control Group & the Full-Sample − Prenatal Care Visits
Treatment Group Control Group All Children
Post-NHIS Period
Treatment (Ghana)
Treatment × Post
Child’s Characteristics
Male
Twin
Birth Order
First
Second
Third
Fourth
≥ Fifth
Mother and Household Characteristics
Rural Residence
Wealth Index
1st Quartile (poorest)
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
5th Quartile (Richest)
Mother Currently Married
Mother’s Age
15 − 26
27 − 34
35 − 40
41 − 49
Mother’s Education
No Education
1−9
10 − 12
≥ 13
Literate
Mother’s Occupation
Not Working
Manual Work
Professionals, Tech., Mgt., Clerks
Sales & Services
Agric. Sector & Self-employed
Ethnicity
Hausa

0.58 (0.49)

0.88 (0.33)

0.82 (0.38)
0.19 (0.39)
0.11 (0.31)

0.51 (0.50)
0.02 (0.13)

0.51 (0.50)
0.02 (0.13)

0.51 (0.50)
0.02 (0.13)

0.22
0.19
0.16
0.14
0.29

0.17
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.41

0.18
0.16
0.14
0.13
0.39

0.58 (0.49)

(0.41)
(0.40)
(0.37)
(0.35)
(0.45)

(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.35)
(0.33)
(0.49)

0.63 (0.48)

(0.38)
(0.37)
(0.35)
(0.34)
(0.49)

0.93 (0.25)

0.30
0.22
0.18
0.17
0.14
0.73

(0.46)
(0.41)
(0.39)
(0.37)
(0.34)
(0.45)

0.32
0.30
0.21
0.12
0.05
0.92

(0.47)
(0.46)
(0.41)
(0.33)
(0.21)
(0.27)

0.32
0.28
0.21
0.13
0.06
0.89

(0.47)
(0.45)
(0.41)
(0.34)
(0.24)
(0.32)

0.33
0.40
0.21
0.11

(0.47)
(0.49)
(0.41)
(0.31)

0.42
0.35
0.19
0.08

(0.49)
(0.48)
(0.40)
(0.26)

0.40
0.36
0.20
0.08

(0.49)
(0.48)
(0.40)
(0.27)

0.39
0.47
0.11
0.03
0.29

(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.31)
(0.18)
(0.46)

0.56
0.29
0.12
0.02
0.30

(0.50)
(0.46)
(0.33)
(0.15)
(0.46)

0.53
0.33
0.12
0.03
0.30

(0.50)
(0.47)
(0.32)
(0.16)
(0.46)

0.13
0.13
0.03
0.34
0.38

(0.33)
(0.33)
(0.17)
(0.47)
(0.49)

0.32
0.10
0.02
0.35
0.20

(0.47)
(0.30)
(0.13)
(0.48)
(0.40)

0.28
0.11
0.02
0.35
0.24

(0.45)
(0.31)
(0.14)
(0.48)
(0.42)

0.12 (0.33)
50

0.31 (0.46)
0.28 (0.45)
Continued on next page
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Treatment Group Control Group All Children
Ghana: Akan
Ghana: Ga-Dangme, Ewe & Guan
Ghana: Mole-Dagbani
Ghana: Others
Nigeria: Fulani
Nigeria: Igbo
Nigeria: Yoruba
Nigeria: Others 1
Nigeria: Others 2
Religion
No Religion
Catholic
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
Survey Year
2003
2008
2013
2014

0.39
0.19
0.25
0.05

0.11
0.07
0.06
0.14
0.34
0.05
0.15
0.54
0.20
0.06

(0.23)
(0.36)
(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.23)

0.37 (0.48)
0.28 (0.45)

0.08
0.29
0.59
0.02

(0.31)
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.34)
(0.47)

0.07 (0.26)
0.04 (0.18)
0.05 (0.21)
0.01 (0.093)
0.09 (0.28)
0.06 (0.23)
0.05 (0.22)
0.11 (0.31)
0.27 (0.45)

(0.27)
(0.45)
(0.49)
(0.13)

0.01
0.09
0.33
0.52
0.02

(0.10)
(0.29)
(0.47)
(0.50)
(0.15)

0.13
0.42
0.38
0.07

(0.34)
(0.49)
(0.49)
(0.25)

0.08 (0.27)
0.45 (0.50)
0.47 (0.50)

0.36 (0.48)

Observations

1.6.2

(0.49)
(0.39)
(0.44)
(0.21)

6,191

27,210

33,401

First Stage Estimates for the Effects of the NHIS on TwelveMonth Healthcare Visits

The statistics in Table 1.2 suggest that the unconditional correlation between
NHIS participation and the years of exposure is positive. On average, women who have
more years of exposure are more likely to enroll in the NHIS. We formally test this correlation and present the results in Table 1.6.46 We report results from linear probability
models and include district fixed effects in all specifications, allowing us to remove the
impacts of district-level time-invariant characteristics on NHIS participation. The spec46 Note that the first stage estimates show NHIS exposure’s effects on the NHIS participation conditional on the
women’s observable characteristics.
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ification in the first column excludes all control variables and time components in the
model. However, because the distributions of the uninsured and insured women’s characteristics differ significantly, as demonstrated in Table 1.1, we include the controls in
the specifications in Columns (2) − (4). In the last two columns, we either add survey
year fixed effects or post-NHIS dummy variable to account for the impacts of economic
growth on the outcome.

Table 1.6. First-Stage Estimates: Effects of Years of NHIS Exposure on NHIS Participation among Women (ages 15 − 49) in Ghana using a Linear Probability Model

Years of NHIS Exposure

Controls
Post-NHIS Indicator
Survey Fixed-Effects
F-Statistic
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.036***
(0.003)

0.036***
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.028)

0.016***
(0.003)

N
N
N
198
15,112

Y
N
N
199
15,112

Y
N
Y
0
15,112

Y
Y
N
30
15,112

Notes: We include the woman’s age, place of resident (rural/urban), marital status of
woman, pregnancy status, number of births in the last five years, birth history, wealth index, woman’s education, woman’s occupation, literacy status of woman, ethnicity, religion,
and district fixed effects as the controls in each specification. We report heteroscedastic
robust-standard errors clustered within the district in the parentheses. *p<.1, **p<.05,
***p<.01

Our first stage estimates with or without controls, but excluding time variables,
show a strong correlation between NHIS participation and years of exposure. In both
cases, we find that a ceteris paribus increase in NHIS exposure by one year is associated with a 3.6 percentage points increase in insurance enrollments and is statistically
significant at 1%. Their corresponding F-statistics are not less than 198. By including
individual and household characteristics, our IV estimate does not change in magni52

tude and precision. It suggests that the individual and household characteristics are
uncorrelated with the years of NHIS exposure in the first stage models. (We test this
hypothesis later). By adding both district and survey year fixed effects to the model,
we obtain a weak IV estimate [see Column (3)]. We explain that since the time frame
for the DHS survey is typically three months, the years of NHIS exposure does not vary
among women surveyed in the same year within a district. In fact, the instrument is
perfectly collinear with the fixed effects of the survey years with an adjusted R-squared
of 0.976.
To overcome the challenge of perfect collinearity, while controlling for time component, we replace the survey fixed effects with a post-NHIS dummy variable and report our estimate in Column (4) of Table 1.6. Our new first stage estimate still shows
a strong correlation between the years of NHIS exposure and health insurance coverage, conditional on the women’s observed characteristics, district fixed effects, and
post-NHIS dummy variable. Notice that adding the post-NHIS dummy variable to the
model reduces the size of our IV estimate by more than 50%, suggesting that the time
variable is essential in the first stage equation [see Column (2) and (4)]. We find that
a ceteris paribus additional year of NHIS exposure is associated with a 1.6 percentage
points increase in NHIS participation and is statistically significant at 1%. The corresponding F-statistic is 30. Since the NHIS enrollment rate in the sample is 24.4%, the
estimate corresponds to a 6.7% increase in NHIS take-up for every additional year of
exposure.
Before closing this subsection, we return to the exclusion restriction assumption
to rule out some possibilities of violating it. If districts that adopted the NHIS early
decided based on need (i.e., pre-determined outcomes) or observed and unobserved
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characteristics, our estimates would not be causal. The excluded instrument would
be endogenous if the rollouts were not random or conditionally random. Although we
cannot formally test the exogeneity of our excluded instrument, we do some diagnostic
checks to rule out some of the concerns of endogeneity. We regress the timing of rollouts (i.e., number of months before districts adopted the NHIS) on the pre-treatment
outcome and observable characteristics and report the results in Table 1.7. In the first
column, we use only the women surveyed in the pre-NHIS period (i.e., 2003). We also
use all the women in the sample and include survey year fixed effects and report the
estimates in the second column. Our results from linear regressions of the number of
months before districts adopted the NHIS on the care-seeking outcome and the observable characteristics rule out our concerns that rollouts were pre-determined based
on need or observable characteristics. Only a few of the variables are statistically significant in both specifications. Since we include these observable characteristics in the
models, we conclude that NHIS adoptions across districts were conditionally random.

Table 1.7. Determinants of District NHIS Adoption. Dependent Variable - Number of
Months

Last 12-Month Healthcare Visits
Age of Woman
27 − 34
35 − 40
41 − 49
Currently Married
Currently Pregnant
Births in the Last 5 Years

Linear Regression
using Women from
Pre-NHIS Period

Linear Regression
using All Women
or Full-Sample

(1)

(2)

-0.537 (0.457)

0.233 (0.254)

0.234 (0.293)
0.211 (0.422)
0.030 (0.341)
0.196 (0.359)
-0.423 (0.342)

-0.005 (0.187)
0.132 (0.225)
0.129 (0.214)
0.142 (0.237)
0.083 (0.224)

Continued on next page
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One Birth
≥ 2 Births
Number of Children Born
One Child
Two Children
≥ Three Children
Wealth Index
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
5th Quartile
Education
1−9
10 − 12
≥ 13
Literate
Employment
Professionals, Tech., Mgt., Clerks
Sales & Services
Agric. Sector & Self-employed
Manual Work
Ethnicity
Akan
Ga-Dangme, Ewe & Guan
Mole-Dagbani
Hausa
Religion
Catholic
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
Rural Residence

Women from Pre-NHIS
0.334 (0.296)
-0.070 (0.435)

Full-Sample Women
0.155 (0.184)
-0.440 (0.268)

-0.146 (0.310)
0.258 (0.614)
0.023 (0.733)

-0.064 (0.174)
0.184 (0.332)
-0.396 (0.546)

1.020 (0.695)
2.278** (0.979)
0.214 (1.096)
-2.313* (1.361)

0.910 (0.775)
0.099 (1.018)
-1.867 (1.163)
-4.000*** (1.361)

0.676 (0.417)
1.122** (0.541)
1.462* (0.760)
-0.546 (0.336)

0.306 (0.344)
0.482 (0.378)
0.816* (0.452)
0.088 (0.264)

-0.958* (0.566)
-0.239 (0.299)
-0.150 (0.656)
-0.436 (0.582)

-0.195 (0.338)
-0.365 (0.304)
-0.496 (0.414)
-0.918*** (0.338)

-3.422 (2.461)
-2.093 (2.493)
-3.025 (2.774)
-4.775** (2.385)

-2.531
-0.869
-0.630
-1.161

(1.718)
(1.779)
(2.180)
(1.874)

-0.926 (0.698)
-0.601 (0.693)
0.545 (1.199)
-0.713 (0.981)
1.674 (1.154)

-1.019 (0.732)
-0.225 (0.541)
0.128 (1.389)
-0.988 (0.881)
1.415 (0.943)

N
3,890

Y
15,112

Survey Year Fixed-Effect
Observations
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1.6.3

Second Stage Estimates for the Effects of the NHIS on TwelveMonth Healthcare Visits

Table 1.8 presents our results from the naive ordinary least squares (OLS), IV,
and reduced-form models. For the naive OLS, we show estimates for two specifications.
The specification in Column (1) includes survey fixed effects, while in Column (2), we
replace the survey fixed effects with the post-NHIS dummy variable. Since survey year
fixed effects are perfectly collinear with the instrument, we report our second-best results from the specification that includes post-NHIS dummy variable as our second
stage IV and reduced-form estimates. The naive OLS estimates suggest that NHIS participation is associated with about 13.2 percentage points increase in the likelihood of
visiting healthcare in twelve months, conditional on the women’s observable characteristics, time variable, and district fixed effects, and is statistically significant at 1%. In
Column (3) and (4), we report the IV estimates.
Our 2SLS estimate is statistically significant when we exclude time fixed effects,
but larger in magnitude and precision compared to the naive OLS estimates. Since
time variables are essential in our models, we include the post-NHIS dummy variable
in the next specification. Including the post-NHIS dummy variable makes the estimate
inefficient. At best, we find that the women induced by the instrument to obtain NHIS
coverage are 30 percentage points more likely to visit healthcare, conditional on their
observable characteristics, post-NHIS dummy variable, and district fixed effects but is
statistically insignificant. Given that the average healthcare visit is 47.7%, our estimate
in Column (4) represents a 63% increase. Our second stage estimates from the linear
IV estimators are inconsistent and inefficient because the outcome and the endoge56

Table 1.8. Naive OLS, Second Stage and Reduced Form Estimates: Effects of NHIS on
Twelve Months Healthcare Visits using Years of NHIS Exposure as Instrumental Variable
Naive OLS

NHIS Coverage

2SLS

(1)

(2)

0.131***
(0.012)

0.133***
(0.012)

(3)

Reduced-Form
(4)

0.246*** 0.300
(0.079) (0.226)

Yrs. of NHIS Exposure
Controls
Post-NHIS Indicator
Survey Fixed-Effects
Observations

(5)

0.005
(0.004)
Y
N
Y
15,112

Y
Y
N
15,112

Y
N
N
15,112

Y
Y
N
15,112

Y
Y
N
15,112

Notes: We include the woman’s age, place of resident (rural/urban), marital status of woman,
pregnancy status, number of births in the last five years, birth history, wealth index, woman’s
education, woman’s occupation, literacy status of woman, ethnicity, religion, and district fixed
effects as the controls in each specification. In Column (3) and (4), we use the years of NHIS
exposure as an instrumental variable for the NHIS participation. We report heteroscedastic
robust-standard errors clustered within the district in the parentheses. *p<.1, **p<.05,
***p<.01

nous variables are binary, as demonstrated in Section 1.11. The reduced-form estimate
shows that a ceteris paribus additional year of NHIS exposure increases a twelve-month
healthcare utilization by about 0.5 percentage points and is statistically insignificant.
At the mean of 47.7% of the outcome, it suggests that a ceteris paribus one additional
year of NHIS exposure increases healthcare utilization by 1%.
The 2SLS estimates are almost twice as large as the OLS estimates and are also
noisy after including a time fixed effect. This finding is surprising because the nature
of endogeneity reasonably points to an upward bias in the OLS. There are possible reasons for the large 2SLS estimates. One reason is that the instrument can be endogenous. However, since we have already demonstrated that early NHIS rollout is uncorrelated with the district-level pre-treatment characteristics and outcomes, we rule out
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this possibility. Another reason is that the 2SLS estimates which, are the LATE, are
larger for the compliers. The final reason is that, as discussed in Section 1.4, the linear
IV models can be approximating the marginal effects of the nonlinear models poorly.
Altonji et al. (2005a) documents similar findings for the 2SLS in their binary response
models with binary endogenous treatment when evaluating instrument strategies for
estimating the effects of Catholic schooling. Consequently, we provide results from the
bivariate probit estimator below to investigate this concern.

Table 1.9. Marginal Effect Estimates of the Impact of NHIS on Twelve Months
Healthcare Visits using Bivariate Probit Models and Years of NHIS Exposure as an
Excluded Instrument

NHIS Coverage

Controls
Post-NHIS Indicator
Survey Fixed-Effects
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.266***
(0.070)

0.320***
(0.106)

0.320***
(0.096)

0.315***
(0.112)

Y/Y
N/N
N/N
15,112

Y/Y
N/N
Y/Y
15,112

Y/Y
Y/Y
N/N
15,112

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Notes: We include the woman’s age, place of resident (rural/urban), marital status of
woman, pregnancy status, number of births in the last five years, birth history, wealth index, woman’s education, woman’s occupation, literacy status of woman, ethnicity, religion,
and district fixed effects as the controls in each specification. We report heteroscedastic
robust-standard errors clustered within the district in parentheses. The coefficient of the
excluded instrument is statistically significant at 1%, except the specification in Column
(2). The notation “N/N” denotes that both the first and second equations of the bivariate
model exclude the variable X. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 1.9 presents our main results on the twelve-month healthcare visits from
the bivariate probit models. We provide estimates for several specifications due to the
flexibility of this estimator in its arguments. In Column (1), we exclude the women’s
observable characteristics and time fixed effects from the first and second stage equa58

tions.47 We include all the control variables in the first and second stage equations
in specifications (2) − (4) but vary both post-NHIS dummy variable and survey year
fixed effects in the first stage and outcome equations. In Column (2), the specification
includes survey year fixed effects in both equations. The specification in Column (3)
substitutes the survey year fixed effects with the post-NHIS dummy variable in both
equations. For the specification in the last column, we include the post-NHIS dummy
only in the first stage equation and survey fixed effects in the outcome equation. The
bivariate model allows for this flexibility since some variables in the first equation can
be excluded from the second equation and vice versa.
The bivariate probit estimates are economically and statistically significant and
larger than the naive OLS results but similar to the linear IV estimates, regardless
of the specification. The estimate for the specification in Column (1) is biased downwards. By adding time variables, we obtain consistently larger coefficients but less efficient, similar to the linear IV estimate. Focusing on our preferred specification in Column (4), we find that a ceteris paribus NHIS coverage increases twelve-month healthcare utilization by approximately 31.5 percentage points and is statistically significant at 1%. Since the estimates from the linear and nonlinear IV estimates are similar,
it demonstrates that we only lose precision and not consistency in the linear models.
Since, on average, 47.7% of women visit health facilities for care in twelve months, the
estimate corresponds to a 66% increase. Compared to the naive OLS estimate, our IV
results suggest that addressing the endogeneity in the NHIS increases the size of the effect by more than twice (i.e., from 13.1 to 31.5 percentage points). It indicates that endogeneity is a more significant concern in the NHIS, and not handling it well can bias
the estimates.
47 The first stage equation estimates the effect of the years of NHIS exposure on NHIS participation. The second
stage equation estimates the impact of the NHIS on the outcome conditional on the predicted variables from the first
stage equation that are included in the second stage equation [See equations (1) and (2)].
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1.6.4

Heterogeneity

We also examine how the effect of the NHIS on any twelve-month healthcare visits is distributed along the dimensions of socioeconomic characteristics and the household location of residence. Estimating the causal impact of the NHIS on healthcare
utilization along these dimensions is interesting because we expect the effect to vary
by the place of residence (rural or urban), household wealth, and woman’s education.
Importantly, we are not sure of the demographic group within which the result will
be more substantial. Since most of the NHIS participants are from low-income households and are more likely to be subsidized, we expect the impact to vary by household
wealth and women’s education. Also, because rural areas in Ghana are less likely to
have healthcare centers, we expect the women in such places to be less likely to visit
healthcare, holding other things constant.48 At the same time, we expect women from
rural communities to utilize the NHIS more than those in urban areas since they are
more likely to have poorer health conditions, ceteris paribus. Table 1.10 presents the
NHIS treatment effects across various sub-samples with twelve-month healthcare visits
as the dependent variable. We only show the results from the preferred specification.49
The first two columns show the analysis by location, followed by household wealth in
the third and fourth columns, and women’s education status in the last two columns.
From our sample, NHIS coverage does not vary much by location, but healthcare
utilization differs on average.50 We suspect that the take-up of the NHIS does not vary
by location because the women from rural areas are more likely to be subsidized due
to their low socio-economic status and are catching up with the urban women. The
first two columns of Table 1.10 show that our estimate from the urban communities is
smaller and less precise than the rural areas’ result. We find that the NHIS increases
twelve-month healthcare visits by about 15.7 percentage points among women from
48 The

monetary and time cost of traveling to healthcare centers may be too high due to poor road network.

49 The

specification that includes post-NHIS dummy variable in the first stage equation and survey year fixed effects
in the outcome equation.
50 Our sample shows 23.7% and 25.0% of the women from the rural and urban communities had NHIS coverage. We
also observe from the sample that 44.9% and 50.7% of the women from rural and urban areas visited healthcare.
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Table 1.10. Heterogeneity in the effect of the NHIS on Twelve Months Healthcare Visits using Bivariate Probit Models and Years
of NHIS Exposure as an Excluded Instrument
Location of Residence

NHIS Coverage

Controls
Post-NHIS Indicator
Survey Fixed-Effects
Observations

Wealth of Household

Education of Woman

Rural

Urban

Poorest 60th
Percentile

Richest 40th
Percentile

Years of
Schooling ≤ 6

Years of
Schooling > 6

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.440***
(0.037)

0.157
(0.159)

0.421***
(0.049)

0.250**
(0.114)

0.436***
(0.051)

0.256*
(0.148)

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
7,720

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
7,392

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
8,975

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
6,137

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
6,874

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
8,238

Notes: We include the woman’s age, marital status of woman, pregnancy status, number of births in the last five years, birth history,
wealth index, woman’s education, woman’s occupation, literacy status of woman, ethnicity, religion, and district fixed effects as the controls
in each specification. We report heteroscedastic robust-standard errors clustered within the district in parentheses. The notation “Y/N”
for a variable X denotes that the first equation of the bivariate probit model includes variable X, whiles the second equation excludes it.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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urban areas and is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the estimate is more
substantial and statistically significant when we consider rural women. Conditional on
the control variables, NHIS coverage increases twelve-month healthcare visits by approximately 44 percentage points among the rural women and is statistically significant
at 1%. At the mean of 44.9% of healthcare visits among women in the rural communities, the estimate corresponds to approximately 98% increase.
In Column (3) and (4), we divide the sample into two sub-samples based on lowand high-income household women. The women in households with wealth from the
1st to 60th percentile are in Column (3), while the remaining women constitute the
group in column (4). On average, 45.7% and 50.7% of the women in the poor and rich
households, respectively, visit healthcare, but NHIS enrollment does not vary between
the two groups. Our results show that the NHIS has a more substantial effect on the
healthcare-seeking behavior among women in the poorest 60th percentile than the women
in the upper 40th percentile. We find a difference of approximately 17 percentage points
and is statistically significant at 1%. Given that the average healthcare utilization among
the women in poor households is 45.7%, our estimates suggest that the NHIS increases
healthcare utilization among poor women by 42.8% more than the rich women.
As our final analysis to prove the heterogeneous effect of the health insurance
on healthcare utilization, we show the causal impact of the NHIS on women with low
(≤ 6) and high (> 6) years of schooling. A quarter of the women in our sample have
no formal education, and 45.5% of them have up to six years of education. While NHIS
enrollment among women with more years of education is about 3.8% higher than women
with a few years of training, the effects of the NHIS on twelve-month healthcare visits
differ substantially between the two groups. The last two columns of Table 1.10 show
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the results from the education sub-sample analysis. We find that the NHIS has a substantial effect on the women with lower years of schooling than those with higher education by approximately 18 percentage points and is statistically significant at 1%. At
the mean utilization level of 47% among the low educated women, the difference corresponds to a 38.3% increase.

1.6.5

NHIS’ Effects on Institutional Births and Prenatal Care

We report our DID results in Table 1.11 and 1.12 for the births in health facilities
and prenatal care outcomes, respectively. We provide estimates for five different specifications by varying the type of controls that we include in the models. While some
specifications exclude individual and household characteristics, others alternate a linear time trend, birth year fixed effects, and post-NHIS dummy variable. In Panel A,
we present our results from the linear probability model (LPM). We also report the
marginal effects of the probit models in Panel B. In all the specifications, we find that
the estimates from the linear models are different from the marginal effects of the probit models in magnitude and precision for the outcome of the institutional birth. In the
case of prenatal care visits, we do not find any differences in the estimates between the
two estimators.
The magnitude of our estimates in Panel B of Table 1.11 shrinks when we include
observable characteristics and a time variable. It decreases from 8.5 to 3.4 percentage
points, depending on the control variables that we include. Focusing on our preferred
specification in Column (4), we find that exposure to the NHIS increases the likelihood
of delivering in health facilities by 5.7 percentage points and is statistically significant
at 1%. Given that the baseline mean of births in health facilities is 30.6% (see Panel A
of Table 1.3), the estimate corresponds to an 18.8% increase.
In the case of our results from prenatal care visits, reported in Table 1.12, our estimates are smaller when we exclude the observable characteristics. By including the
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controls and time component, they become larger in magnitudes, but with stable precision. The estimate from our preferred specification in Column (4) suggests that the
NHIS in Ghana increases prenatal care visits by 6.6 percentage points and is statistically significant at 1%. Since 36.4% of the mothers attended prenatal care visits in the
first four months of pregnancies (see Panel B of Table 1.3), the estimate corresponds to
a 18.2% increase.

1.6.6

Effects of Free Maternal Healthcare on Maternal Healthcare Use

As already indicated, some pregnant women in our sample were eligible for free
NHIS coverage after introducing the free maternal healthcare policy in July 2008. However, each mother needed to send a proof of pregnancy from an obstetrician to the district NHIS office to obtain a free NHIS card for free maternal services. We suspect that
not all eligible pregnant women gained NHIS coverage because of the initial monetary
costs of getting the proof from an obstetrician, the cost of traveling to healthcare centers, and the queues at the centers. We would think of our DID estimates as the effects
of free maternal healthcare policy on prenatal care visits and institutional births if the
law was passed at the initial rollout period. Since the new policy was later added, we
re-estimate our DID models to include only the children born after July 2008 in the
post-NHIS period and report our results in Table 1.13 and 1.14 for births in health facilities and prenatal care visits, respectively. We find a ceteris paribus exposure to the
law increases institutional births and prenatal care visits by 8.7 and 10.5 percentage
points, corresponding to 26.2% and 26% increase at the mean of 0.332 and 0.403, respectively.
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Table 1.11. Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effects of the NHIS in Ghana on Children Born in Health Facilities Outcome using Children from Rural Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.125***
(0.033)

0.114***
(0.033)

0.091***
(0.022)

0.088***
(0.022)

0.067***
(0.022)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post
Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

0.085***
(0.028)

0.075***
(0.029)

0.061***
(0.018)

0.057***
(0.018)

0.034*
(0.017)

N
Y
N
N
46,857

N
N
Y
N
46,857

Y
Y
N
N
46,857

Y
N
Y
N
46,857

Y
Y
N
Y
46,857

Notes: The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics that may affect the outcome. They are
mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status,
education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order, and household wealth index. We cluster
standard errors at the district and Local Government Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the
outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration area similar to census block (in the U.S.A. context).
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Table 1.12. Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effects of the NHIS in Ghana on Prenatal Care Visits using Children from Rural Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.072***
(0.025)

0.062**
(0.025)

0.074***
(0.022)

0.066***
(0.023)

0.067***
(0.022)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post
Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

0.073***
(0.026)

0.062**
(0.025)

0.074***
(0.023)

0.066***
(0.023)

0.065***
(0.022)

N
Y
N
N
33,401

N
N
Y
N
33,401

Y
Y
N
N
33,401

Y
N
Y
N
33,401

Y
Y
N
Y
33,401

Notes: The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics that may affect the outcome. They are
mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order, and household wealth index. We
cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration area similar to census block (in the U.S.A. context).
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Table 1.13. Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effects of Free Maternal Healthcare Policy in Ghana on Children Born in Health
Facilities Outcome using Children from Rural Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.112***
(0.039)

0.129***
(0.038)

0.108***
(0.027)

0.118***
(0.027)

0.106***
(0.026)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post

0.072**
(0.036)

0.090**
(0.035)

0.076***
(0.024)

0.087***
(0.024)

0.074***
(0.022)

Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

N
Y
N
N
29,518

N
N
Y
N
29,518

Y
Y
N
N
29,518

Y
N
Y
N
29,518

Y
Y
N
Y
29,518

Notes: The mean of the outcome is 0.332. The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics
that may affect the outcome. They are mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order,
and household wealth index. We cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration area similar to census block (in the U.S.A.
context).
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Table 1.14. Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effects of Free Maternal Healthcare Policy in Ghana on Any Prenatal Care Visits
using Children from Rural Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.085***
(0.031)

0.085***
(0.031)

0.095***
(0.027)

0.096***
(0.027)

0.101***
(0.026)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post
Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

0.093***
(0.031)

0.093***
(0.031)

0.104***
(0.027)

0.105***
(0.027)

0.108***
(0.026)

N
Y
N
N
19,900

N
N
Y
N
19,900

Y
Y
N
N
19,900

Y
N
Y
N
19,900

Y
Y
N
Y
19,900

Notes: The mean of the outcome is 0.403. The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics
that may affect the outcome. They are mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order,
and household wealth index. We cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration area similar to census block (in the U.S.A.
context).
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The DID estimates in Table 1.13 and 1.14 would be the potential effects of free
maternal healthcare policy on prenatal care visits and institutional births if every pregnant woman obtained NHIS coverage after July 2008. Given that the 2008 DHS survey
interviewed the respondents in August − November 2008, all the pregnant women in
our sample in the post-NHIS period were eligible for free maternal healthcare. But our
data summarized in Table 1.1 shows that only 45% of the pregnant women obtained
NHIS coverage, compared to 31.4% of the non-pregnant women with coverage in the
post-NHIS period.51 To show suggestive evidence of the free maternal healthcare policy’s potential causal effect, we weight the DID estimates in Table 1.13 and 1.14 by the
inverse probability that a pregnant woman gained NHIS coverage after the free maternal care policy. After adjusting the results, we find that they increase to 19.3 and 23.3
percentage points for birth in health facilities and prenatal care visits, respectively. Our
interpretation is that if all pregnant women gain NHIS coverage, institutional births
and prenatal care visits will increase as much, ceteris paribus. They are the full potential of the causal effect of the free maternal healthcare policy.

1.6.7

Robustness Checks

One threat to identifying the parameters in IV models is whether growth in the
healthcare sector induces participation in the NHIS. Hospital openings after the rollout
of the NHIS could lead to more enrollments in health insurance due to improvement
in healthcare access. Although we consider these supply-side factors as mechanisms,
we provide results to show that they do not fully influence healthcare utilization after
the implementation of the NHIS. We include the per 1, 000 people regional-level number of hospitals, hospital beds, doctors, and nurses to capture the supply-side effects
on healthcare utilization. Table 1.A1 in Appendix B reports the results from our reestimated bivariate probit models when we include the supply-side factors as additional
51 Although we do not report these statistics in the tables, we can calculate them indirectly. NHIS coverage differed
by year and pregnancy status. About 25% and 34% of the non-pregnant women had NHIS coverage in 2008 and 2014,
respectively. On the other hand, approximately 34% and 52% of the pregnant women had NHIS coverage in 2008 and
2014, respectively.
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controls. We find that our results do not substantially differ from the main estimates
reported in Table 1.9 when we add the supply-side factors separately or jointly.
We also show how our results change with additional controls. We include other
observable characteristics that we believe in influencing the NHIS take-up decisions.
Dummies for frequent radio listeners, television viewers, long-distance to healthcare
centers, and the education and occupation of the women’s partners at the time of the
survey are the set of additional controls that we also include in the models. For the IV
estimates, our results reported in Table 1.A2 in Appendix C are robust to these supplementary control variables compared to the main results shown in Table 1.9. Similarly,
for the DID estimates, our results, reported in Table 1.B1 in Appendix D and 1.B2 in
Appendix E, are not different from the main results shown in Tables 1.11 and 1.12.
The main concern in identifying the parameters in the DID models is whether the
children from rural Nigeria are similar to the Ghanaian children in observable and unobservable characteristics. Since Nigeria implemented the NHIS in 1999 and introduced
the FSSHIP in 2005, some individuals in the control group could have treatment. Our
next robustness check shows the results when we use the full sample of children from
Nigeria, including those from the urban areas. Figure 1.B1 in Appendix F and 1.B2
in Appendix G show the parallel trends and the events study graphs. Even though
the treatment and control groups’ pre-trends are parallel, the post-NHIS period slope
of births in health facilities outcome for the control group increased drastically, contrary to what we observe when we use rural Nigeria as our control group. In the case
of prenatal care visits, we do not see any significant change in the slope and is reasonably equivalent to the case of using rural Nigeria as a control group. Our estimates reported in Table 1.B3 in Appendix H and 1.B4 in Appendix I are consistently higher
than those shown in Tables 1.11 and 1.12. They suggest that we would overestimate
the causal effect of the NHIS if we used the full sample of children from Nigeria as the
control group.
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1.7

Discussion and Conclusion
Unlike developed economies, evidence on the causal effects of health insurance

programs on healthcare utilization from developing countries, where several factors affect take-up decisions, is limited. Ghana is one of the first African countries to implement a public health insurance program successfully. Before the NHIS, there was limited access to the few insurance programs that existed in a few areas, and almost all
the population had no insurance coverage. The districts, which are the third-level administrative divisions in Ghana, staggered the rollout of the NHIS from 2004 − 2007
and set the price of the NHIS coverage; most of the districts chose the minimum premium enforced by the government of Ghana. Individuals voluntarily enrolled anytime
once the district of residence adopted the NHIS, but with a three-month waiting period. Some other essential features of the NHIS include universal eligibility, national
coverage with a short rollout period, subsidies for some eligible groups, and free insurance for pregnant women. Additionally, the government of Ghana imposes a 2.5% tax
on goods and services, funding approximately 70% of the cost of the NHIS annually.
Despite the fact that the districts sell the NHIS below its actuarially fair price, over
60% of the Ghanaian population still have no health insurance coverage.
Because the design of the NHIS introduces endogeneity and other issues, it is
challenging to identify its causal impact. Consequently, evidence on the causal effects
of the NHIS on a variety of outcomes is sparse. This paper estimates the causal impact of the NHIS on healthcare utilization among women aged 15 − 49 using empirical
strategies that overcome prior methodological issues. We organize data from Ghana
and Nigeria Demographic and Health Surveys and administrative data on district rollout dates. Our outcomes of interest are twelve-month healthcare visits, births in health
facilities (or institutional births), and prenatal care visits. We use two different empirical strategies to model the outcomes appropriately, depending on the availability
of data. In both approaches, we exploit districts’ staggered rollouts as an exogenous
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source of variation to identify the causal effect of the NHIS on the outcomes. For the
twelve-month healthcare visits, which we observe only in the years that surveys occurred, we jointly model enrollment in the NHIS and healthcare utilization decisions
using the years of NHIS exposure as an excluded instrument in an IV framework.52 After constructing data for years 1999 − 2013 using dates of births of under five-year-old
children, we apply a DID estimation strategy to identify the impact of the NHIS on
prenatal care visits and institutional births using rural Nigeria as a control group.
Our results provide strong evidence that NHIS substantially increases healthcare
utilization among women of childbearing ages. In all cases of healthcare utilization outcomes, we obtain statistically and economically significant effects. We find that NHIS
participation increases twelve-month healthcare visits among women by about 32 percentage points (i.e., 66% relative to the baseline mean of approximately 47.7%). Our
results also show that the NHIS increases the likelihood of mothers delivering in health
facilities by 5.7 percentage points (18.8%) and prenatal care visits by 6.6 percentage
points (18.2%). From the IV analysis of the NHIS’s impact on twelve-month healthcare
visits, we stratify our analysis by household wealth, residence, and education. In all
cases, we find a more substantial effect of the NHIS on the outcome among the disadvantaged women (i.e., poor, rural, and uneducated women). We also provide an event
study analysis to explore the effect of the timing of district staggered rollout on the
outcomes. We find evidence of significant impacts of the NHIS only after three years of
national coverage. Also, we show from the event study models that the NHIS in Ghana
possibly has differential effects with an increasing impact over time. Finally, we characterize the potential effects of the free maternal care (i.e., a law passed in July 2008
to give pregnant women free NHIS). We find higher estimates for births in health facilities and prenatal care visits and show that they would double if all the eligible women
enrolled in the NHIS.
We discuss a few implications of our results. First, they imply that the NHIS re52 We construct the years of NHIS exposure in the district of residence using the dates of NHIS rollouts in districts
and the survey dates.
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duces home deliveries, which was a significant concern before implementing the program. Second, the NHIS induces women to utilize prenatal care services that have several effects on maternal and child health. Therefore, we believe that the NHIS helps
Ghana achieve the Millennium Development Goals of improving maternal health and
decreasing infant mortalities. Our third finding that the NHIS increases twelve-month
healthcare utilization among women is evidence of increasing healthcare visits. This
is important because Ghana as tropical country, where malaria and cholera are common, women must visit healthcare regularly. Our results also imply a declining social
gradient in health since the NHIS has more significant effects on poor, rural, and loweducated women’s outcomes.53 Finally, our findings of NHIS increasing utilization motivates us to consider other outcomes in future studies. In one study, we intend to use
DHS data from seven African countries in a synthetic control methodology to estimate
the impact of the NHIS on infant mortality. In another study, we intend to evaluate
the effects of the NHIS on the child’s later-in-life outcomes, including cognitive skills
and school-related consequences.
This study has several strengths and provides the most credible causal estimate of
the effect of the NHIS on healthcare utilization using the best available data sets and
empirical strategies to overcome methodological challenges in prior studies. First, we
recognize the endogeneity caused by the nature of the design of the NHIS. We use districts’ staggered rollout as an exogenous source of variation to address the endogeneity
concerns in the NHIS participation. The staggered rollout is a common natural experiment often used to tackle endogeneity issues (Fink et al., 2013; Gruber and Hanratty,
1995; Cesur et al., 2017; Ater et al., 2017). We argue that the timing of NHIS rollouts
across districts is uncorrelated with pre-existing healthcare utilization behaviors and
the individual observed characteristics after ruling out some of the concerns about the
excluded instrument being endogenous.
Second, our methodologies utilize all the women and under five-year-old children
53 The

social gradient in health indicates that the poorest of the poor have the worst health.
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in our data sets, including those with incomplete information on NHIS enrollments.
Studies either limit their samples to individuals with full details to use fewer observations or assume that the NHIS enrollment status of mothers observed in the year of the
survey is representative of their enrollment status at the time of utilizing healthcare.
Given that our study period overlapped the phase-in stage of the NHIS when rollouts
were still increasing over time, we think that such a strong assumption can lead to an
overclassification of NHIS enrollments. Because the NHIS participation variable takes
a zero or one value, it makes measurement errors from misclassification non-classical.54
Such errors negatively correlate with the actual underlying values of NHIS participation.55 The severity of the non-classical measurement error is that since the bias can
assume any sign (i.e., positive or negative), its effect can extend beyond just an attenuated coefficient to assume a wrong sign (Nguimkeu et al., 2019; Wossen et al., 2019).
Additionally, non-classical measurement errors cannot be easily overcome with standard errors-in-variables methods. Therefore, regardless of the source of misclassification, causal identification in the presence of a non-classical measurement error is nontrivial. Failure to account for such issues will lead to biased estimates with misleading
policy implications.
Third, our data sets allow us to overcome the concerns of measurement errors and
endogenous misreporting. The interviewers used several approaches to verify respondents’ answers to the survey questions. We define our health insurance participation
variable to include only the women with verified NHIS cards. By this definition, we
mitigate the concerns of measurement errors in the NHIS participation variable. Also,
since we define our IV from administrative data on the dates of certificates of commencements of the NHIS across districts, we mitigate any measurement error concerns
on our excluded instrument.
The final and probably the most subtle strength of our study is that we use es54 If

the measurement error is classical, it will not be a significant concern since we can sign the bias.

55 If

NHIS participation is one, measurement error can only be negative, and if the NHIS participation is zero, it can
only be positive. So, the measurement error is negatively correlated with the actual values of NHIS participation.
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timation techniques that consistently identify the causal impact of our binary endogenous NHIS participation variable on the binary outcomes. The majority of the causal
studies on the NHIS use estimation techniques that literature has shown to inconsistently estimate the effect of a binary endogenous variable on binary outcomes of interest. We use a bivariate probit estimation technique that produces consistent and efficient estimates, unlike the linear models that sometimes give poor approximations of
marginal effects of highly nonlinear models (Altonji et al., 2005a,b; Lewbel et al., 2012;
Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 596-597).
Three caveats to our study are as follows. First, given that we observe one of the
outcomes in our data only in 2003, 2008, and 2014, there could be many changes in
the aggregate economy that the post-NHIS dummy variables cannot capture. It would
be useful if data are available in all years to account for the trends in the growth of
the Ghanaian economy and the health sector. Second, one challenge in our estimation
procedure is the data limitation of not obtaining variations in the NHIS participation
before 2003. Before implementing the NHIS in 2003, there was almost no health insurance. Everyone in our sample from the post-NHIS period, 2008 and 2014, was eligible
for insurance. We overcome this challenge by relying on 1% women with private insurance from the pre-NHIS period for identification. It allowed us to implement the IV
strategy that relies on the assumption of independence and exclusion restriction. We
would focus on the reduced form strategy that makes a minimal assumption of independence and not exclusion restriction if data was available. Therefore, our IV estimate of 32 percentage points needs to be interpreted with caution due to these challenges. Third, a threat to the validity of the DID estimates is that our control group,
rural Nigeria, could be different from the treatment group, Ghana, in terms of unobservable characteristics that could affect the outcomes differently. For example, we do
not have information on household income. Since Nigeria has benefited from crude oil
for many years, and Ghana only discovered oil in 2007, the individuals in Nigeria may
be wealthier than the women from Ghana. We provide Figure 1.6 to compare the GDP
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per capita for Ghana and Nigeria. In the years that we draw our samples (1999 − 2013),
the GDP per capita gap between Ghana and Nigeria widened, with Nigeria leading in
all years. However, we assume that the women from rural Nigeria, used as the control
group, are as poor as the Ghanaian women, making them comparable.

Figure 1.6. GDP per Capita (in Current US$) for Ghana and Nigeria, 1960 − 2018

To close, we provide three policy recommendations. First, from our results, we
believe that the policymakers of the NHIS can influence the healthcare utilization of
women by increasing coverage. Even with the low NHIS coverage (i.e., only 24.4% of
the women in our sample), we find a substantial causal impact of the insurance on our
outcomes of interest. It suggests that implementing a mandatory health insurance policy that increases NHIS coverage will induce more healthcare utilization. However, we
also recommend that the supply-side factors should be available to meet the increasing
demand to prevent overburden on the existing resources. Since the mandate cannot be
effective without supporting low-income families, we recommend that the policymakers
subsidize more women with low socioeconomic status who cannot afford the NHIS. Our
finding of heterogeneous impacts of the NHIS in favor of the poor, low-educated, and
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rural women suggests that these women are benefiting more, reducing health inequality.
Finally, we recommend that the policymakers implement a complementary policy that
can ensure a 100% take-up of the free maternal healthcare policy. Our results suggest
that if all pregnant women gain coverage, the NHIS’s impact on deliveries in health facilities and prenatal care visits will double.
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Chapter 2
The Long-term Effects of Charter School Exposure on
Education and Health Behaviors

2.1

Introduction
Over the years, policymakers have devoted efforts to increase the quantity and

improve the quality of human capital investments.1 Increasing the quality of human
capital investment can induce further investment among individuals with sub-optimal
levels (Becker, 1967; Card et al., 2012; Aaronson and Mazumder, 2011). After Becker
(1964) established that investment in human capital improves health, raises earning,
and increases the person’s knowledge about own lifetime, with more evidence from
Schultz (1961, 1967) that investment in human capital positively affects aggregate income and economic growth, several studies have focused on it. In this paper, we present
new evidence on how efforts to improve the quality of K-12 education in the U.S. influences human capital development and other outcomes.
A recent state-level policy intended to improve the quality of human capital investments in the U.S. was the state charter laws, which allow public schools to operate
independently with less supervision from state and local school authorities. Minnesota
was the first state to pass the law in December 1991 and opened its first charter school
in 1992. Many states passed the laws subsequently and opened charter schools, and as
of 2020, 44 states and the District of Columbia had charter schools. Currently, about
7500 charter schools exist, serving 3.3 million students, about 5% of the population of
1 Policies such as state compulsory school attendance laws (CSLs), which started in Massachusetts in the late 19th
century, were implemented to increase human capital investment. Other policies such as classroom size regulations,
school lunch, anti-bullying regulations, etc., seek to improve the rate at which human capital investments convert to
the desired outcomes. Improving the efficiency of the investment in human capital is analogous to increasing the rate at
which every dollar invested in human capital translates into the desired outcome.
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public schools.2
Since its inception in 1991, several studies have examined the impacts of charter
schools on students’ outcomes. However, these studies have primarily focused on immediate and short-term outcomes such as students’ performance and school competition
(Sass et al., 2016; Booker et al., 2011; Angrist et al., 2016; Ni, 2009), with a few considering medium-term impacts, including health behaviors and earnings.3 Also, each study
focused on a few jurisdictions, starting from one city to a maximum of sixteen states.4
Therefore, a study that uses national data to assess the charter schools’ long-term impacts on students’ later-in-life outcomes is important. With many states opening charter schools by 2003, it is worth focusing on their impacts on students’ later-in-life outcomes.
This paper estimates the long-term effects of exposure to charter schools on laterin-life education outcomes and health behaviors. Specifically, we answer the following questions. (1) What are the long-term impacts of charter school exposure on educational outcomes such as completed years of schooling and college completion? (2)
What are the long-term effects of charter school exposure on health behaviors, including cigarette smoking and excessive alcohol consumption? We define charter school exposure from two different dimensions. First, we construct charter school exposure as
the number of years students were exposed to charter schools in their resident counties
before graduating from secondary schools. Second, we define a comprehensive measure
of exposure analogous to those used in Aaronson and Mazumder (2011), who estimated
2 See

from data.publiccharters.org/

3 Most

of these studies consider outcomes, including college enrollment and a transition from 2- to a 4-year institution. For example, Sass et al. (2016) and (Booker et al., 2011) has college enrollment as the main outcome in their
Florida and Chicago studies.
4 Notably, studies have focused on Texas, Chicago, Michigan Denver, New York, Boston, Florida, North Carolina,
and a few others ((Sass et al., 2016; Booker et al., 2011; Dobbie and Fryer, 2020; Bettinger, 2005; Booker et al., 2007; Ni,
2009; Hanushek et al., 2007; Zimmer et al., 2012; Jinnai, 2014; Hoxby, 2004; Davis and Raymond, 2012).
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Rosenwald school exposure on black achievements and Miller and Wherry (2019) that
assessed the long-term effects of early Medicaid coverage, respectively. Our measure
calculates the intensity of charter schools coverage before graduating from high schools.
We use an instrumental variable approach as our empirical strategy since the ordinary least squares has two primary limitations. First, there might be endogenous migration, which would bias the estimates if we use the exposure at the county of residence. Charter school opening could induce students to migrate across counties. Second, even if we define charter school exposure at birth counties, we still face attenuation bias concerns since people do not stay in their county of birth forever. To address
these issues, we compute the two measures, exposure from the county of residence and
at the county of birth. Then we use the birth county exposure as an instrument for
that of the county of residence. Therefore, the first-stage model regresses the county
of residence’s exposure on exposure from the birth county and controls for individual
characteristics, county, and birth year fixed effects. The second stage then estimates
the impacts of charter school exposure from the county of residence on the outcomes.
Using this strategy overcomes the attenuation and endogeneity concerns.
We link potentially exposed individuals from the restricted, geocoded National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth to charter schools at the county level using the National
Center for Education Statistics Common Core Data, providing the universe of public
elementary and secondary schools. A summary of our findings is as follows. We find a
local average treatment effect estimate such that an additional year of charter school
exposure increases the chances of completing a four-year college or better by 3%. When
we use charter school coverage as the measure, our results are that a 1-point increase
in the exposure increases the probability of completing a four-year university educa80

tion or better by 0.4% among those induced. We also obtain larger estimates (i.e., 4%
for every additional year and 0.5% for a 1-point increase in charter school coverage)
when we restrict our sample to include only those who completed high schools. We also
demonstrate that charter schools favor females more than males and Blacks and Hispanics than Whites on four-year college completion. Our local average treatment effects
for alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking are small but not negligible and more
pronounced among high-educated individuals and Blacks and Hispanics.
The study makes four substantial contributions to the literature. First, we are the
first to provide national estimates on charter schools’ impacts on students’ outcomes
to the best of our knowledge. Second, because the law started in 1991 and by 2003,
more than 40 states had opened charter schools, there is a need to consider their longterm impacts on students’ outcomes. Importantly, the inconclusive evidence of their
short- and medium-term effects makes it impossible to predict their long-term effects.
Third, a few studies have considered the impacts of charter schools on health behaviors. Although the policymakers intend to improve education outcomes, we demonstrate that charter schools also reduce adverse health behaviors. Finally, rather than
focusing on only the direct effects (i.e., charter school attendance), our strategy estimates the spillover effects of charter schools, adjusting for their impacts on those who
were indirectly affected.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide brief institutional details of charter school establishment. Section 2.3 summarizes the previous studies on charter schools, while Section 2.4 discusses the conceptual framework
and mechanisms through which charter school exposure affect students’ long-term outcomes. The empirical models and charter school exposure measures and data sources
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for this study follow in Section 2.5. We present the results in Section 2.6 and discuss
the results, provide policy recommendations, and conclude the paper in Section 2.7.

2.2

Institutional Details
Charter laws are state-level legislation that permits K-12 schools to operate in-

dependent of local authorities. A state that legislates a charter school law provides
guidelines for writing charter contracts. Charter authorizers are responsible for managing charter schools through the contracts. The authorizers can be the local school
board, the state education board, or any independent organization. Charter laws differ by state. For example, several states place caps on the number or percent of charter
schools the state (or a school district) can establish at any period. Mississippi passed
charter law in 1996 but started with only one pilot charter school until 2013. California
restricted authorizations to 250 schools in 1998/99 but allows a successive increase of
100 annually. Table 2.A1 in Appendix K presents states’ charter law and regulations on
the number of charter schools that the school districts permit. By 2018, about sixteen
states and the District of Columbia imposed caps on charter schools.
Within school districts, charter authorizers are responsible for managing charter contracts. A traditional public school (henceforth, TPS) can convert into a charter
school, while new schools can also begin as start-up charter schools. Charter schools
can also reverse to TPS at any time. Non-profit organizations, people, or communities who wish to start charter schools apply for approval from the charter authorizers.
In the application, the prospective school provides a comprehensive description of the
school, including the attendance zone, the number of proposed students and teachers,
available facilities, food and health service available, and students’ background informa82

tion such as students’ age and grade levels. If the authorizer approves the application,
they write the charter contract, and the two parties sign it.5 The contract specifies essential clauses, including the duration of the charter status, the minimum academic
performance, and a periodic reporting of the school’s progress.6 The school keeps the
conditions in the contract; otherwise, the authorizers revoke the contract. A charter
contract is also not renewed automatically. Instead, continuation depends on how well
the school performs in upholding the standards specified in the contract.
After gaining the charter school status, it operates independently as a public
school. Charter schools are semi-autonomous. Like any TPS, charter schools are publicly funded, have more freedom over their budgets, staffing, curricula, and other operations. They cannot charge tuition or demand extra fees from students and must hold
the same academic accountability measures as TPSs and private schools (Yilan and
Berger, 2011). Meeting the accountability standards outlined in the contracts are some
of the ways that charter schools use to maintain their charter status so that they get
exempted from a particular state or local rules and regulations accompanied by freedom, flexibility, and autonomy.7
Unlike the TPSs, charter schools are open to all students within the school district or attendance zone. Students within the school district are given enrollment opportunities before allowing those outside the school district to sign up if seats are still
available.8 In this regard, parents freely choose to enroll (or disenroll) their children
in (or from) any charter school. A charter school cannot discriminate on demographic
5 See

more from https://www.dekalbschoolsga.org/charter-schools/.

6 An

example of a charter contract is available at https://www.gadoe.org/External-Affairs-and-Policy/CharterSchools/Documents/Atlanta%20Public%20Schools.pdf.
7 See more from “The Condition of Education 2018”, a report on education from the National Center for Education
Statistics.
8 See more from https://www.gadoe.org/External-Affairs-and-Policy/Charter-Schools/Pages/General-FrequentlyAsked-Questions.aspx.
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characteristics or medical conditions. A student who transfers from a TPS to a charter school moves with the previously provided funds. If a charter school receives more
application than its capacity, it uses a lottery strategy to allocate students. Also, charter schools have periods when students can apply for consideration. Therefore, charter
schools are alternative (i.e., substitutes) to TPS and private schools since parents do
not incur additional direct costs to transfer their children. In localities where all public
schools are charter are called charter districts or system. A few charter districts exist.9
The Decatur City Schools in Georgia is an example of a charter school system.

2.3

Previous Studies
Many studies have estimated the short-term impacts of charter school attendance

on several outcomes, predominantly test scores but find mixed evidence with no consensus. Some evidence of no impact exists (Dobbie and Fryer, 2020; Zimmer et al.,
2012; Booker et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2007; Bettinger, 2005). However, there is
both positive and negative evidence as well. One group of studies find positive effects
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017; Angrist et al., 2016; Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2015; Deming
et al., 2014; Jinnai, 2014; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011; Hoxby, 2009; Booker et al., 2008;
Holmes et al., 2006; Hoxby, 2004). On the other hand, some studies also find negative effects (Imberman, 2011; Winters, 2012; Ni, 2009; Sass, 2006; Bifulco and Ladd,
2006).10 Other nonacademic outcomes of students such as health behaviors are rarely
analyzed in the literature. Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2015) find that charter school atten9 See

more from https://www.crpe.org/publications/charter-school-districts.

10 Hoxby

(2004) surveyed 36 charter schools in 15 states and found that charter school attendance increases math
and reading proficiency except that of targeted and at-risk students. The study included these states: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, DC, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.
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dance reduces pregnancy for girls and incarceration for boys using New York data. One
caveat is that studies that find positive impacts on short-run outcomes also find that
students perform poorly in the few years following enrolling in charter schools (Booker
et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2007).11
A few studies have considered medium-term outcomes, including college enrollment and shifts from 2- to 4-year institutions. Generally, they find positive effects (Sass
et al., 2016; Angrist et al., 2016; Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2015; Booker et al., 2011).12
Deming et al. (2014) is the only study that has studied four-year college degree completion. They use Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools data to find that girls who attend their
first-choice schools are 14 percentage points more likely to complete four-year degree
colleges, but no effects on boys. To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have
analyzed labor-market outcomes. However, these two papers find contradictory evidence. Sass et al. (2016) find that charter school attendance has positive effects on students earnings in their early 20s, while Dobbie and Fryer (2020) find adverse effects.13
Therefore, the medium-term effects are also inconclusive. Besides, other studies have
considered the effect of charter school competition on students’ outcomes. In general,
there is mixed evidence in the literature as well. While studies such as Ni (2009) find
less competitive effects, Zimmer et al. (2009) finds no impact, as Holmes et al. (2006)
demonstrates positive effects on competition among schools.
The studies discussed above focused on a few states or cities, usually from one
state or city to a maximum of sixteen states or cities. However, as of 2017, all but six
11 When students transfer from TPSs to charter schools, they experience lower outcomes than their counterparts who
remain in TPSs in the first two years. They equalize in the third and fourth years before experiencing a positive impact
afterward.
12 Dobbie and Fryer (2020) analyzed administrative data from Texas and found that at the mean, charter school
attendance has no impact on test scores, and the best case is increasing both test scores and college enrollment.
13 Sass et al. (2016) study students from Florida and Chicago using administrative data find that charter school students experience higher earnings in their mid-20s. (Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2015) also analyzed the impact of charter school
attendance on students’ outcomes six years after enrollment using Texas data.
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states had opened charter schools. Since the school systems in states operate differently
based on their educational policies, state-level estimates in the literature may lack external validity. Therefore, a study that uses national data is important. Additionally,
charter schools’ long-term impacts are relevant since states and the federal government
expenditure on welfare programs correlate with the later-in-life outcomes. For example,
states spent about $31.7 billion on Temporary Assistant for Needy Families (TANF)
in 2015,14 $592.75 billion on Medicaid in 2017,15 and $66.54 billion on Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in 2016.16 Understanding how charter school exposure affects these outcomes is useful because policymakers will understand how they
possibly change these expenditures through education.

2.4

Conceptual Framework
Card and Krueger (1996) developments on Becker (1967) model provides a basis

for understanding how charter schools affect students’ future outcomes. Additionally,
Aaronson and Mazumder (2011) framework demonstrates how changing schools’ availability and quality affect the socially optimal choice. One precise prediction of the latter study’s model was that Rosenwald’s school construction, increasing the number and
quality of schools in rural counties, increased the time spent in school among treated
students. Since charter school opening is an expansion of school choice, we develop a
similar framework for understanding the model’s prediction as charter schools opening
varied over time. By equating the marginal cost to the marginal benefit of schooling,
14 See

from https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-and-moe-spending-and-transfers-by-activity-fy-2015.

15 See

from https://www.medicaid.gov/state-overviews/scorecard/national-context/annual-expenditures/
index.html.
16 See

from https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/FY16-State-Activity-Report.pdf.
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students can choose their optimal education. Since the marginal benefit is a positive
function of the school quality, improving the school quality increases the marginal benefit. Hence, the optimal level of schooling among affected school children rises as the
school quality improves.
Suppose there are individuals with a suboptimal level of schooling due to some
reasons, including low quality of schools and lack of competition. Then any policy that
improves the quality of education leads to an increment in human capital investments.
If opening charter schools enhances school quality within that neighborhood, students
whose marginal benefits rise will invest more in their education. It implies that the theoretical prediction is an increment in schooling years among students with suboptimal
levels due to charter school openings. Of course, one can argue with many reasons why
charter school openings may improve school quality. States passing charter laws permit
the penetration of charter schools, which serve as alternatives to TPSs to drive competition. Therefore, every new charter school potentially improves the average school
quality in its neighborhood. Also, the fact that parents and students searched for alternative schools suggests that they were not satisfied with the quality of TPSs and
wanted better alternatives.
Contrarily, suppose charter schools opening decreases the quality of schools in
its neighborhood. In that case, the marginal benefit of schooling falls, and the optimal
choice of years of education decreases as well. The optimal levels of investments in human capital will fall among affected school children. However, the argument that charter schools can reduce the quality of schools in their neighborhoods is debatable. On
the one hand, proponents argue that charter schools are under close supervision and
close if they cannot satisfy their charter contracts. The authorities’ close monitoring
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ensures that charter schools are accountable to the charter contract. Moreover, parents
possibly migrate or move their children to places with relatively good schools if schools’
quality falls in their neighborhood. However, critics of charter schools argue that since
a few charter schools closed for many reasons, including mismanagement, inadequate
enrollment, and non-compliance of contract, they could have detrimental effects on students. Therefore, one cannot undermine the possibility that some charter schools negatively affect quality in their neighborhoods. In summary, the theoretical prediction of a
charter school opening on human capital investment is ambiguous.
Aside from educational outcomes, there is no direct connection between charter school attendance or the state’s charter law and health behaviors. However, there
are so many mechanisms through which charter school exposure can potentially affect
health behaviors in the long-term. Earnings and education are two apparent mechanisms. If charter schools impact earning and education, then we expect health outcomes to be affected. Starting from Grossman (1972), a body of literature has established the effects of earnings and education on health behaviors and outcomes. In his
model, education increases the productivity of medical services, which predicts that any
exogenous shock that shifts the education level increases the demand for health. Therefore, higher education leads to improved health outcomes. Also, in the model, higher
earnings increase the opportunity cost of sick days. People cannot afford to stay home
when their earnings are high. Therefore, they invest more in their health. The higher
earnings translate into health investment to get more healthy days to work.
Many empirical studies have established these predictions of the Grossman (1972)
model. For example, studies including but not limited to Gerdtham et al. (1999); Apouey
and Clark (2015); Lindahl (2005) find that income improves health while Lleras-Muney
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(2005); Silles (2009); Kenkel et al. (2006) find that higher education causes less risky
behaviors and improve health outcomes. Using charter school exposure as an exogenous
source of variation for education to estimate their impacts on health behaviors and outcomes is a useful exercise.
Because Sass et al. (2016) find that charter school attendance increases students’
earnings in their mid-20s, it is exciting to explore how these students’ health behaviors
and outcomes are affected. Also, since Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2015) demonstrate that
Texas’ charter school attendance reduces teenage pregnancy and male incarceration, we
further explore these outcomes using national data. Only these studies have analyzed
the charter school effects on earnings and health behaviors to the best of our knowledge.
Aside from the two mechanisms discussed above, Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2015)
identified other channels through which charter school attendance can affect health
outcomes and behaviors. They argued that noncognitive skills, social networks, and
economic preference parameters are other mechanisms. They also find that charter
school attendance negatively impacts noncognitive skills, including self-esteem and persistence. Also, they find that attending charter schools has no effect on the discount
rate but increases risk-aversion. The incremental change in risk aversion implies that
charter school students are less likely to take risky behaviors, including smoking, drinking, and drug abuse, but are more likely to invest in their health, including purchasing
insurance, exercising, and eating healthy food. Finally, they find that charter school
attendance does not cause changes in peer quality. Because the evidence suggests that
charter schools affect health behaviors, it is interesting to use nationally representative
data.
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2.5

Methods

2.5.1

Empirical Strategy

To address endogeneity in this study, we abstract away from models that compare
the outcomes of students who attend charter schools to students who attend TPSs. We
discuss the various method used in the literature in Appendix J. Our method relies on
a few assumptions. First, we assume that an opening of charter schools potentially affects all elementary and secondary school students at all grade levels in the county. Because every student at the level of implementation of the law in the county with a charter school is potentially exposed, it is not feasible to use a pre-post approach to identify
the effects. Second, we assume that there is no heterogeneous effect across grades. In
other words, the impact of exposure in elementary level 6 is not different from that of
grade 12. From these assumptions, we estimate a model that compares the outcome of
students with varying levels of exposure based on year, cohort, and the county of residence (i.e., cohort-by-year-by-county analysis).
We begin with a basic specification of an intent-to-treat model below:

Yibct = γ0 + γ1 ACSExposureibc + βXibct + λc + λb + λt + ξibct .

(2.1)

In equation (1), the variable Yibct represents the outcome of the individual i, born in
birth cohort b at county c, whose outcome was observed at year t. The outcomes are
years of schooling, college attendance, cigarette smoking, and alcohol consumption.
The variable ACSExposureibc represents a measure of charter school exposure for individuals i, among the birth cohort b, and in county c. The vector Xibct represents a
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set of individual basic characteristics. To overcome potential endogeneity, we only include age, race, gender, and education. Also, λc , λb , and λt represent vector of county,
birth cohort, and year fixed effects, respectively. Finally, the variable ξibct captures the
random unobserved component of equation (1).
The argument for specifying the model of this form is that the outcomes of the
student within a county with charter schools may vary by birth cohort. In equation (1),
the coefficient of interest is γ1 , capturing the effect of charter school exposure at the
county level. By including the county, birth cohort and year of outcome fixed effects
in the model, we compare individuals born in the same county across periods, while
those in counties without charter schools serve as controls for those in areas with charter schools. The model exploits the cross-cohort variation in the timing of the opening
of charter schools in counties.
In the next few paragraphs, we provide a detailed account of the strategies used
to generate various measures of charter exposure. These measures rely on a few assumptions as follows. First, each cohort begins their first grade at age 6 and are expected to graduate from high school at age 18, irrespective of the state of residence.
Although the school starting age in states in the U.S. are 5, 6 or 7, the mean and median age of starting school is 6. Second, every child in ages 6–18 in counties where
charter schools opened was exposed. Third, all children of ages 6–8 enrolled in schools.
As our first measure of the charter school exposure, we aggregate the number of
years that each birth cohort were exposed based on their county of residence. This
variable is discrete and takes values 0 to 12. Using this definition, we assume that all
states use a 12-year system where students begin first grade at age 6 and are expected
to graduate at age 18. Therefore, by observing the grade of the student at the time the
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county of residence first opened a charter school and the years expected to graduate,
we calculate the maximum years of exposure.
Our second measure of charter school exposure is like the definition of Rosenwald
school exposure in Aaronson and Mazumder (2011). In their study, they constructed
the “Rosenwald Coverage” that each student born in year b in county c experienced
over ages 7–13 as the average probability of enrolling in the Rosenwald school.17 Additionally, Miller and Wherry (2019) used a similar strategy in their long-term effect
of early life Medicaid study. In their study, they constructed a cumulative measure of
public health insurance eligibility at ages 1-18 for each birth year and the state as the
fraction of children eligible for coverage at each age during childhood in each state and
summed across ages. We construct our exposure variable as the average charter school
coverage that each student born in year b in county c experienced between ages 6–18
based on counties ever resided before graduating from high school. That is, we compute the second measure of exposure (“actual exposure”) based on all counties that the
student lived before graduating from secondary school. Specifically, for all individuals
in my sample who began school after their counties opened charter schools, we define
exposure as:
ACSExposureibc =

b+12
1 X CSStudcτ
,
Tib τ =b+6 Ncτ,6−18

(2.2)

where Tib denotes the number of years student i in birth cohort c was exposed to charter school, which depends on the counties lived. We also use CSStucτ to represent the
number of charter school students in county c at year τ and Ncτ,6−18 for the number of
school-going children of ages 6-18 in county c in year τ .
P
Tct ×45
and Mazumder defined their measure as Ebc = 71 b+13
, where Ebc represents Rosenwald
τ =b+6
Nct
exposure for individuals born in year b in county c, Tct represents the number of Rosenwald teachers and Nct represents
the number of black populations in county c.
17 Aaronson
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This measure of charter school exposure calculates the cumulative probability
of enrolling in a charter school at the county level and normalizes it by the expected
years of exposure. It measures the average probability of enrolling in charter schools
for all individuals throughout their elementary and secondary school years. The variation comes from the fact that individuals in counties without charter schools get zero
exposure, while those in counties with charter schools get value ranging from 0 to 1, depending on the years of exposure and available seats. Therefore, two individuals born
in the same county can have different exposures due to differences in the year of birth
and places stayed.
Notice that exposure to charter schools depends on the counties that the person
lived during his elementary and high school period. A major drawback of this approach
is endogenous migration. Students could move due to charter school opening. This will
bias the estimates in equation (2.1) if estimated by OLS. Even if we calculate the exposure at the county of birth, we would attenuate γ1 since people do not stay in their
county of births forever. To address these issues, we calculate the exposure from the
county of birth and follow Miller and Wherry (2019) to use an instrumental variable
approach. The first stage model is as follows:

ACSExposureibc = α0 + α1 CSExposurebc + ΦXibct + λc + λb + λt + νibct .

(2.3)

In equation (2.3), the dependent variable represents the “actual exposure,” which depends on the year born and county of residence before graduating from high school, is
regressed on charter school exposure in the county of birth, CSExposurebc . We also include a vector of covariates that we use in equation (2.1). The parameter of interest is
α1 , which shows the correlation between charter school exposure at the county of birth
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and residence.
We discuss the identifying assumptions as follows. First, the instrument needs to
be relevant. We test this assumption from the data by looking at the first stage estimates, capturing the correlation between exposure in the county of birth and residence.
A high positive α1 and F-statistic would imply a robust first stage estimate and suggest exposure in the county of birth highly predicts exposure in the county of residence.
The second identifying assumption required for a causal interpretation of our estimates
is the exclusion restriction. This assumption requires that the charter school exposure
be uncorrelated with omitted and unobserved variables that affect education outcomes
and health behaviors. It also implies that the only mechanism through which the instrument affects the outcomes is exposure in the resident counties. The extent to which
this assumption is satisfied depends on the randomness of charter school opening in
birth counties. If charter school opening correlates with county characteristics, including wealth, educational resources, and educational outcomes, our IV estimates would
be biased. We minimize this possibility by including county-level time-varying factors
in our models. Finally, we discuss the assumption of monotonicity, which requires that
the instrument must affect subjects in the same direction. In other words, the exposure
in the birth county must increase exposure in the county of residence and not decrease
it. Since this assumption is less likely to be satisfied among some children (i.e., some
non-compliers exist), our estimates come from only compliers (local average treatment
effects or simply LATE), children whose charter school exposure positively correlates
with exposure in their birth counties.
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2.5.2

Student-Level Data

The primary source of individual-level data comes from the publicly available
and restricted, geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), organized by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS follows different groups of individuals
in the NLSY surveys. One cohort is a sample of youth born from 1957 through 1964,
which included about 12,700 individuals surveyed in 1979 (i.e., NLSY79). Since charter
school openings started in 1992, none of the youth in this sample potentially attended
one. Fortunately, the BLS began to follow the children of all females in the NLSY79
cohort as well. This series tracks all children under the age of 14 born to women in the
NLSY79 cohort annually beginning from 1986. In the NLSY79, the mothers provide information on their children. Starting in 1994, the BLS followed the young adults aged
14 or more born to all women in the NLSY79 cohort. These two series were combined
and name NLSY79 Children Survey and Young Adult Survey.
We include all individuals in the sample potentially exposed to charter schools
born from 1974–1995 in the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult Survey. The sample exclude all children who had completed high school before 1992, when charter school
opening started. We supplement these individuals with the NLSY97 cohort, born from
1980-1984, due to sample size concerns. One advantage of using the NLSY data is that
it collects information on respondent’s state and county of residence. In the children’s
sample, because we can identify where their mothers lived when they were born or before charter school opening began, their county of birth and residence are available.18
We obtained the respondents’ geographic data and linked it to the publicly available
18 Unfortunately, the NLSY data does not include census tracks, residential address, or school district of residence.
Therefore, the smallest geographic identifier is county-level information.
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information. The publicly available data has all other data, including demographics, including family income, age, sex, educational attainment, years of schooling, economic
status such as employment status, type of employment, and wages, etc., and health behaviors, including smoking, alcohol consumption, and incarceration status.

2.5.3

Charter School Data

One limitation of the NLSY data is that the BLS did not collect charter school
information until 2000. Consequently, using the actual charter school attendance to
estimate the long-term impacts can bias the estimates due to the missing information. We use the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core Data
(CCD)—data on the universe of public elementary and secondary schools. Every year,
the NCES gathers information on all primary and secondary schools. Relevant information needed is the number of full-time teachers and county of residence of all charter
schools. Therefore, the unit of analysis for the variable of interest, charter school exposure, can only be aggregated within the residence county.
A limitation to the NCES-CCD data is that they included charter schools’ identifiers starting from 1998, even though charter school opening began in 1992. To overcome missing data concerns, we supplement the NCES-CCD data with two additional
sources to identify all charter schools. First, we contacted the twenty-four states that
opened charter schools before 1998, but only eight states have made the data available.
Unfortunately, some states do not keep information on charter schools at all. Second,
we scrape charter school data from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) National
Charter School Resource Center (NCSRC) website. The ED-NCSRC keeps names of all
charter schools it has funded in the past. Importantly, for all active charter schools
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(a) 1992 - 1993

(b) 1992 - 1995

(c) 1992 - 1997

(d) 1992 - 1999

(e) 1992 - 2003

(f) 1992 - 2015

Figure 2.1. Timing of States Charter School Laws (1992 - 2015).
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(a) 1992

(b) 1995

(c) 1998

(d) 2001

(e) 2004

(f) 2007

(g) 2010

(h) 2013

Figure 2.2. Charter School Presence in Counties for Some Selected Years (1992 - 2013).
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(a) 1992

(b) 1995

(c) 1998

(d) 2001

(e) 2004

(f) 2007

(g) 2010

(h) 2013

Figure 2.3. Charter School Coverage in Counties for Some Selected Years (1992 - 2013).
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under their umbrella, it keeps their information, including address, year of opening,
number of students in the current year, and grades offered in the current year. Unfortunately, it does not include information on closed charter schools. Nevertheless, it
publishes a complete list of all closed charter schools every year. Their publication consists of the school name, state and school district of residence, and the year opened or
closed. Hence, we identify a complete list of all charter schools that opened and is still
in operation or closed. We match all charter schools that existed before 1998 to the
NCES data using school names and addresses.

2.5.4

Descriptive Statistics

Figure 2.1 shows variations ins states’ adoptions of charter school laws over time.
Seven states had not adopted the policy by 2015. Among states that passed the law,
Figure 2.2 shows the timing of charter school openings within counties. Our definition
for presence is all counties that had at least one charter school. We also calculate charter school coverage in each county and year, shown in Figure 2.3. Despite the fact that
several counties opened charter schools, their students’ populations were mostly low
and below 25%. Therefore, the average exposure across all periods is expected to be
small.
In Table 2.1, we summarize the variables. We obtained about 13, 000 individuals born in 518 counties. About 56% of them were exposed to charter schools in their
county of residence. The average years of charter school exposure were 3.1 years, and
their chances of getting admissions in charter schools were about 2.8%. Among those
exposed to charter schools, the average length of exposure was about 5.6 years, and
they had a 5.1% chance of enrolling in a charter school. To get enough variation in the
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variable of interest (i.e., exposure to charter schools), we exclude all counties with less
than five births throughout the study period. Of the sample, 7,348 lived in counties
with charter schools before graduating from secondary schools, while the remaining
5,817 lived in counties that never opened charter schools before graduating from high
schools. The sample consists of 60% of individuals drawn from the NLSY97 cohort (the
cohort born from 1980 to 1984). The remaining 40 percent comes from the NLSY79
Child and Young Adult Survey, born in 1971 to 1995. The NLSY oversampled the minority (i.e., the Blacks and Hispanics). Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics in our sample are
49, 31, and 20%, respectively. To mitigate the impacts of oversampling in our regressions, we use sampling weights and report the weighted means in the last two columns
of Table 2.1. The weighted means are closer to national estimates. Males constitute
about 51% of the sample. The ages of individuals in the sample ranged from 15 to 42,
with an average of 30.

Table 2.1. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parenthesis) of Outcomes and Characteristics of Potentially Exposed Individuals
Unweighted Means
Full
Sample
Outcomes
Years of Schooling
No High School Diploma
High School Diploma
Some College
College or Better
Current smoking

Not
Exposed

Exposed

13.25
13.27
13.24
(2.589)
(2.651)
(2.539)
0.188
0.192
0.186
(0.391)
(0.394)
(0.389)
0.260
0.276
0.247
(0.438)
(0.447)
(0.431)
0.295
0.278
0.309
(0.456)
(0.448)
(0.462)
0.256
0.254
0.259
(0.437)
(0.435)
(0.438)
0.342
0.332
0.307
Continued on the next page
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Weighted Means
Not
Exposed

Exposed

13.37
(2.524)
0.165
(0.371)
0.267
(0.443)
0.299
(0.458)
0.268
(0.443)
0.350

13.45
(2.352)
0.138
(0.345)
0.217
(0.412)
0.331
(0.471)
0.313
(0.464)
0.335

Table 2.1 – Continued from the previous page
Unweighted Means

Binge Drinking
Charter School Exposure
Binary (0/1)
Years [0,12]
Coverage [0,1]
Controls
Black
White
Hispanic
Male
Birth County Known
NLSY97 Cohort
Observations

Weighted Means

Full
Sample

Not
Exposed

Exposed

Not
Exposed

Exposed

(0.475)
0.170
(0.375)

(0.471)
0.151
(0.358)

(0.461)
0.153
(0.360)

(0.477)
0.165
(0.371)

(0.472)
0.174
(0.379)

0.558
(0.497)
3.116
(3.754)
0.028
(0.125)

5.583
(3.388)
0.051
(0.164)

6.022
(3.613)
0.065
(0.185)

0.308
(0.462)
0.490
(0.500)
0.202
(0.401)
0.509
(0.500)
0.608
(0.488)
0.601
(0.490)

0.329
(0.470)
0.579
(0.494)
0.092
(0.289)
0.510
(0.500)
0.569
(0.495)
0.627
(0.484)

0.292
(0.455)
0.419
(0.493)
0.289
(0.453)
0.507
(0.500)
0.638
(0.481)
0.580
(0.494)

0.169
(0.374)
0.784
(0.412)
0.048
(0.213)
0.527
(0.499)
0.670
(0.470)
0.475
(0.499)

0.164
(0.370)
0.701
(0.458)
0.135
(0.342)
0.525
(0.499)
0.752
(0.432)
0.398
(0.490)

13,006

7,348

5,817

7,348

5,817

Since we do not have information on the county of birth for the individuals in
the NLSY97 cohort but only know their counties resided on their 12th birthday, we
use them as proxies for their birth counties. With charter schools opening beginning
from 1992, we include a dummy variable in the regressions to distinguish between all
individuals whose county of births are available or those in states that later adopted
charter school law. About 60% of the individuals have information of their county of
birth or residence at age 12 available.
We also summarize the outcomes in Table 2.1. The schooling outcome represents
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the highest grade as of the date of the last interview. The survey asks respondents to
select one for the following categories: 8th grade or less, some high school, high school
graduate, some vocational or technical after high school, completed some vocational
or technical after high school, some college, completed an associate degree, completed
bachelor’s degree, some graduate, completed a Master’s degree, some graduate beyond
a Master’s degree, Ph.D., some professional education such as Law, Medical School,
Nursing, etc., and completed a professional education. We coded these categories into
a continuous education outcome. For individuals with years of schooling above 20, we
top-coded to 20.19 The data shows that, on average, students in the NLSY attended
some college (i.e., 13 years of schooling). We do not find any statistically significant difference between the years of education of those exposed to charter schools and those
that were not. Since our continuous education measure is more likely to be inaccurate,
we also create discrete education outcomes as follows: some high school, high school
graduate, some college, and a college degree or better. About 19% had no high school
diploma in the sample, while 26% had completed only high school. Also, about 30% of
the individuals had between 13 and 15 years of education (some college). The remaining 34% had college degrees.
Two other outcomes that we consider in this study are cigarette smoking and alcohol consumption. Prevalence of current smoking (i.e., past 30-days smoking) was 2%
lower among those exposed to charter schools than their counterparts that did not have
any exposure. However, binge drinking (i.e., drinking more than 5 bottles a day) did
not differ by charter school exposure status.
19 We do not distinguish between the number of years required to complete different post-graduate programs, especially professional programs such as law school, medical school, doctoral programs.
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2.6

Results

2.6.1

First Stage Estimates

A set of summary statistics that we do not report in Table 2.1 is information on
exposure when individuals are treated as if they lived in the same counties forever (i.e.,
exposure at the county of birth). Among those born in counties that did not open charter schools in their elementary and secondary school years, only 10% were exposed to
charter schools and only had about 4 months of exposure, on average. In contrast,
among those born in counties that opened charter schools during their school ages,
they were about 96% more likely to have some exposure to charter schools, and their
average years of exposure were about 5.6. Notice that some individuals moved from
their birth counties before charter schools opened. Therefore, not everyone whose birth
counties opened charter schools had actual exposure.
The description above suggests that the unconditional correlation between charter
school exposure in the birth county and residence is positive. On average, individuals
who have more years of exposure at their birth counties are more likely to have more
years of exposure in their county of residence. Before discussing the main results, we
formally test this correlation to assess the strength of our instrument by estimating
equation (4) and presenting the results in Table 2.2. The results in columns (1)–(4)
show the case where we construct our variable of interest and instrument as years of
charter school exposure. We use the years of exposure in the birth counties as an instrument for the years of exposure in the county of residence.
The estimates in the last four columns are for the case where we define our variable of interest as charter school coverage, the chance of getting a seat in charter schools
104

Table 2.2. First Stage Estimates for Education Outcomes - Effects of Charter School
Exposure in the County of Birth on Exposure in the County of Residence
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.908*** 0.888*** 0.819*** 0.818***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026)

Coverage [0,1]
F-Statistic
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

0.755*** 0.730*** 0.707*** 0.700***
(0.037) (0.043) (0.046) (0.041)
7,704
13,006

4,490
13,006

995
13,006

990
13,006

422
13,006

287
13,006

238
13,006

290
13,006

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), race (Black, White, and Hispanic), a dummy for birth county availability, and
NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add
the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county
fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county
time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1,
**p<.05, ***p<.01

in the county of residence, using the variable calculated at the birth county as an instrument. We provide alternative specifications to show how the results are robust to
controls, year and county fixed effects and county-level time-varying characteristics,
including unemployment and poverty rate. In all cases, the estimates are statistically
significant at 1%, with F-statistics above 100, suggesting we have a strong instrument
(Lee et al., 2020). From the results in the first four columns, we show that every year
of exposure in the birth county is associated with approximately 10 months of actual
exposure (i.e., exposure in the county of residence). Intuitively, it means that for individuals whose birth counties opened charter schools, they got approximately 10 months
of exposure. Similarly, we interpret the results in the last four columns as follows. A 1-
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point increase in charter school exposure in the birth county is associated with at least
a 0.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of getting actual exposure

2.6.2

Charter School Effects on Education Outcomes

We first show the effects of charter school exposure on education since it is the
only channel for affecting the two other outcomes that we discuss later. In Table 2.3,
we summarize our results when we measure education as a continuous variable. All our
estimates are small and statistically insignificant, except the estimates in the first two
columns. However, the estimates when we measure the charter school exposure in years
are similar across different specifications, but the standard error blows up after including the county of birth fixed effects. In the first and fifth columns, we include only the
basic controls (i.e., gender [male/female], a dummy for Hispanics, a dummy for birth
county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect).
From column (1), we find that every additional year of charter school exposure
increases schooling years by one week among those induced by the instrument (i.e.,
the local average treatment effect [LATE]). By including survey year and birth cohort
fixed effects, which also control the individual’s age, the estimate rises to approximately
10 days. Both estimates are statistically significant at 5%. After including the county
fixed effects, the estimate decreases, and the standard error doubles; however, including
the county time-varying characteristics increases the estimate. Therefore, the estimate
from our preferred specification, where we include all the controls, is imprecise. When
we define charter school exposure as coverage rates [see equation (2) and the results
in columns (5) – (8)], our estimates are smaller and statistically insignificant across all
specifications. We find imprecise estimates due, in part, our inability to calculate the
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Table 2.3. Second Stage Estimates for Years of Schooling - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on Years of Schooling using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.021** 0.028** 0.019 0.026
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

13,006

13,006

13,006 13,006

-0.031 0.113 0.093
(0.154) (0.180) (0.295)

0.135
(0.294)

13,006 13,006 13,006

13,006

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), race (Black, White, and Hispanic), a dummy for birth county availability, and
NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add
the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county
fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county
time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1,
**p<.05, ***p<.01

students’ actual schooling years precisely. For example, we do not know the exact years
of schooling for those with some high school education.
Because the completed years of schooling results are less attractive, we measure
education in discrete terms. Specifically, we focus on completed bachelor’s degrees or
better against everyone else and report the results in Table 2.4. We focus on our preferred specifications in columns (4) and (8). We find that every additional year of charter school exposure increases the probability of completing a four-year university education or better by 0.8 percentage points (i.e., 3% increase) among those induced by the
instrument and is statistically significant at 10%. When we use charter school coverage, the LATE is such that a 1-point increase in exposure increases the chances of completing a four-year degree college by a 0.1 percentage point (0.4%) and is statistically
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Table 2.4. Second Stage Estimates for Four-Year College Graduation - Effects of Charter School Exposure on Four-Year College Graduation using Exposure at the County of
Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.002 0.002 0.007* 0.008*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

13,006 13,006 13,006

13,006

0.053 0.069 0.101**
(0.042) (0.046) (0.048)

0.101**
(0.051)

13,006 13,006

13,006

13,006

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), race (Black, White, and Hispanic), a dummy for birth county availability, and
NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add
the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county
fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county
time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1,
**p<.05, ***p<.01

significant at 5%.
The results become stronger when we focus on those with high school diploma or
better. We find that a 1-point increase in charter school coverage increases the likelihood of completing a four-year degree college by 0.15 percentage points (0.5%) among
those induced by our instrument and is statistically significant at 1% (see Table 2.5).
Our more substantial estimates suggest that charter schools move people from just a
high school education or some college into four-year degree programs. We also demonstrate that charter schools significantly impact females than males (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7).
Males experience smaller effects and are statistically insignificant at all conventional
levels (see Table 2.6). When we consider the impact of charter schools on females, we
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find a large effect, but only significant at 10%. We also find that charter schools improve the educational outcomes of minorities (Blacks and Hispanics) than Whites (see
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9).
Table 2.5. Second Stage Estimates for Four-Year College Graduation - Effects of
Charter School Exposure on Four-Year College Graduation among High School Graduates using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.001 0.001 0.008* 0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

0.045 0.100* 0.152*** 0.148***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.055)
10,674 10,674 10,674

10,674

10,674 10,674

10,674

10,674

Notes: Mean of outcome is 0.326. Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender (male/female), race (Black, White, and Hispanic), a dummy for
birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications
in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns
(3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8),
the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and
unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

2.6.3

Charter School Effects on Later-in-Life Health Behaviors

We also show how charter school exposure possibly affects later-in-life health behaviors. One outcome we consider is excessive alcohol consumption. It is responsible
for over 95,000 deaths annually in the U.S. and is associated with poor pregnancy outcomes and several chronic health effects, including heart attack, high blood pressure,
heart disease, stroke, liver disease, and cancer.20 We obtained 12,480 individuals who
reported their alcohol consumption behavior (see Table 2.10). As already described in
Table 2.1, about 17% of these individuals are binge drinkers (i.e., consuming five or
20 See

from https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/factsheets/alcohol.htm
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Table 2.6. Second Stage Estimates for College Attendance - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on Four-Year College Graduation among Males using Exposure at the County
of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.003 0.002 0.008* 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

0.051 0.042 0.067
(0.058) (0.066) (0.093)
6,696

6,696

6,696

6,696

6,696

6,696

6,696

0.072
(0.089)
6,696

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include race (Black,
White, and Hispanic), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect.
Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth
cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the
results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by
including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

more bottles per day). We demonstrate the effects of charter school exposure on binge
drinking in Table 2.10 - 2.17. We show the first stage estimates are in Table 2.A2 in
Appendix L. The are strong, statistically significant at 1% across all specifications, and
have F-statistics above 180.
From the full-sample results in Table 2.10, we find that charter school exposure
has small local average treatment effects on binge drinking. In some specifications,
we obtained inconsistent signs (i.e., positive effects instead of negative). Specifications
that exclude the county of birth fixed effects reveal that each additional year of charter
school exposure reduces binge drinking by about 0.4 percentage points (i.e., 2.4%) and
is statistically significant at 1%. Our regression results from the charter school coverage show that a 1-point increase in exposure decreases binge drinking by approximately
0.08 percentage points (i.e., 0.4%), but only statistically significant at 10%.
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Table 2.7. Second Stage Estimates for Females - Effects of Charter School Exposure
on Four-Year College Graduation among Females using Exposure at the County of
Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

0.002 0.001 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)

(4)

(6)

(7)

0.063 0.108 0.186*
(0.083) (0.085) (0.099)
6,469

6,469

6,469

(8)

0.009
(0.007)

Coverage [0,1]

Observations

(5)

6,469

6,469

6,469

6,469

0.178*
(0.101)
6,469

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include race (Black,
White, and Hispanic), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect.
Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and
birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally,
for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Because the minimum drinking age was 21 during the years that the NLSY measured the outcomes, we restrict our sample to demonstrate the effects of the charter
school exposure on those who could drink legally.21 We find consistently similar results
when we use the years of exposure but slightly high estimates in the case of the charter school coverage (see Table 2.11). A 1-point increase in charter school exposure decreases binge drinking by 0.1 percentage points (i.e., 0.6%), but only statistically significant at 5%. Again, by including the county of birth fixed effects in the specifications,
we find only imprecise LATE estimates.
The final set of alcohol consumption results demonstrates heterogeneity in the
effects of charter schools on binge drinking, analyzed by gender, race, and education.
21 See more of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 from the following link https://www.cdc.gov/
alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-drinking-age.htm.
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Table 2.8. Second Stage Estimates for Whites - Effects of Charter School Exposure
on Four-Year College Graduation among Whites using Exposure at the County of
Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

0.219* 0.172 0.191
(0.127) (0.123) (0.143)
6,450

6,450

6,450

6,450

6,450

6,450

6,450

0.182
(0.151)
6,450

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth
cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for
the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 2.9. Second Stage Estimates for Blacks - Effects of Charter School Exposure
on Four-Year College Graduation among Blacks and Hispanics using Exposure at the
County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

0.000 -0.001 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)

(4)

(6)

(7)

0.035 0.059 0.096*
(0.046) (0.050) (0.054)
6,715

6,715

6,715

(8)

0.009*
(0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

6,715

6,715

6,715

6,715

0.101*
(0.057)
6,715

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), a dummy for Hispanics, a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year
of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed
effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county timevarying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05,
***p<.01
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Table 2.10. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles daily) using Exposure at the County of
Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.003*** -0.004*** 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

12,482

12,482

12,482 12,482

-0.075* -0.075* -0.05
(0.044) (0.044) (0.051)

-0.046
(0.054)

12,482 12,482 12,482

12,482

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), dummies for Whites and Blacks, education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort
fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects.
Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying
characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

We find statistically significant estimates in some specifications for the female sample
(see Table 2.12) but only noisy estimates among males (see Table 2.13). The results
for Whites versus Non-Whites show a similar pattern. At least we find two consistent
and statistically significant estimates among Whites (see Table 2.14), while the estimates for Non-Whites are just noisy (see Table 2.15). The results are most substantial
among those with college degrees or better compared to those without college degrees.
A 1-point increase in charter school exposure decreases binge drinking by 0.2 percentage points (i.e., 1.0%) and is statistically significant at 5% even after including the
county of birth fixed effects (see Table 2.16). On the other hand, we find that, without county of birth fixed effects, one additional year of charter school exposure reduces
binge drinking by 0.6 percentage points (i.e., 3.5%) among individuals without college
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Table 2.11. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Individuals of Ages
21+ using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.003** -0.004*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

-0.101** -0.101** -0.078 -0.073
(0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.054)
11,852

11,852

11,852 11,852

11,852

11,852 11,852

11852

Notes: Mean of outcome = 0.145. Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender (male/female), dummies for Whites and Blacks, education (high
school graduates, some college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county
availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2)
and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we
also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications
control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 2.12. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Females using Exposure
at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.004*** -0.006*** 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

-0.001 -0.043 -0.037
(0.046) (0.045) (0.051)
6,085

6,085

6,085

6,085

6,085

6,085

6,085

-0.035
(0.054)
6,085

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include dummies for
Whites and Blacks, education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates or
better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally,
for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed
effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in
columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 2.13. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Males using Exposure
at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)

(5)

(7)

-0.035 -0.096 -0.049
(0.049) (0.072) (0.081)
6,391

6,391

(8)

0.004
(0.004)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(6)

6,391

6,391

6,391

6,391

6,391

-0.046
(0.083)
6,391

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include dummies
for Whites and Blacks, education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates
or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort
fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results
in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 2.14. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Whites using Exposure at
the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.004*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

0.066 -0.034 0.042
(0.066) (0.076) (0.082)
6,218

6,218

6,218

6,218

6,218

6,218

6,218

0.037
(0.082)
6,218

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the
specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects.
In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4)
and (8), the specifications control county time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate
and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 2.15. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Blacks and Hispanics
using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

-0.000 -0.002 0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.008
(0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

-0.039 -0.075 -0.04
(0.038) (0.050) (0.059)
6,264

6,264

6,264

6,264

6,264

6,264

6,264

-0.034
(0.063)
6,264

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), a dummy for Hispanics, education (high school graduates, some college,
and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort
fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of
survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county timevarying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05,
***p<.01

Table 2.16. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Individuals with College
Degree or Better using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

0.002 -0.002 0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.007
(0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

-0.043 -0.213*** -0.220*** -0.174**
(0.038) (0.067) (0.077) (0.089)
3,380

3,380

3,380

3,380

3,380

3,380

3,380

3,380

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), a dummy for Hispanics, a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of
survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects.
Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying
characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 2.17. Second Stage Estimates for Binge Drinking - Effects of Charter School Exposure on Alcohol Consumption (≥ 5 bottles per day) among Individuals without College Degrees using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure
in County of Residence [0,12]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.004*** -0.006*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

Proportion of Students in Charter
School in County of Residence [0,1]

-0.014 -0.022 -0.000
(0.044) (0.051) (0.059)
9,102

9,102

9,102

9,102

9,102

9,102

9,102

-0.001
(0.062)
9,102

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), a dummy for Hispanics, a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of
survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects.
Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county time-varying
characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

degrees and is statistically significant at 1% (see Table 2.17).
Table 2.18. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking using Exposure at the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.003* -0.006*** -0.009* -0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

11,156

11,156

11,156 11,156

0.029 -0.045 0.037
(0.067) (0.088) (0.103)

0.057
(0.111)

11,156 11,156 11,156

11,156

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), dummies for Whites and Blacks, education (high school graduates, some
college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY
cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the
year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county
fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county
and state time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and
cigarette prices, taxes, and revenues. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Our second and last outcome that we consider in this study is current cigarette
smoking. Cigarette smoking remains the leading cause of preventable death. It is responsible for more than 480, 000 deaths annually.22 Among adults of ages 18 and above,
about 14% of the U.S. population are daily smokers. We analyze past 30-day cigarette
smoking behavior since daily smoking is not available in our sample. We organized
information on about 11, 156 individuals who responded to the survey questions on
their smoking behavior (see Table 2.18). Among these individuals, about 34% are current smokers (see Table 2.1). Our first stage results in Table 2.A3 in Appendix M are
strong, statistically significant at 1% across all specifications, and extremely large Fstatistics. The final set of tables present results to show how charter school exposure
affects future cigarette smoking outcomes.

Table 2.19. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking among Males using Exposure at the County of Birth as
an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.003 -0.007*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

0.046 -0.022 0.141
(0.096) (0.139) (0.122)
5,846

5,846

5,846

5,846

5,846

5,846

5,846

0.161
(0.130)
5,846

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include, dummies
for Whites and Blacks, education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates
or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort
fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results
in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county and state time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and cigarette prices, taxes, and revenues.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
22 See more from https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/data/
cigarette-smoking-in-united-states.html.
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Table 2.20. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking among Females using Exposure at the County of Birth
as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

-0.003 -0.004 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007)

(4)

(6)

(7)

0.031 -0.045 -0.063
(0.071) (0.091) (0.119)
5,304

5,304

5,304

(8)

-0.009
(0.007)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

5,304

5,304

5,304

5,304

-0.045
(0.127)
5,304

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include, dummies
for Whites and Blacks, education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates
or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort
fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results
in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county and state time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and cigarette prices, taxes, and revenues.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 2.21. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking among Blacks and Hispanics using Exposure at the
County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.002 -0.006** -0.012* -0.012*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

0.025 -0.065 0.042
(0.066) (0.094) (0.106)
5,500

5,500

5,500

5,500

5,500

5,500

5,500

0.065
(0.115)
5,500

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for
the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed
effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in
columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county and state time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and cigarette prices, taxes, and revenues.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 2.22. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking among Whites using Exposure at the County of Birth
as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

-0.003 -0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007)

(4)

(6)

(7)

0.060 -0.005 -0.049
(0.150) (0.161) (0.217)
5,650

5,650

5,650

(8)

-0.005
(0.008)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

5,650

5,650

5,650

5,650

-0.032
(0.217)
5,650

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), education (high school graduates, some college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for
the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed
effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in
columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county and state time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and cigarette prices, taxes, and revenues.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 2.23. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking among High-Educated Individuals using Exposure at
the County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.003 -0.005* -0.014** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

-0.076 -0.144** -0.098
(0.053) (0.068) (0.089)
5,843

5,843

5,843

5,843

5,843

5,843

5,843

-0.082
(0.095)
5,843

Notes: Mean of outcome is 0.248. Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender (male/female), dummies for Whites and Blacks, dummy for college completion or better, a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed
effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey
and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county and state timevarying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and cigarette prices,
taxes, and revenues. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 2.24. Second Stage Estimates for Current Smoking - Effects of Charter School
Exposure on 30-Day Smoking among Low-Educated Individuals using Exposure at the
County of Birth as an Instrument
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.003 -0.007*** -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)

Coverage [0,1]
Observations

(5)

0.212 0.121 0.229
(0.142) (0.203) (0.201)
5,307

5,307

5,307

5,307

5,307

5,307

5,307

0.255
(0.212)
5,307

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), dummies for Whites and Blacks, dummy for high school graduates, a dummy
for birth county availability, and NLSY cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In
columns (3) and (7), we also add county fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4)
and (8), the specifications control county and state time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and cigarette prices, taxes, and tax revenues. *p<.1,
**p<.05, ***p<.01

From our full-sample estimates in Table 2.18, we find that charter school exposure
has small local average treatment effects on current smoking. We find that every additional year of charter school exposure decreases current cigarette smoking by 1.8 and
2.6% at the mean with and without 1% and 10%, respectively. Because cigarette taxes
could fund charter schools, we include state-level cigarette prices, taxes, and revenues
as additional time-varying controls, aside from county-level poverty and unemployment
rates. However, our estimate does not differ from that of the model in which we include
county-fixed effects. It suggests that cigarette tax revenues do not correlate with charter school law and opening. We find similar estimates among males but noisy estimates
among females (see Table 2.19 and 2.20). However, we find twice and robust evidence
among Blacks and Hispanics, as reported in Table 2.21, but no effect among Whites
(see Table 2.22). Even though all the estimates among Whites have correct signs, as
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expected, they are very imprecise. By considering heterogeneity by education, we find
that charter school exposure effectively reduces cigarette smoking among the most educated individuals. From our preferred specification, we find that one additional year of
exposure decreases cigarette smoking by 1.4 percentage point among individuals with
some college or better education and is approximately 4.1% at the mean, with statistical significance at 5% (see Table 2.23). We only find half of this estimate among those
with high school diploma or lower but only statistically significant in the specification
that does not control for location fixed effects and time-varying area-level characteristics (see Table 2.24).

2.7

Discussion and Conclusion
States adopted charter school laws starting from 1991, and by 2003, more than 40

states had opened charter schools. Charter schools are public educational institutions
that operate without state and local school boards’ interference over specified years.
Since states opened charter schools, several studies have analyzed their impacts on students, predominantly contemporaneous schooling outcomes such as test scores and high
school completion. However, there are gaps in the literature, and other important questions remain unanswered. First, there is no consensus on the direction of their impacts
since studies find negative, null, and positive results from different states. Second, no
study has used national data to estimate charter school effects on students’ outcomes.
Finally, a few of the available articles have assessed their impacts on students’ longterm outcomes. This study fills the gap by using national data to estimate the effects
of charter schools on students’ later-in-life education and health behaviors.
We use student-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
122

by combining the children of the 1979 cohort with the youth from the 1997 cohort.
Some of the children of the NLSY79 cohort in the Child and Young Adult Survey were
born when states passed the laws and opened charter schools. Also, the NLSY97 cohorts born from 1980 - 1984 were in elementary and high schools when several states
opened charter schools. We obtained county geocoded, restricted students’ information
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because the NLSY excluded students’ information
on the type of school they attended until 2003, we organized charter school information
from the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core Data (NCES-CDD),
which provides information on all K-12 schools. We supplement NCES-CDD data with
charter school information from two other sources. First, we contacted and obtained
data from the state’s department of education. Second, we use charter school opening and closure information from the U.S. Department of Education National Charter
School Resource Center since some states did not respond to our request or have the
data available. We link students from the NLSY samples to the universe of elementary
and high schools at the county level, which is the lowest geographic identifier in the
NLSY.
Because we cannot identify students who attended charter schools in the NLSY,
we calculate two charter school exposure measures at the county-level. First, we calculate the number of years that students were potentially exposed to charter schools.
Since the years of exposure do not have information on their chances of getting seat
assignments, we also calculate a second measure, the intensity and coverage of charter
schools (i.e., number of charter school students in the relevant population). We calculated the weighted probability of charter school coverage for every student in the sample.
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Our study uses instrumental variable (IV) strategy, which addresses two key methodological concerns. First, regressing the outcomes on the charter school exposure, calculated at the county of residents may bias the estimates due to endogenous migration.
Because school choice is an individual decision, rather than random assignment, students could move around counties in response to charter school openings. Second, attenuation bias becomes another challenge when we calculate the charter school exposure at the county of birth rather than the county of residence. We address these concerns by using the county of birth exposure as an instrument for the exposure at the
counties resided throughout elementary and high school years in the IV framework.
The findings of this study are as follows. First, we show that charter school exposure affects four-year college completion. Our local average treatment effect (LATE) estimate is that an additional year of charter school exposure increases college graduation
by 3%. Given that students in the sample were exposed to charter schools for three
years on average, we think the charter schools have substantial and desirable effects
on students’ long-term education outcomes. It also suggests that students with more
years of exposure have significant chances of completing four-year degree programs
than those born in the same county without any exposure. In terms of the charter
school coverage, we find that a 1-point increase in exposure increases the probability of
completing a four-year college by 0.4% among those induced by the instrument. Again,
our estimate implies that students in counties with more charter schools have higher
chances of completing a four-year college than those born in the same county but with
fewer charter schools. We also demonstrate that the effects are large for Blacks and
Hispanics than Whites and females than males.
Aside from education outcomes, we also consider two health behaviors. Exces124

sive alcohol consumption (or binge drinking) and cigarette smoking are the outcomes
we analyze. Our results suggest that charter school exposure reduces binge drinking.
We find that a 1-point increase in exposure decreases binge drinking by 0.4% and 0.6%
among those in the legal drinking age of 21 and above. We also find some evidence of
heterogeneity by the level of education. A 1-point increase in exposure decreases binge
drinking by 1% among individuals with four-year degrees or better. We do not find any
statistically significant evidence among those without college degrees. While we do not
find robust evidence from the full sample on cigarette smoking, we show some evidence
from our sub-sample analysis. We find that every additional year of charter school exposure decreases cigarette smoking by about 3.6% among Blacks and Hispanics and
4.1% among individuals with more than twelve years of education.
This study has several strengths. We highlight a few as follows. First, we are the
first to estimate both the direct and indirect effects of charter schools using exposure.
With several studies focusing on actual attendance, they ignore the spillover effects of
charter schools. By following individuals in the NLSY over time, our charter school exposure credibly estimates the spillover effects. Second, no study has used national data
to characterize the impacts of charter schools on students’ outcomes to the best of our
knowledge. Our analysis uses data that includes students born in over 500 counties and
currently live in over 44 states. Third, we demonstrate the long-term effects of charter schools by including individuals in the mid-careers. About 70% of our sample is
30 years or above, enabling us to estimate charter schools’ long-term impacts. Finally,
we show evidence of the positive effects of charter schools on adverse health behaviors,
which the literature has ignored.
Two limitations to our analysis are as follows. First, we do not know the actual
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county of birth for individuals born from 1980-84. We only know the counties they
resided at their 12th birthday. Although we can identify their locations before states
passed the laws, they could move earlier in anticipation of the policy and opening of
charter schools. Second, our study covers about 25% of all counties and has a small
sample size, making it computationally difficult to find statistically significant effects.
Overall, our results demonstrate that charter schools positively affect long-term
education and health behaviors. Therefore, we recommend that states and local school
boards should allow more charter schools to operate.
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Chapter 3
Revisiting the Effects of Economic Conditions on Cigarette
Smoking

3.1

Introduction
Tobacco use is still the leading cause of preventable death, claiming about 7 mil-

lion lives worldwide annually, with only cigarette smoking responsible for 480,000 deaths
per year in the United States. Additionally, about 16 million Americans have smokingcaused diseases currently.1 Although the long-run trend in the prevalence of current
(i.e., past 30-day) cigarette smoking among adults shows a steady decline from 42.4%
in 1965 to 13.7% in 2018, over 34 million Americans were smokers in 2018.2 Moreover,
the associated economic costs of cigarette smoking are over $300 billion a year.3
A possible contributing factor to the steady decline in smoking prevalence is changing macroeconomic conditions. During the Great Recession, occurring from December
2007 to June 2009, and the COVID-19 pandemic season, which started in February
2020 in the U.S., leading to lockdown and social distancing policies, several individuals and households were impacted, which could affect their lifestyles. The daily and
current smoking increased in several heavy-smoking countries during the Great Recession. Data show spikes in the current smoking in the Great Recession period.4 Gallus
et al. (2015) estimate that the number of current smokers in the U.S. increased by ap1 See

more from https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm.

2 See from https://www.lung.org/research/trends-in-lung-disease/tobacco-trends-brief/
overall-tobacco-trends.
3 See

more from https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm

4 See

more from https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6444a2.htm.
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proximately 0.6 million during the Great Recession period.5 In addition to the longlasting and high-intensive downturn, its aftermath was so devastating that recovery was
slowest in history (Boen and Yang, 2016; Currie et al., 2015) and output and unemployment rates in the U.S. returned to their normal levels after several months (Cunningham, 2018).6 It takes longer time for lifestyles to return to normal after a severe
macroeconomy shock.
Lifestyle changes caused by macroeconomic fluctuations occur because victims
suffer from involuntary job loss, longer unemployment spells, and stress from constant
job searches, affecting their mental and physical health (Golden and Perreira, 2015;
Catalano et al., 2011). During downturns, individuals experiencing financial loss, psychological stress, and physical strain might engage in unhealthy lifestyles, including
smoking and excessive alcohol consumption, to mitigate the stress and its related consequences (Charles and DeCicca, 2008; Catalano and Dooley, 1983; Catalano, 1991).
Besides stress, unemployed individuals spend more time at social gatherings during bad
economic times, increasing their chances of engaging in risky behaviors. However, one
plausible argument for a decrease in cigarette smoking is an income effect that shifts
household budgets inwards during downturns. Nevertheless, in periods when involuntary unemployment becomes more prevalent, affecting most low-income households,
government cash transfers, including unemployment insurance and stimulus packages,
and automatic stabilizers, such as tax reduction, offset income loss.
5 During the Great Recession, the U.S. economy was affected to the extent that the unemployment rate increased
and peaked at 10 percent by October 2009. Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the U.S. macroeconomy, such
that the unemployment rate rose to about 15%, the highest since 1932. See from the following link https://www.bls.
gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-rate-rises-to-record-high-14-point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm?view_full.
6 In the U.S., the unemployment rate remained at higher levels for several months before returning to its usual longrun trend. By 2012, the unemployment rate was still as high as 8 percent. One out of ten people in the labor market
could not find a job, and involuntary unemployment formed a more significant proportion of the unemployment rate during the Great Recessionary period (Golden and Perreira, 2015; Theodossiou and Hipple, 2011). The U.S. unemployment
duration between 2000 and 2020 was longer during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 season. That is, the fraction
of people who were unemployed for at least 27 weeks and over increased drastically and remained high during and after
the Great Recession (see https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/duration-of-unemployment.htm).
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Studying the effects of macroeconomic conditions on cigarette smoking started
back in the early 2000s. Yet, the evidence is inconclusive. Using data from the U.S.,
some studies find that smoking prevalence falls as the economy contracts (Ruhm, 2000,
2005; Xu, 2013). However, Goel (2008) finds that income and unemployment do not
significantly affect cigarette smoking. Other studies find contrasting evidence of cigarette
smoking increasing during bad economic times (Kalousova and Burgard, 2014; Barnes
et al., 2009; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004). Besides, there is also evidence of heterogeneity in the economic conditions and cigarette smoking relationship in the U.S. context. Currie et al. (2015) finds that high-educated women are more likely to smoke during economic downturns. Charles and DeCicca (2008) demonstrate that cigarette smoking increases among minorities and less-educated individuals least likely to be employed
but decreases for those with higher chances of getting jobs. While Falba et al. (2005)
find that high-smoking levels persist even after re-employment, Golden and Perreira
(2015) show that the effect becomes highest after re-employment and reverses when out
of the labor market.7
Similar to the findings from the U.S., the effects are also inconclusive across different countries. De Vogli and Santinello (2005) find that higher unemployment is associated with a higher risk of cigarette smoking and stress using data from Italy. Montgomery et al. (1998) demonstrate that young British men who are unemployed are
more likely to engage in life-long patterns of dangerous behaviors. Similarly, Novo et al.
(2000) followed young men and women from Sweden during a recession and boom and
found that unemployment is associated with lower daily smoking levels. McClure et al.
(2012) show that the risk of cigarette smoking reduced among males whose income fell
7 The most recent working paper, Peng et al. (2020), also finds some evidence of counter-cyclicality in cigarette
smoking, suggesting that it increases during downturns. However, the study only uses MSA-level data, which may not
provide evidence for the U.S. population.
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in Iceland shortly after the Great Recession. Jung et al. (2013) demonstrate that job
loss in Korea during the Great Recession was associated with a higher probability of
becoming heavy smokers and job losers were more likely to smoke than their counterparts who remained employed. In China, Wang et al. (2016) find that an increase in
the unemployment rate increases cigarette smoking. Finally, Kaiser et al. (2017) use
German Socio-Economic Panel data to find that the propensity of becoming a smoker
increase in downturns, but conditional on being a smoker, the number of cigarettes
smoked decreases in recessions.
Although several studies have examined the effects of economic conditions on
cigarette smoking behavior, the evidence is far from the conclusions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we use long-run data from 1987-2019,
identifying the dynamics in smoking behavior. The over three decades of data allow
us to include information on several significant macroeconomic shocks, including the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, and the Great Recession. Including data from
these dates when shocks heavily impacted the U.S. macroeconomy and worldwide can
provide more insight into how lifestyle changes in such periods and help plan for similar future occurrences. The Ruhm (2005) study that we follow closely used data up to
2000. However, the introduction of electronic cigarettes without taxes after 2000 that
are substitutes for regular cigarettes and cigars might make cigarettes more responsive to macroeconomic conditions. Additionally, the Food and Drug’s Board ban on
flavoring in cigarettes in 2009, other than menthol, might also affect the relationship
we study. Using data covering several periods capturing these supply-side changes in
product availability and tobacco control policies might help demonstrate how the effect
has changed over time. Another important reason for studying the relationship between
130

economic conditions and cigarette smoking using more recent data is differences in the
marginal smokers likely to be affected by macroeconomic conditions. Because smoking
intensities in the 1990s were higher than 2000s and 2010, it is crucial to study how sensitive the two groups were to economic conditions. Importantly, people from the 1990s
who were most likely to be high-intensive smokers might be less susceptible to prices
and other factors likely affected by economic conditions.
We use the 1987–2019 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and
employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We first replicate the results in
Ruhm (2005), which uses the 1987–2000 BRFSS data. The results from our replication
exercise are similar to Ruhm’s findings. Using civilian employment rate as a measure
of economic condition, Ruhm finds that a one-point increase in employment rate increases current smoking by 0.6%, while we find 0.7%. The author also estimated the
effects of economic conditions on two categories of heavy smoking. He considered those
who smoke more than 20 cigarettes a day and found an estimate of 0.9%. We estimate
the effect to be 1%. Finally, he also demonstrated the cigarette smoking effects of employment among extremely heavy smokers who consume 40 or more sticks of cigarettes
per day. Even though his estimate was not different from those who smoke 20 or more
sticks of cigarettes daily, we estimate a slightly higher effect. We find a 1.2%. We attribute the difference in the estimates to the disparities in his and our sample. Our
data for the replication is 212 above the 1,490,249 individuals in Ruhm’s sample.
We extend the analysis for current smoking to include data from the 1987–2019.
However, since the survey discontinued asking questions about the intensity of cigarette
smoking per day, we cannot consider the heavy and extremely heavy smoking outcomes. We find that a one-point increase in employment rate raises current cigarette
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smoking by 0.4%, a slightly lower estimate. However, a sub-sample analysis provides
more insights into our new estimate. We show evidence of attenuation bias toward a
null effect and demonstrate that the older cohorts drive the current study results. We
also demonstrate a drastic temporal decline in employment and smoking’s procyclical
relationship during the Great Recession period. Our final analysis considers heterogeneity by different demographic groups. We only find differential effects such that the
positive impact is larger among males and low-educated individuals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the method
used for this study. We present the estimates from the replication exercise in Section 3.3,
while we devote Section 3.4 to our results. Section 3.5 concludes and provides some
policy recommendations.

3.2

Methods

3.2.1

Data

Our data on cigarette smoking come from the 1987–2019 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), an annual telephone survey of the adult population
administered by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The BRFSS, which
started in 1984, collects information on health-related risk behaviors, chronic health
conditions, and the use of preventive services from all 50 states and the District of
Columbia. It consists of a repeated cross-section of randomly selected individuals but
does not track them over time.
Information on individuals’ smoking habits is available, allowing us to define binary variables for daily and current smoking outcomes. Before 1996, the BRFSS ques132

tionnaire included only one question asking for the number of cigarettes smoked per
day. On the other hand, starting from 1996, they expanded the questionnaire to ask
only those who smoke daily to indicate the number of cigarettes smoked every day. We
classify a respondent as a current smoker if he smokes daily or some days. The BRFSS
data also includes individual-level characteristics, which we control in the regressions.
Specifically, we include the age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status of
respondents in all regressions.
The second source of data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local
Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS).8 Every month, the BLS publishes state-level,
including the District of Columbia, information on the number of adults (age 16 and
above) employed, unemployed, and in the labor force. We calculate the percentage of
those in the labor force employed in each month for each state.

3.2.2

Econometric Model

The individual smokes a positive amount of cigarettes when his unobserved latent
utility from smoking is above a certain threshold and zero cigarettes when below. Because we only observe his behavior in the data, but not the latent utility, we model his
observed cigarette smoking outcome in a binary choice model as follows:

Yijmt = 1(β + λEmpmjt + ΠXijmt + γj + τm + δt + ξijmt > 0).

(3.1)

In equation (1), 1(•) is the indicator function taking the value one if its argument is
true and zero if false, Yijmt represents a smoking outcome for individual i, living in
8 The website, http://stats.bls.gov/lau/home.htm, provides information on state-level employment and unemployment rates.
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state j, and interviewed in calendar month m of survey year t. The variable Xijmt represents its corresponding vector of individual-level characteristics, Empmjt denotes employment rate, which is our measure of economic conditions, and ξimjt represents the
disturbance term, indicating the effects of all unobserved and random factors that affect smoking. In the original study, the author estimated the effects of employment on
cigarette use at different intensities by categorizing it into current smoking and smoking ≥ 20 and ≥ 40 sticks per day.
The vector of parameters γj removes time-invariant state-level characteristics
correlated with both economic conditions and changes in cigarette smoking. Because
smoking behaviors also depend on weather, seasons, and events, we also include τm as
the calendar-month fixed effects. In this case, our analysis compares individuals surveyed in the same calendar month. Even after including the calendar-month fixed effects, other fiscal year characteristics might be similar across states. For example, the
2009 Great Recession uniformly affected the entire U.S. economy. Therefore, we include
a vector of survey-year fixed effects, δt , to remove such impacts. By including state,
calendar month, and survey year fixed effects, we cannot add month-by-year dummies
since they are perfectly collinear with Empmjt . Since Yijmt is a binary variable, we estimate probit models and report their marginal effects for interpretations.
Following Ruhm (2005), we use the average percent of the civilian non-institutionalized
state population (aged 16 and over) employed during the three months ending with the
survey month called “employment rate” as the primary measure of economic condition.
The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is λ. Its estimate, λ̂, measures the impact of
employment rate, Empmjt , on the outcome, Yijmt . Identifying the parameter λ comes
from the fact that individuals are affected by exogenous macroeconomic conditions, de134

termining employment levels in the state of residence, affecting smoking behaviors.

3.2.3

Ordered Probit Estimator

In addition to the probit models used in Ruhm (2005), we also use an ordered
probit estimator to simultaneously analyze the three smoking outcomes. Because current cigarette smoking and smoking more than ≥ 20 and ≥ 40 sticks per day are all
defined from the same survey question “On the average, about how many cigarettes a
day do you now smoke?” are mutually exclusive, we model the responses together as a
∗
, but only
discrete ranked-ordered variable. We do not observe the latent utility yijmt

the smoking outcome yijmt such that

yijmt






0 if









1 if




2 if









3 if

∗
yijmt
≤ κ1
∗
κ1 < yijmt
≤ κ2

(3.2)
∗
κ2 < yijmt
≤ κ3
∗
yijmt
≥ κ3

where κ1 , κ2 , and κ3 are constants that represent the cutoff points. Also, the outcome
categories are defined as follows; 0 represents non-smoking, 1 denotes smoking up to
19 cigarettes per day, 2 is for consuming 20 or more cigarettes per day up to 29, and 3
represents 40 or more cigarettes per day. An ordered probit regression of yijmt on the
employment rate and the control variables estimates the probabilities in each of the
categories 0-3 as follows:

Pr(Yijmt = 0) = Φ(κ1 − β − λEmpmjt − ΠXijmt − γj − τm − δt − ξijmt )
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(3.3)

Pr(Yijmt = s) =Φ(κs − β − λEmpmjt − ΠXijmt − γj − τm − δt − ξijmt )
− Φ(κs−1 − β − λEmpmjt − ΠXijmt − γj − τm − δt − ξijmt )

(3.4)

∀s ∈ (1, 2)
Pr(Yijmt = 3) = 1 − Φ(κ3 − β − λEmpmjt − ΠXijmt − γj − τm − δt − ξijmt )

(3.5)

where Φ represents a cumulative standard normal distribution function, and the parameter of interest is λ. Since the probability functions are not linear, we compute the
marginal effect of the estimate for interpretation rather than the coefficient itself. In
each equation, the parameter estimate λ̂ represents the effect of a one-point increase in
the employment rate on the probability of choosing the outcome.

3.3

Replication of the Results in Ruhm (2005)
We first show the results from the replication exercise and focus on only tobacco

use outcomes.9 Table 3.1 shows the author’s summary statistics reported in the first
two columns and our replication in the last two columns. While the author’s final data
consists of 1,490,249 individuals, our sample has 212 additional people. For the three
outcomes we consider, the means are approximately equal, irrespective of being weighted
or not. We find only one significant difference between our unweighted sample averages and those in the original paper for the explanatory variables. While the author
reported that 49.3% of his sample were females, we find approximately 58.5% instead.
To verify that our reported statistic for the percent of females in the data is accurate,
we also compute the summaries for each survey year. Though we do not report them in
the paper, our observation is that the percentage of females in the BRFSS survey data
9 Ruhm

(2005) considered body weight and physical activity as additional outcomes.
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ranges from approximately 57–59% each year, suggesting the average from the pooled
sample cannot be below.
Table 3.2 replicates the regression estimates of the tobacco outcomes. We first
present the original results from Ruhm (2005) in Panel A, while Panel B shows our
replicated estimates. For each outcome, the first column displays its weighted mean.
The second column of Table 3.2 shows the predicted effect of a one-point increase in
employment rate on the percentage point change in the probability of smoking evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variable reported in Table 3.1. Each row
corresponds to one regression estimate with two standard errors beneath it. A robuststandard error calculated assuming that observations are independent across months
and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Its corresponding robust-standard errors, assuming independence across but not within states,
are shown in brackets.

Table 3.1. Replicated Means of Ruhm (2005) Study Sample
Ruhm Sample Means Replicated Sample Means
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
Means
Means
Means
Smoking Outcomes
Current smoking
23.4%
23.4%
Smokes ≥ 20 cigarettes per day
11.6%
11.4%
Smokes ≥ 40 cigarettes per day
1.7%
1.7%
Age (in years)
46.3
44.3
Female (%)
49.3%
52%
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic Black
8.4%
9.4%
Other non-Hispanic non-White
3.8%
3.6%
Hispanic origin
5.5%
9.2%
Continued on the next page
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Weighted
Means

23.4%
11.6%
1.7%
46.3
58.5%

23.3%
11.4%
1.7%
44.3
52%

8.4%
3.9%
5.5%

9.4%
3.6%
9.1%

Table 3.1 – Continued from the previous page
Ruhm (2005) Sample

Replicated Sample

Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
Means
Means
Means
White only
Education
High school dropout
High School Graduate
Some college
College graduate
Education not reported
Current marital status
Never married
Married/cohabiting
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Marital status not reported
State-level variables
% Employed

Weighted
Means

82.3%

77.8%

82.3%

77.9%

14.2%
33.2%
26.1%
26.3%
0.2%

15.1%
33%
25.8%
25.9%
0.2%

14.2%
33.5%
25.6%
26.5%
0.2%

15.1%
33.6%
25.2%
25.9%
0.2%

17.1%
56.9%
14.9%
10.9%
0.2%

19.1%
62.5%
10.9%
7.3%
0.2%

17.1%
56.9%
14.9%
10.9%
0.2%

19.1%
62.5%
10.9%
7.3%
0.2%

64.1%

62.9%

64.1%

62.9%

The results in Panel B of Table 3.2 show that our sample generates quantitatively
and qualitatively similar estimates reported by the author. While Ruhm (2005) found
that a one-point increase in state-level employment rate increases current cigarette
smoking by 0.13 percentage points, we find 0.16 percentage points. The author also
estimated the effects for daily smoking ≥ 20 and ≥ 40 sticks of cigarettes to be 0.10
and 0.02 percentage points, respectively. Our corresponding estimates are 0.11 and 0.02
percentage points. The last two columns of Table 3.2 show estimates regarding the percentage change in the outcomes. The third column estimates are calculated by dividing the marginal effects in the second column by the sample averages in the first column. For those in the last column, we re-estimate the model and compute the average
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Table 3.2. Replicated Predicted effect of a one-point increase in the percent employed on lifestyle behaviors for Tobacco use in Ruhm (2005)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

Panel A: Original Results of Ruhm (2005)
Current smoking

0.2336

0.1317
(0.0287)
[0.0489]

0.6

0.6

Smokes ≥ 20 cigarettes daily

0.1144

0.1044
(0.0194)
[0.0349]

0.9

1.0

Smokes ≥ 40 cigarettes daily

0.0174

0.0155
(0.0055)
[0.0065]

0.9

1.4

Panel B: Replicated Results in Ruhm (2005)
Current smoking

0.2338

0.1586
(0.0328)
[0.0453]

0.7

0.7

Smokes ≥ 20 cigarettes daily

0.1156

0.111
(0.0227)
[0.0350]

1.0

1.0

Smokes ≥ 40 cigarettes daily

0.0173

0.0202
(0.0074)
[0.0081]

1.2

1.5

Note: This table is the replicated results of Table 2 in Ruhm (2005). Panel A corresponds
to the original results from Ruhm (2005), whiles the replicated results are in Panel B. The
table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of the population employed from binary probit models using data from BRFSS 1987–2000. The dependent variable means were calculated by incorporating sampling weights. The probit
models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and controls for age, sex,
race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is 1,490,461. Predicted effects
indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that
observations are independent across months and states but not within states in a given
month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets. Percentage changes are computed
by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for
each individual and then averaged across all sample members.
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marginal effects using respondent values reported for each of the independent variables
and average across all sample members before dividing it by the means in the first column.
Regardless of how we compute the marginal effects, we find 0.7% for the current
smoking outcome, while the author found 0.6%. For the daily cigarette smoking ≥ 20
sticks of cigarettes, the author found 0.9% and 1.0%, depending on how he computed
the marginal effect, but our replication leads to 1.0% in both cases. On the last outcome, smoking ≥ 40 sticks of cigarettes daily, the author found 0.9%, while we find
1.2% when we calculate the marginal effect at the means of the control variables. The
corresponding estimate when we evaluate the marginal effect at the control variables’
actual values for each person and average it across all individuals in the sample, we
find a 1.5%. In contrast, the original paper estimated it to be 1.4%. Therefore, our results are similar to those we replicate, suggesting that our estimates from the extension
will be comparable.
We also show results for the three smoking outcomes when we use an ordered probit estimator, described in Section 3.2. We cannot show ordered probit results in the
extension because the survey discontinued asking questions about smoking intensities
after 2000. Table 3.3 presents the estimates from the ordered probit models. The sample shows that 77% were non-smokers, 12% smoked at least 19 cigarettes per day, 10%
consumed 20-39 sticks of cigarettes daily, while the remaining 2% smoked 40 or more
cigarettes every day. Our results from the ordered probit models are that a one-point
increase in employment rate decreases the probability of being a non-smoker by 0.2%
and increases the chances of smoking 1-19, 20-39, and 40+ sticks of cigarettes by 0.40.5%, 0.7%, and 0.9-1.2%, respectively. These estimates provide better information
than those presented in Ruhm (2005) since he combined smokers and non-smokers as
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a comparable group when estimating at different intensities.

Table 3.3. Ordered Probit Estimates: Predicted effect of a one-point increase in
the percent employed on lifestyle behaviors for Tobacco use in Ruhm (2005)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

Pr(Smokes = 0)

0.7662

-0.1460
(0.0314)
[0.0441]

-0.2

-0.2

Pr(0 < Smokes < 20)

0.1182

0.0587
(0.0126)
[0.0177]

0.5

0.4

Pr(20 ≤ Smokes < 40)

0.0984

0.0715
(0.0154)
[0.0216]

0.7

0.7

Pr( Smokes ≥ 40)

0.0173

0.0158
(0.0034)
[0.0048]

0.9

1.2

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of the population employed from binary probit models using data from BRFSS
1987–2000. The ordered probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size
is 1,490,461. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Robust standard
errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states
but not within states in a given month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets.
Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In
the fourth, these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample
members.
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Table 3.4. Sample means (standard deviations in parenthesis) using BRFSS
1987–2019 (aged 18+)

Current smoking
Age (in years)
Female
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic Black
Other non-Hispanic non-White
Hispanic
White only
Education
High school dropout
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Education not reported
Current marital status
Never married
Married/cohabiting
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Marital status not reported
State-level variables
% Employed

Observations
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Unweighted means

Weighted means

0.177
(0.382)
52.880
(17.567)
0.592
(0.492)

0.201
(0.401)
45.734
(17.764)
0.516
(0.500)

0.087
(0.281)
0.067
(0.250)
0.057
(0.231)
0.789
(0.408)

0.114
(0.318)
0.068
(0.251)
0.113
(0.316)
0.706
(0.456)

0.098
(0.297)
0.300
(0.448)
0.268
(0.443)
0.331
(0.471)
0.003
(0.057)

0.137
(0.344)
0.305
(0.461)
0.274
(0.446)
0.281
(0.449)
0.004
(0.059)

0.148
(0.355)
0.564
(0.496)
0.158
(0.365)
0.125
(0.331)
0.005
(0.067)

0.206
(0.404)
0.604
(0.489)
0.117
(0.322)
0.069
(0.253)
0.004
(0.060)

0.621
(0.045)

0.615
(0.038)

8,950,116

8,950,116

Figure 3.1. Prevalence of Current Cigarette Smoking among Adults 1987-2019 BRFSS

Figure 3.2. Trends in normalized current cigarette smoking and employment rate
(1987-2019)
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3.4

Main Results
We extend the analysis to include the cohorts surveyed from 2001–2019. We be-

gin by describing the full sample data. In addition to the data we use for the replication exercise, we organize 7,459,655 respondents surveyed from 2001–2019. Therefore,
the sample used for the final analysis increased to 8,950,116. Table 3.4 reports the summary statistics of the new sample. The statistics in the first column do not account for
sampling weights, while those in the second column are weighted. Our new sample confirms that the prevalence of current smoking has declined drastically from about 25%
in 1987 to 14% in 2019 (see Figure 3.1), which is approximately 48% decrease (see from
Figure 3.2). On average, current smokers are about 18% of our full sample. Using sampling weights increases it to 20%.
The individuals in the recent BRFSS cohorts are relatively older than those in
the earlier surveys since the average age in the full sample is 53 years, compared to 46
years in the data used in Ruhm (2005). The proportion of non-Whites non-Hispanic
race also increased, while that of Whites declined. On average, approximately 6.7 percent of the entire sample is non-White non-Hispanic. Over the years, the proportion
of high school dropouts has fallen in the BRFSS survey, while college graduates have
increased. About 14 percent were high school dropouts in the older cohorts, but only
10 percent do not have high school diplomas in our new sample. Compared to the individuals in the data used in Ruhm (2005), our new data contains a relatively smaller
proportion of people who have never married, declining from 17.1 to 14.8%.
Our measure of economic conditions, the percent of state civilian non-institutionalized
monthly employment (or simply “employment rate”), is relatively smaller in the newer
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sample compared to the those used in Ruhm (2005). The average employment rate
from 1987–2000 was 64.1% but has declined to 62.1% after including the data from
2000–2019. It is not surprising because of the 2001 and 2009 recessions. During these
periods, the employment rates fell drastically. Figure 3.2 shows trends in employment
rate and current smoking, plotting annual averages of employment rates and current
smoking, normalized to 100 in 1987 values. The period from 1987-2000 mimics the
graph presented in Ruhm (2005). While the employment rate rose mildly and was reasonably stable during this period, the percent of current smoking fell slowly, as shown
in Figure 3.2. After 2000, current smoking fell drastically even though the employment
rate continued its usual trend. The sharp decline in current smoking relative to the employment rate suggests that the findings in Ruhm (2005) might not be the same in the
newer data. In the rest of the study, we demonstrate how the relationship between economic conditions and cigarette smoking has changed over time.
Table 3.5 shows the regression results from our full sample. In Panel A, we estimate the models without sample weights, while Panel B shows the results for the case
where sample weights are included. The models also include calendar month, year, and
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors, calculated assuming that observations are
independent across months and states but not within states and each month, are reported in parentheses. Their corresponding standard errors that assume independence
across but not within states are shown in brackets. From the unweighted regressions,
we find that a one-point increase in employment rate on current cigarette smoking is
0.076 percentage points and is statistically significant at 1%. This estimate is lower
than those reported in Ruhm (2005) and our replication results, which use data from
1987–2000. When we use the sample weights, the estimate decreases to 0.030 and is
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very imprecise.
Table 3.5. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.0763
(0.0145)
[0.0358]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0300
(0.0299)
[0.0380]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed, from binary probit models using data from BRFSS 1987–2019.
The probit models also include month, year and state dummy variables and controls for
age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is 8,950,116. Robust
standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and
states but not within states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding
standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent
variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are
computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third
column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample members.

The columns marked “a” and “b” show the percent change in current smoking
when predicted effects are evaluated at the sample means of the regressors or calculated for each and then averaged across all sample members, respectively. Regardless
of how we calculate the marginal effects, we find that the impact of a one-point increase in the employment rate on current cigarette smoking is 0.4%. As discussed in
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Section 3.3, our estimate from the replication exercise that uses individuals from the
older cohort surveyed from 1987-2000 is 0.7%, while Ruhm (2005) found an estimate of
0.6%. The drastic decline in the positive relationship between economic conditions and
cigarette smoking suggests attenuation bias toward zero effect. Despite the fact that
sample weights are necessary for the estimations to ensure our results are externally
valid, we find a weighted least squares estimate of 0.2%, which is relatively smaller and
statistically insignificant.

3.4.1

Dynamic Effects

We demonstrate more evidence on the attenuation bias towards a null relationship between economic conditions and cigarette smoking by allowing the effect to vary
over time (see Sun and Abraham (2020) for more discussion). We interact employment
rate with a full set of year dummies as specified below:

Yijmt = 1(β +

2019
X

λt Y EARt × Empmjt + ΦXijmt + γj + τm + δt + ξijmt > 0), (3.6)

t=1987

where Y EARt represents a dummy for year t, and the rest of the variables follow their
usual definitions in equation (1). Additionally, the parameters of interest are λt , for
t = 1987, 1988, ..., 2019. By including the interaction between employment rate and a
full set of year dummies, we omit Emjt from the model to avoid a perfect collinearity.
Because there are 31 coefficients of interests from equation (2), we summarize
them by providing their margins plot, with their 95% confidence intervals, in Figure 3.3.
The black dots represent the marginal effect estimates for all the years, while the lines
denote the 95% confidence intervals. The plots confirm that the impact of a one-point
increase in employment rate on current smoking attenuates over time. The figure pro147

vides three insights. First, the effects of economic conditions on cigarette smoking have
downward trends and are expected to switch from procyclical to a countercyclical relationship, especially after 2019. Since the estimate from 2019 shows approximately zero
effect, we anticipate a countercyclical estimate in 2020. Second, there was a significant
temporal drastic decline in the impact during the Great Recession. They reversed to
their normal trajectory after recovery from the recession. Our last revelation, implied
from the first and second insights, is that we should expect another sharp decline in the
estimate during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 that worsened the U.S. macroeconomic conditions. Because the coronavirus pandemic’s economic impacts are similar to
that of the Great Recession, we expect a similar sharp decline again.

Figure 3.3. Dynamic Estimates - Effects of a one point increase in employment rate on
current cigarette smoking, with their 95% confidence intervals (1987-2019)

The attenuation bias toward zero estimates in the smoking-employment relationship shown in Figure 3.3 suggests some underlying unobserved structural or behavioral
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changes are driving the continuous decline. Figure 3.2 shows that current cigarette
smoking decreased drastically by about 40 percentage points from 2001–2019, but the
employment rate changed only marginally, creating an impression of a structural break.
Therefore, it is interesting to re-estimate the models with the newer cohorts. Table 3.6
shows the results for the analysis that uses only 2001–2019 survey data. Our estimates
are negative in signs, contrary to our findings from the full sample. We find that the
predicted effect of a one-point increase in the employment rate does not affect current
cigarette smoking. The estimate is small and statistically insignificant, regardless of
whether the samples are weighted or standard errors are clustered with assumptions.
Also, the event-study graph in Figure 3.4 gives a consistent picture of the trends in
the effects of economic conditions on cigarette smoking. In contrast, when we use data
from 1987–2000, we find slightly decreasing impacts over time, but with significant dips
in 1988–1989 and 1998 (see Figure 3.5).

3.4.2

Robustness Checks

One concern is whether state tobacco control policies can explain the estimates in
Table 3.5 and the structural change in the relationship between cigarette smoking and
economic conditions demonstrated in Figure 3.3. In recent years, policymakers have
enacted several regulations to reduce cigarette smoking, including federal, state, and
local cigarette excise taxes, youth access policies, flavor bans, and other tobacco control policies (Farrelly et al., 2017), expenditure (Huang and Chaloupka, 2014; Ciecierski et al., 2011), and State Medicaid smoking cessation programs (Greene et al., 2014).
Since the models include the year, state, and calendar month fixed effects, we do not
think tobacco control policies are the underlying cause of the structural break in cur149

Table 3.6. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 2001–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

-0.1

-0.1

-0.0

-0.0

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1662

-0.0117
(0.0152)
[0.0288]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.1829

-0.0057
(0.0312)
[0.0343]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed, from binary probit models using data from BRFSS 2001–2019.
The probit models also include month, year and state dummy variables and controls for
age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is 7,459,306. Robust
standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and
states but not within states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding
standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent
variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are
computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third
column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample members.

rent cigarette smoking trends unless they vary within states over time. However, if
state tobacco control policies change over time, then our states and year fixed effects
in the models would not account for them. As the first robustness check, we include
state-level cigarette sales taxes in the models. Cigarette excise taxes are shown to be
a significant predictor of smoking and correlate with economic conditions (Charles and
DeCicca, 2008). We use cigarette sales tax data from the Center for Disease Control
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Figure 3.4. Dynamic Estimates - Effects of a one point increase in employment rate on
current cigarette smoking, with their 95% confidence intervals (2001-2019)

Figure 3.5. Dynamic Estimates - Effects of a one point increase in employment rate on
current cigarette smoking, with their 95% confidence intervals (1987-2000)
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and Prevention (Orzechowski and Walker, 2019). Table 3.7 re-estimates the models in
equation (1) with state cigarette taxes. The results show that the increase in cigarette
smoking prevalence due to a one-point increase in employment rate does not differ significantly with cigarette sales taxes in the models. While there is a slight increase in
the estimate when we exclude sample weights in the models, the weight least squares
estimates are not different from those in Table 3.5. Therefore, tobacco control policies
seem not to explain the structural change in the effects.
Since it is reasonable to expect that immediate past economic conditions affect
current cigarette smoking, the second set of robustness checks uses previous economic
conditions in the specifications. We use the average three months employment rate, the
average two-year employment rate (both ending in the survey month), and the previous month’s employment rate in separate regressions. Table 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, show
the results from these specifications, respectively. Except for the case where we use the
lagged employment rate (see Table 3.10), the estimates are consistently similar to the
main results in Table 3.5. Even the weighted least squares estimates are sometimes statistically significant at 5%, depending on how we calculate the standard errors. If we
use the lagged employment rate, the estimate is still positive and statistically significant at convention levels but economically insignificant. It is not surprising because
we do not expect the previous month’s economic conditions to have a similar effect as
that of the current month. Importantly, since the estimate is consistently positive and
statistically significant, it supports the findings of the procyclical relationship between
economic conditions and cigarette smoking.
It could be possible that changes in macroeconomic conditions have differential impacts on individuals with different levels of demographic characteristics. In an152

Table 3.7. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+) with cigarette taxes
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.6

0.6

0.2

0.2

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.0991
(0.0137)
[0.0320]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0306
(0.0290)
[0.0378]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models using BRFSS 1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and controls for age, sex,
race/ethnicity, education, marital status, and state cigarette taxes. Robust standard errors
calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not
within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that
assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects
indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the
predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are
evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for everyone and then
averaged across all sample members.

other set of robustness checks, we consider specifications that include interactions between age and sex (one variable), age and race/ethnicity (three variables), sex and
race/ethnicity (three variables), sex and marital status (three variables), and sex and
education (three variables). Table 3.11 presents the results from these specifications.
The estimates compared to the main results in Table 3.5 are not different in any respect.
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Table 3.8. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+) using average employment
over three months
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.1140
(0.0227)
[0.0582]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0856
(0.0423)
[0.0668]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. Sample size is 8,950,116. Different employment definitions are used for alternative specifications. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables
and controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Robust
standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and
states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets.
Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable,
with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed
by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for
everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

In my next robustness checks, we include state-specific linear time trends in the
models as a way of accounting for unobserved factors that vary within-states and across
time. For example, social norms, natural disasters, and state-specific tobacco control
policies can change over time. Table Table 3.12 shows the results from these specifications. Doing so does not significantly affect the predicted macroeconomic effects on
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Table 3.9. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+) using average employment
over 2 years
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.3

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.1152
(0.0175)
[0.0435]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0696
(0.0344)
[0.0516]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. Sample size is 8,950,116. Different employment definitions are used for alternative specifications. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables
and controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Robust
standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and
states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets.
Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable,
with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed
by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for
everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

current cigarette smoking. Even after controlling for the state, month, and year fixed
effects and the trend absorbing some of the variations in the employment rates, we still
find robust estimates.
One possible omitted bias to the main results Table 3.5 is our failure to control
for household incomes, which correlates with macroeconomic conditions and affects
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Table 3.10. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
lagged employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.005

0.005

0.002

0.002

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.0008
(0.0001)
[0.0004]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0004
(0.0003)
[0.0004]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. Sample size is 8,950,116. Different employment definitions are used for alternative specifications. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables
and controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Robust
standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and
states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets.
Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable,
with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed
by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for
everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

cigarette smoking. As the final set of robustness checks, we include a measure of household income in the models. Before 1994, BRFSS categorized household income information into < US$ 10,000, US$ 10,000–14,999, US$ 15,000–19,999, . . . , and US$ 50,000+.
Starting from 1994, they included US$ 50,000 – 74,999 and 75,000+ as additional categories. Since unobserved factors that affect cigarette smoking could also determine income, creating endogeneity concerns, we use the weighted averages for BRFSS residents
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Table 3.11. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+) with additional controls
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.5

0.5

0.1

0.1

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.0834
(0.0143)
[0.0342]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0291
(0.0284)
[0.0320]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed, from binary probit models using data from BRFSS 1987–2019.
The probit models also include month, year and state dummy variables and controls for
age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, and interactions between age and sex
(one variable), age and race/ethnicity (three variables), sex and race/ethnicity (three variables), sex and marital status (three variables), and sex and education (three variables).
Sample size is 8,950,116. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations
are independent across months and states but not within states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but
not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample
means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent
variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means.
In the fourth, these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample
members.

in the state with the same sex, age, and education, converted to 2019 constant dollars
using the all-items consumer price index. Within each state, we categorize the real
average incomes for the 16 groups stratified by sex (male versus female), age (18–34,
25–54, 55–64, 65 and over), and education (no college versus college graduate). By
including household incomes in the models (see Table 3.13), the results do not differ
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Table 3.12. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+) with state-specific linear time
trends
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.7

0.7

0.3

0.3

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.1302
(0.0096)
[0.0224]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0696
(0.0252)
[0.0289]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed, from binary probit models using data from BRFSS 1987–2019.
The probit models also include linear time trend, month and state dummy variables,
and controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is
8,950,116. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent
across months and states but not within states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in
the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage
changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample members.

from the main estimates in Table 3.5, providing strong evidence of the procyclical relationship between macroeconomic economic conditions and cigarette smoking. Also,
although we do not report it in the table, we find that household income and cigarette
smoking positively correlate.
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Table 3.13. Percentage change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the
employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+) with household income
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.4

0.4

0.1

0.1

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1774

0.0678
(0.0139)
[0.0328]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2012

0.0198
(0.0284)
[0.0335]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed, from binary probit models using data from BRFSS 1987–2019.
The probit models also include linear time trend, month and state dummy variables, and
controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, and state–age–sex–education
group average household incomes. Sample size is 8,950,116. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within
states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects
indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the
predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are
evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth, these are calculated for each individual
and then averaged across all sample members.

3.4.3

Heterogeneity

Since the data may not be nationally representative, the external validity of the
results is a possible concern. As already pointed out, the BRFSS oversamples females.
Therefore, the results could be disproportionately driven by females. To verify whether
the results are heterogeneous across different demographic groups, we present sub159

sample analyses by gender, age, race, and education. For the analysis by gender, we
stratify the sample into only males and females. Table 3.14 shows the results for males,
while those of the females are in Table 3.15. Regardless of whether the data is weighted
or not, males are at least 2.6% more likely to be smokers than females. Focusing on the
estimates from the unweighted regressions, we find that the predicted effect of a onepoint increase in employment rate raises current cigarette smoking by 0.6 for males and
0.3 for females and is statistically significant at 1%. With sample weights in the models, the estimates are less precise and smaller. Therefore, economic conditions possibly
affect cigarette smoking for males more than females.
Next, we present the results by age categories in Table 3.16 - 3.18. Even though
the sample means differ significantly across different age groups, there are no disparities between their weighted and unweighted means. Also, smoking behavior does not
vary so much between young adults aged 18–34 (see Table 3.16) and adults aged 35–64
(see Table 3.17). As expected, smoking prevalence among those above 64 years is lower
than in the younger generations (see Table 3.18). Focusing on the estimates from the
unweighted least squares, we find that the effect of a one-point increase in employment
on current cigarette smoking does not differ among the three age groups. A one-point
increase in employment rate increases cigarette smoking by about 0.5% if weighted or
unweighted, except the weighted least squares results among individuals of ages 65+.
The effect among those of ages 65+ when weighted is negative but statistically insignificant.
Another interesting demographic category that we consider is race. We study the
effect of economic conditions on cigarette smoking among Whites, Blacks, Hispanics,
and all other racial groups combined. The unweighted means suggest that smoking
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Table 3.14. Heterogeneous Effect Among Males – Percentage change in current
smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019
(aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.6

0.6

0.2

0.2

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1922

0.1195
(0.0180)
[0.0308]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2222

0.0535
(0.0399)
[0.0459]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of the population employed, from binary probit models for females using data from
BRFSS 1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year and state dummy variables
and controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. The sample size
for the males is 3,653,696. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations
are independent across months and states but not within states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but
not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample
means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent
variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means.
In the fourth, these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample
members.

prevalence is higher among Blacks and the other racial groups than Whites and Hispanics (see from Table 3.19 - 3.22). Our results show that a one-point increase in employment rate increases current smoking by 0.4% among Whites (see Table 3.19), 0.6%
among the other racial groups (see Table 3.22), but imprecise among Blacks (see Table 3.20) and Hispanics (see Table 3.21) when we exclude sample weights in the re-
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Table 3.15. Heterogeneous Effect Among Females – Percentage change in current
smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019
(aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.1

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1673

0.0456
(0.0175)
[0.0432]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.1815

0.0089
(0.0359)
[0.0458]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of the population employed, from binary probit models for females using data from
BRFSS 1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year and state dummy variables
and controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. The sample size
for the males is 5,296,420. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations
are independent across months and states but not within states in each month, are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but
not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample
means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent
variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means.
In the fourth, these are calculated for each individual and then averaged across all sample
members.

gressions. Including sampling weights in the estimation leads to different results. The
estimates are that a one-point increase in employment rate increases current cigarette
smoking by 0.8% among Blacks and at least 1.1% among the other racial groups, but
we do not find any economic and statistically significant impacts among Whites and
Hispanics.
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Table 3.16. Heterogeneous Effect among Adults of Ages 18-34 – Percentage change
in current smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS
1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.2313

0.1145
(0.0346)
[0.0819]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2333

0.1100
(0.0828)
[0.0940]

The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of
the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. The sample size
is 1,637,595. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in
the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage
changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

Our final analysis demonstrates heterogeneity in the effects of economic conditions on cigarette smoking by education attainment. We categorize our sample into
those without four-year college degrees (or the low-educated) and those with college
degrees (or the high-educated). The unweighted means show that highly educated individuals are approximately two times less likely to smoke than those with fewer schooling years, as shown in Table 3.23 and 3.24, respectively. Regarding the impact of eco163

Table 3.17. Heterogeneous Effect among Adults of Ages 35-64 – Percentage change
in current smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS
1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.2065

0.0953
(0.0185)
[0.0393]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2175

0.1097
(0.0394)
[0.0534]

The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of
the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. The sample size
is 4,704,627. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in
the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage
changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

nomic conditions on cigarette smoking, the estimates suggest that a one-point increase
in employment rate increases current cigarette smoking by 0.5% among the low-educated
individuals and imprecise effect among highly educated people when we do not include
sample weights. By including sampling weights in the regressions, the estimate for the
low-educated individuals declines to 0.3%, but negative and statistically insignificant
among the high-educated individuals. These results are not surprising since we expect
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Table 3.18. Heterogeneous Effect among Adults of Ages 65+ – Percentage change
in current smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS
1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.6

0.6

-0.3

-0.3

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.0911

0.0535
(0.0155)
[0.0286]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.0979

-0.0284
(0.0373)
[0.0361]

The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage of
the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. The sample size
is 2,607,894. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in
the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage
changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

individuals with lower education levels to be affected by changes in economic conditions. Since high-educated people have stable employment and income, low-educated
individuals are more likely to gain employment and income during good economic conditions. On the other hand, less-educated people are more likely to lose their jobs during economic downturns. Therefore, we expected the effect to be larger among the loweducated people, as confirmed in the data.
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Table 3.19. Heterogeneous Effect among Whites – Percentage change in current
smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019
(aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.4

0.4

-0.0

-0.0

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1752

0.0636
(0.0148)
[0.0336]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2097

-0.0052
(0.0828)
[0.0940]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size
is 7,065,604. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in
the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage
changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

3.5

Conclusion
Since cigarette smoking is one of the leading causes of preventable death, we doc-

ument how macroeconomic conditions affect it. This paper uses the 1987–2019 Behavioral Risk Surveillance System and the Bureau of Statistics employment dataset to estimate the effects of economic conditions on cigarette smoking. Our findings support
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Table 3.20. Heterogeneous Effect among Blacks – Percentage change in current
smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019
(aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.4

0.4

0.8

0.8

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1957

0.0693
(0.0458)
[0.1116]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2097

0.1688
(0.0739)
[0.0493]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is
713,333. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent
across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses.
Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change
in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

the evidence that cigarette smoking increases when the economy improves. Specifically,
we find that a one-point increase in employment rate increases current cigarette smoking prevalence by 0.4%. We also show evidence of a declining procyclical relationship
between cigarette smoking and employment towards a zero effect, and the attenuation
is larger during severe economic downturns. The declining procyclical relationship, accompanied by a sharp decline during the Great Recession period, suggests that esti167

Table 3.21. Heterogeneous Effect among Hispanics – Percentage change in current
smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS 1987–2019
(aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.3

0.3

-0.1

-0.1

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1569

0.0417
(0.0525)
[0.0881]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.1597

-0.0100
(0.1230)
[0.1014]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is
569,367. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent
across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses.
Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change
in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

mates with data from 2020 will be more likely to be negative (i.e., countercyclical) due
to the coronavirus pandemic. Finally, we find evidence of heterogeneous impacts. The
effects are larger among males, Blacks, and low-educated individuals than their counterparts, but no differential impacts by age.
From the “rational addiction” framework, we anticipated a relatively small response to transitory price variations for heavy smoking “addicted” individuals (Becker
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Table 3.22. Heterogeneous Effect among Other Races – Percentage change in
current smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using BRFSS
1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.8

0.8

2.2

1.1

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.1992

0.1559
(0.0614)
[0.1063]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.1623

0.3590
(0.1759)
[0.2261]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size is
601,012. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent
across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses.
Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but not within states
are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change
in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean.
In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor means. In the fourth,
these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample members.

and Murphy, 1988; Ruhm, 2005). Consequently, our finding of the substantial macroeconomic effect of current cigarette smoking is contrary to my expectation. Nevertheless,
the main finding is consistent with previous estimates demonstrating that improvement in macroeconomic conditions leads to unhealthy lifestyles (Ruhm, 2000, 2005;
Xu, 2013) and contrast with studies that find no or countercyclical relationship (Goel,
2008; Currie et al., 2015; Kalousova and Burgard, 2014; Barnes et al., 2009; Dehejia
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Table 3.23. Heterogeneous Effect among Low-Educated Individuals – Percentage
change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using
BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.3

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.2209

0.1127
(0.0199)
[0.0508]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.2394

0.0695
(0.0387)
[0.0532]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size for the low
educated individuals are 5,983,292. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but
not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample
means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor
means. In the fourth, these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample
members.

and Lleras-Muney, 2004). Following Ruhm (2000, 2005) that used the BRFSS microdata from 1987–1995 and 1987–2000, respectively, this study is the first to use long-run
data covering major macroeconomic shocks, including the 2001 economic downturn and
the 2009 Great Recession. Using the 1987–2019 data allows us to capture the changing
cigarette smoking responses to macroeconomic shocks and recoveries.
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Table 3.24. Heterogeneous Effect among High-Educated Individuals – Percentage
change in current smoking due to a one-point change in the employment rate using
BRFSS 1987–2019 (aged 18+)
Sample Mean

Predicted Effect

Percent Change
a

b

0.2

0.2

-0.2

-0.2

Panel A: Predicted effect without sampling weights
Current smoking

0.0898

0.0180
(0.0139)
[0.0212]

Panel B: Predicted effects with sampling weight
Current smoking

0.1034

-0.0181
(0.0369)
[0.0377]

Note: The table shows the predicted effects of a one-point increase in the state percentage
of the population employed from binary probit models for females using data from BRFSS
1987–2019. The probit models also include month, year, and state dummy variables and
controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Sample size for the high
educated individuals is 2,966,824. Robust standard errors calculated assuming that observations are independent across months and states but not within states each month are reported in parentheses. Corresponding standard errors that assume independence across but
not within states are shown in brackets. Predicted effects indicate the estimated percentage point change in the dependent variable, with other regressors evaluated at the sample
means. Percentage changes are computed by dividing the predicted effect by the dependent variable mean. In the third column, predicted effects are evaluated at the regressor
means. In the fourth, these are calculated for everyone and then averaged across all sample
members.

Two policy recommendations are as follows. Currently, tobacco control policies
are designed to be fixed irrespective of the economic conditions. However, the results
suggest that individuals myopically change their smoking behavior during downturns,
leading to multiple unstable equilibria, which reverse to their usual pattern after temporal shocks. Therefore, we recommendation that policymakers create programs and

171

policies that embed features of automatic stabilizers to absorb temporal economic shocks
on cigarette smoking. During economic downturns, these policies should mitigate the
magnified impacts of the economic shocks on smoking behaviors. Secondly, by demonstrating that the procyclical relationship between economic conditions and cigarette
smoking has diminished towards countercyclical effects, especially in recent years, it
implies that current policies need to tackle the countercyclical impacts instead of the
procyclical relationships found in previous studies.
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Appendix A
An Appropriate Estimator - A Recursive Bivariate Probit
An important econometrics issue that several studies overlook but still a debate
in the literature is how to estimate binary choice models with endogenous regressors
(Lewbel et al., 2012). Our goal is to use an estimation technique that can efficiently
and consistently determine the parameters in equations (1) and (2). We would rely on
the linear IV [i.e., two-stage least squares (2SLS)] if the outcome in equation (1), Yidt ,
is continuous, even if the endogenous variable, Iidt [i.e., the outcome in equation (2)],
is binary. However, since the dependent variable and our variable of interest are both
binary, we use nonlinear models since the linear IV models cab be bad approximations
of highly nonlinear models and lead to inconsistencies marginal effects (Altonji et al.,
2005a; Lewbel et al., 2012; Angrist and Pischke, 2008, pp. 80).
Below, we show that the linear models may not be good. First, we rewrite the
binary choice outcomes in equations (1) and (2) as below:

P(Yidt = 1|Xidt , Iidt , H) = F (β0 + β1 Iidt + ΛXidt + γd + τt ),

(A.1)

P(Iidt = 1|Xidt , Zdt , H) = G(α0 + α1 Zdt + θXidt + λd + πt ),

(A.2)

where F (•) and G(•) are nonlinear functions in their arguments, H represents a vector
of the instrument, district and year fixed effect. The 2SLS procedure requires the substitution of the G into the F function to get the conditional expectation function. By
substituting equation (7) into (6), we obtain (8) below:
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P(Yidt = 1|Xidt , Iidt , H) = F {β0 + β1 G(α0 + α1 Zdt + θXidt + λd + πt ) + ΛXidt + γd + τt }.
(A.3)
The conditional expectation function, E, which we estimate empirically, is given by:

E[Yidt = 1|Xidt , Iidt , H] = E[F {β0 +β1 G(α0 +α1 Zdt +θXidt +λd +πt )+ΛXidt +γd +τt }].
(A.4)
However, because the F and G are nonlinear functions, we cannot pass the expected
value through the composite functions, unless we approximate them with linear functions. If they are highly nonlinear, then the linear approximations will be bad. Therefore, using 2SLS can lead to marginal effects that are far from the parameters we are
trying to estimate. Another fruitless technique is to use the two-step procedure that
mimics the 2SLS. It is tempting to estimate equation (7) to obtain the predicted values
(i.e., the predicted values from the first-stage equation) and substitute into the outcome equation in (6) before estimating it. However, with the same reasons why the
2SLS fail, Wooldridge (2010) and Green (1998) argue that substituting first stage fitted values into the outcome equation is inappropriate (i.e., known in the literature as
”forbidden regression”) and cannot produce consistent and efficient estimates.
Although there is no consensus on the best technique to use, most studies in the
literature argue for the bivariate probit estimator. The main weakness is the assumption of joint normality on the error terms, idt and ηidt , as specified below:




  



 idt 
0 1 ρ
  ∼ N   , 
 .
 
  

ηidt
0
ρ 1
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(A.5)

The matrices in equation (10) indicate that idt and ηidt are jointly normal, each with
mean zero, unit variances, but with an unknown correlation, ρ 6= 0.1 With the assumption of joint normality of the error terms, our G(•) and F (•) functions become Φ(•),
the cumulative normal distribution function. The identification in the bivariate probit
framework comes from both the instrument and the functional form restriction. Although we can identify the parameters without the instrument, we include it to allow
for a semiparametric identification (Altonji et al., 2005a). Unfortunately, there is no
econometric theory or formal test to show the relative contribution of the functional
form and excluded instrument to the identification of the parameters.

1 Check

Wooldridge (2010, pp. 596 - 597) for the full derivation of the maximum likelihood estimator.
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Appendix B
Table 1.A1. Robustness to Supply-side Factors on the Impact of NHIS on Twelve Months
Healthcare Visits using Bivariate Probit Models and Years of NHIS Exposure as an Excluded
Instrument

NHIS Coverage
Number of Hospitals (per 1000)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.276**
(0.1285)
0.559*
(0.3090)

0.307***
(0.1037)

0.291**
(0.1224)

0.314***
(0.0970)

0.194
(0.1367)

0.289***
(0.1038)
0.724*
(0.4034)
-0.0193
(0.1078)
0.0867
(0.0660)
0.478
(0.4621)

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Number of Hospital Beds (per 1000)

-0.00294
(0.0294)

Number of Nurses (per 1000)

0.0726
(0.0695)

Number of Doctors (per 1000)

Controls
Post-NHIS Indicator
Survey Fixed-Effects
Observations

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Notes: We include the woman’s age, place of resident (rural/urban), marital status of woman, pregnancy status, number of births in the
last five years, birth history, wealth index, woman’s education, woman’s occupation, literacy status of woman, ethnicity, religion, and district fixed effects as the controls in each specification. Additionally, we include the number of hospital beds to capture supply-side effects.
We report heteroscedastic robust-standard errors clustered within the district in the parentheses. The notation “N/N” for a variable X
denotes that both the first and second equations of the bivariate model exclude the variable X. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Appendix C
Table 1.A2. Robustness to Additional Control Variables on the
Impact of NHIS on Twelve Months Healthcare Visits using
Bivariate Probit Models and Years of NHIS Exposure as an
Excluded Instrument

NHIS Coverage

Controls
Post-NHIS Indicator
Survey Fixed-Effects
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.270***
(0.066)

0.314***
(0.091)

0.302***
(0.111)

0.309***
(0.104)

Y/Y
N/N
N/N
15,112

Y/Y
N/N
Y/Y
15,112

Y/Y
Y/Y
N/N
15,112

Y/Y
Y/N
N/Y
15,112

Notes: We include the woman’s age, place of resident (rural/urban), marital status of
woman, pregnancy status, number of births in the last five years, birth history, wealth
index, woman’s education, woman’s occupation, literacy status of woman, ethnicity, religion, and district fixed effects as the controls in each specification. Additionally, we
include dummies for frequent television viewer and radio listener and education and occupation of the mother’s partner at the time of the survey. We report heteroscedastic
robust-standard errors clustered within the district in the parentheses. The notation
“N/N” for a variable X denotes that both the first and second equations of the bivariate
model exclude the variable X. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Appendix D
Table 1.B1. Robustness to Additional Control Variables on the Difference-in-Differences
Estimates of NHIS on Children Born in Health Facilities using Children from Rural Nigeria as a
Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.095***
(0.024)

0.088***
(0.025)

0.086***
(0.021)

0.083***
(0.022)

0.062***
(0.021)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post
Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

0.054***
(0.019)

0.047**
(0.020)

0.054***
(0.017)

0.051***
(0.018)

0.028*
(0.017)

N
Y
N
N
46,857

N
N
Y
N
46,857

Y
Y
N
N
46,857

Y
N
Y
N
46,857

Y
Y
N
Y
46,857

Notes: The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics that may affect the outcome. They are
mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order, and household wealth index. Some
of the models also include year of birth fixed effects to account for changes in the national trends in the healthcare sector, income, and
other factors that may increase growth. We cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration area similar to census block
(in the U.S.A. context).
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Appendix E
Table 1.B2. Robustness to Additional Control Variables on the Difference-in-Differences
Estimates of NHIS on Prenatal care Visits using Children from Rural Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.047**
(0.022)

0.039*
(0.022)

0.063***
(0.022)

0.056**
(0.022)

0.057***
(0.022)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post

0.045**
(0.022)

0.037*
(0.022)

0.061***
(0.022)

0.054**
(0.022)

0.054**
(0.021)

Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

N
Y
N
N
33,401

N
N
Y
N
33,401

Y
Y
N
N
33,401

Y
N
Y
N
33,401

Y
Y
N
Y
33,401

Notes: The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics that may affect the outcome. They are
mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order, and household wealth index. Some
of the models also include year of birth fixed effects to account for changes in the national trends in the healthcare sector, income, and
other factors that may increase growth. We cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration area similar to census block
(in the U.S.A. context).
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Appendix F
Figure 1.B1. Parallel Trends with Nigeria (i.e., Rural and
Urban) as a Control Group
Panel A: Births in Health Facilities (or Institutional Births)

Panel B: Prenatal Care Visits in the First Four Months of Pregnancy
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Appendix G
Figure 1.B2. Event Study with Nigeria (i.e., Rural and Urban)
as a Control Group
Panel A: Births in Health Facilities (or Institutional Births)

Panel B: Prenatal Care Visits in the First Four Months of Pregnancy

Notes: In each figure, two separate linear regression models were used to calculate the estimates. The first regression used only data from the pre-NHIS period (1999 - 2003) to estimate the pre-NHIS coefficients (with 2003, before the NHIS, serving as the reference). The
second regression used all data from 1999 to 2013 to estimate the post-NHIS coefficients, using the entire pre-NHIS period (1999 - 2003) as the reference. Results are conditional on the
characteristics: sex of child, indicator for twins, birth order, place of resident (rural/urban),
household wealth index, mother’s age, marital status, education, occupation, literacy status,
ethnicity, and religion.
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Appendix H
Table 1.B3. Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Effects of the NHIS in Ghana on Children Born
in Health Facilities Outcome using Children from Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.116***
(0.033)

0.101***
(0.033)

0.105***
(0.021)

0.102***
(0.022)

0.084***
(0.022)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post
Controls
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

0.088***
(0.028)

0.074**
(0.029)

0.074***
(0.017)

0.071***
(0.018)

0.052***
(0.017)

N
N
N
65,032

N
Y
N
65,032

Y
N
N
65,032

Y
Y
N
65,032

Y
N
Y
65,032

Notes: The mean of the outcome is 0.378. The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics
that may affect the outcome. They are mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order, and household wealth index. Some of the models also include year of birth fixed effects to account for changes in the national trends in
the healthcare sector, income, and other factors that may increase growth. We cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government
Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration
area similar to census block (in the U.S.A. context).
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Appendix I
Table 1.B4. Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Effects of the NHIS in Ghana on Any Prenatal
Care Visits Outcome using Children from Nigeria as a Control Group
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models
Treatment × Post

0.076***
(0.023)

0.071***
(0.023)

0.083***
(0.021)

0.082***
(0.021)

0.081***
(0.021)

Panel B: Marginal Effects from Probit Models
Treatment × Post
Controls
Post-NHIS Dummy
Birth Year Fixed Effect
Linear Time Trend
Observations

0.084***
(0.025)

0.079***
(0.025)

0.090***
(0.022)

0.089***
(0.022)

0.086***
(0.022)

N
Y
N
N
46,271

N
N
Y
N
46,271

Y
Y
N
N
46,271

Y
N
Y
N
46,271

Y
Y
N
Y
46,271

Notes: The mean of the outcome is 0.569. The specifications in Column (3) - (5) include mother, child, and household characteristics
that may affect the outcome. They are mother’s age at the time of childbirth categorized into four groups, ethnicity, place of resident (rural/urban), religious beliefs, marital status, education and, literacy status, occupation in the survey year, the gender of the child, birth order, and household wealth index. Some of the models also include year of birth fixed effects to account for changes in the national trends in
the healthcare sector, income, and other factors that may increase growth. We cluster standard errors at the district and Local Government
Agency to account for the overtime correlation in unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The DHS cluster is the same the enumeration
area similar to census block (in the U.S.A. context).
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Appendix J
Challenges in Identifying Charter School Effects
The positive effects of charter schools on school competition may imply they are
“skimming the cream,” taking only the best students from the TPSs. They could also
signal parents looking for alternatives. On the other hand, a negative effect could suggest that poor-performing students transfer to charter schools, searching for better
schools. Suppose charter schools increase competition, which eventually increases the
outcomes of the students in their jurisdiction. In that case, comparing charter schools
and TPSs students will not capture the charter schools’ full effects if the initial distribution of performance is unknown. The presence of school competition could shift
the distribution of students’ performance. Therefore, understanding students’ performance distribution for charter schools and TPSs students is essential for a valid comparison.1 However, a common concern in most studies in the literature is that they do
not have data on pre-treatment outcomes. Without such data, it is challenging to disentangle the charter schools impacts on students’ achievements. Therefore, the mixed
evidence of the impact of attending charter schools on students’ outcomes can mislead
policymakers because the results across different studies may be incomparable due to
data limitations. Our study uses empirical strategy that does not require students’ pretreatment outcomes, as discussed in Section 2.5.
Identifying the impact of charter schools on the students’ outcomes is not an easy
task due to possible endogeneity. First, charter school attendance is not by chance.
Parents seek a better alternative for their children, especially those who are already
1 The reason is that charter schools may be attracting students from one side of the ability distribution. If only
students struggling in the TPSs transfer to the charter schools, we would expect students’ average quality in charter
schools to be lower than those who remain in the TPSs. Making a comparison based on average performance leads to an
underestimation of charter school effects. The converse is also true.
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struggling in the TPSs. The fact that students and parents choose charter schools over
TPSs suggests that there are inherent reasons which make them seek for alternatives.
Also, students who choose charter schools may be having difficulties regarding their
performances in the TPSs. Without data on students’ initial performance before transferring into charter schools, it is challenging to identify charter schools’ effects. Hence,
unobserved characteristics, including students’ ability and preferences, can lead to selfselection into charter schools. Second, the decision by a state to pass a charter school
law may be endogenous since states with good and highly competitive school systems
are less likely to implement the charter law, whereas states whose school system is
less competitive would be willing to pass the law. Even if states do not endogenously
pass the laws,2 school districts and local school boards may endogenously open charter
schools. Third, different charter schools may face different rules depending on the state,
county, or school district’s preferences. Fourth, charter schools may differ from each
other based on curricular, teaching styles, teachers, and resources available. Finally, different charter schools may serve different communities or students, which can lead to
different outcomes.
Studies that focus on charter school attendance and students’ outcomes use different methods to address endogeneity issues. They use both experimental and quasiexperimental methods. The ideal scenario is to conduct an experiment where one-half
of the student is randomly assigned to charter schools. The random assignment can
identify the average treatment effect of charter school attendance. Unfortunately, conducting such an experiment is not feasible because of ethical concerns. (School choice
2 This reason is that charter schools were established to provide alternatives to the TPSs and create competition.
For example, Hoxby (2004) examines the impact of charter schools by examining the changes in mean test scores before
and after introducing charter schools. The findings are that schools exposed to charter school competition have more
enormous improvements in an average performance in terms of test scores than schools not exposed to a significant charter school competition.
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is voluntary, and it is illegal to force students to attend schools unwillingly). One natural experiment similar to random assignment is using a lottery to assign students in
oversubscribed charter schools. Students who lose in the lottery and remain in TPSs
or private schools become the control group, and those who win the lottery form the
treatment group. Focusing on students who subscribe to charter schools only becomes
analogous to the experiment described earlier. These are known in the literature as
“lottery-based” studies.
Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2015) is a lottery-based study that followed applicants to
a charter middle school in the Harlem Children’s Zone (New York). Similarly, Angrist et al. (2016) lottery-based study considered only oversubscribed Boston (Massachusetts) charters. Despite the experimental nature of these studies, they have limitations. First, conditions that lead to oversubscription is neither universal nor random
since only older schools and academically better schools get oversubscription (Davis
and Raymond, 2012). Second, the rate of oversubscription differs across charter schools.
Whereas one school may have a larger subscription rate, others may have a lower subscription rate. Third, students may enroll in a non-TPS because of losing the lottery.
If the data for these studies do not reflect students who are home-schooled or move to
private schools after losing the lottery, the results can be biased. Fourth, these studies
could include only oversubscribed schools. But there are many charter schools without
oversubscription. Hence, a generalization of findings from lottery-based studies is problematic, and their findings’ external validity is concerning.
An alternative to experimentally designed (or “lottery-based”) studies is the quasiexperimental studies. These studies choose methods that can solve the endogeneity issues associated with survey data. Among these studies, the predominantly used method
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is the student-level fixed effects model. They use panel data to account for the students’ pre-treatment outcomes and remove time-invariant observed and unobserved
characteristics. The net effect is the “value-added” from attending charter schools.
Studies such as Imberman (2011); Booker et al. (2007, 2008); Ni (2009); Zimmer et al.
(2012); Jinnai (2014); Winters (2012); Bifulco and Ladd (2006); Zimmer et al. (2009),
have implemented this approach. A few of their limitations are as follows. First, there
may be demographically identifiable differences between students who always remain in
charter schools and TPSs as noted in Davis and Raymond (2012). Second, the research
design requires students to move from TPSs to charter schools and eliminates a sample
of students who never switched schools. Third, these studies may have smaller sample
sizes due to the nature of the design.
Other methods that are predominantly found in the literature are the matching
method (Sass et al., 2016; Dobbie and Fryer, 2020; Hoxby, 2004), instrumental variable
(IV) approach (Imberman, 2011; Bettinger, 2005), and difference-in-difference (Bettinger, 2005). However, all these methods have issues as well.
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Appendix K
Table 2.A1. Dates of State Charter Law and Regulations on
the Number of Charter Schools Permitted
State

Law Year

Cap

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC

2015
1995
1994
1995
1992
1993
1996
1995
1996

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

1996
1993
1994
1998
1996

No
No
No
No
Yes

Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

2001
2002
1994
NA
1995
2011
2003
1993

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

1993
1991
2010
1998
1997
1995
1996
1993

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

New York

1998

Yes

Ohio

1997

Yes

Oklahoma

1999

Yes

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee

1999
1997
1995
1996
2002

No
No
Yes
No
No

Description of Cap
10 until 2022
Approve up to 24 per year
250 in 1998/1999 and increased by 100 annually

10 per year per authorizer. If an authorizer has not
reached 10, another authorizer can grant up to 20

120 but 70 in Chicago with at least 5 for students from
low-performing or overcrowded schools. No more than
45 will operate in the rest of the state
But not more than 10 innovation zone applications

10 until 2022
120. Up to 48 reserved for Horace Mann charter &
schools up to 72 reserved for commonwealth charter
school not including charter schools in low-performing
school districts. At least 2 charter schools must be
in the lowest 10%.
15
15 per year but expires in 5 years
But limited to certain areas

75 schools in any 5-year period.
Not more than 15 opened per year
460 and not more than 50 charters issued after
July 1, 2015 can be granted for schools located
in a city with a population of 1 million or more.
100 schools per authorizer and its DOE approving
up to 20 schools per year
Up to 5 if county pop < 500K and no
more than 1 per year in single school district.
35
Continued on the next page
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Table 2.A1 – Continued from the previous page
State

Law Year

Cap

Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington

1996
1998
1998
2012

Yes
No
No
Yes

Wisconsin
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kentucky
West Virginia
Vermont

1993
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Yes

Description of Cap
305 new per year starting 2019
A maximum of 40 charter schools may be established
over a 5-year period, starting in 2016. Not more
than 8 per year
Cap on the number that an authorizer may oversee
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Appendix L
Table 2.A2. First Stage Estimates for Drinking - Effects of
Charter School Exposure in the County of Birth on Exposure
in the County of Residence
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.908*** 0.890*** 0.816*** 0.816***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.028) (0.029)

Coverage [0,1]
F-Statistic
Observations

(5)

0.734*** 0.706*** 0.687*** 0.682***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047)
7,724
12,482

4,568
12,482

822
12,482

809
12,482

317
12,482

221
12,482

182
12,482

203
12,482

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), race (Black, White, and Hispanic), education (high school graduates, some
college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY
cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the
year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county
fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county
time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1,
**p<.05, ***p<.01
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Appendix M
Table 2.A3. First Stage Estimates for Smoking - Effects of
Charter School Exposure in the County of Birth on Exposure
in the County of Residence
Years of Charter School Exposure Proportion of Students in Charter
in County of Residence [0,12]
School in County of Residence [0,1]
(1)
Years [0,12]

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.919*** 0.907*** 0.819*** 0.819***
-0.01 (0.011) (0.030) (0.030)

Coverage [0,1]
F-Statistic
Observations

(5)

0.758*** 0.715*** 0.703*** 0.696***
(0.037) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044)
9,347
11,156

6,440
11,156

768
11,156

753
11,156

413
11,156

262
11,156

220
11,156

251
11,156

Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. The regressions include gender
(male/female), race (Black, White, and Hispanic), education (high school graduates, some
college, and college graduates or better), a dummy for birth county availability, and NLSY
cohort fixed effect. Additionally, for the specifications in columns (2) and (6), we add the
year of survey and birth cohort fixed effects. In columns (3) and (7), we also add county
fixed effects. Finally, for the results in columns (4) and (8), the specifications control county
time-varying characteristics by including poverty rate and unemployment rate. *p<.1,
**p<.05, ***p<.01
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